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Abstract 
 
Exploring the Role of the Self in the Islamic-Western Human Rights Discourse: 
 
A Comparative Examination of Foundational Texts by Key Scholars from the 
Shī‘ī-Muslim and Western Philosophical Tradition - ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, Zayn al-
‘Ābidīn, Søren Kierkegaard and Immanuel Kant 
 
The goal of my thesis is to explore the role of the self in the current Islamic-Western 
discourse on human rights. This discourse is about whether the Islamic and Western 
worldviews on human rights are compatible with each other. It is my contention that the 
dominant voices in this discourse that aim to reform Islamic human rights or find ways 
for it to engage with Western human rights are primarily legal. I aim to shift the 
discourse and consider the way in which the concept of the self can play a role in 
informing this discourse but more importantly, offer a potential framework by which 
human rights are understood and implemented. Here, the self becomes a unifying 
concept for both worldviews and offers a different line of enquiry for the discourse. 
 
I aim to do this by basing my thesis on keys works of four scholars from the Shī‘ī-
Muslim and Western philosophical tradition. These are Nahj al-Balāgha (Peak of 
Eloquence), which contains the sermons, letters and sayings of the first Shī‘ī Imām and 
cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Muḥammad, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib; Risālat al-Ḥuqūq  
(Treatise of Rights) by Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, the fourth Shī‘ī Imām and great grandson of 
Prophet Muḥammad; Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses by the Danish philosopher, Søren 
Kierkegaard and finally, The Metaphysics of Morals by the German philosopher, 
Immanuel Kant. 
 
By engaging in a comparative analysis of these texts, I aim to construct a role for the self 
that is appropriate for the human rights discourse and introduce a framework to access it. 
I argue that human beings from whatever religious background they originate need a 
way to understand their identity, personhood and the rights they claim for. This is 
particularly important today where human rights are not merely legal and political 
entities but show the endless empowerment of human beings to demand whichever right 
they wish for. This is dangerous as there is a lack of enforcement machinery on 
curtailing this empowerment which can lead to pursuing base desires through rights as 
well as causing harm to others. Thus, this thesis aims to carve out a practical framework 
for the self that can be sieved through human rights in order to help solve human rights 
conflicts, break the oppositional discourse between ‘Islām’ and the ‘West’ as well as 
bring the intellectual traditions of Shī‘ī-Muslim and Western philosophy closer together. 
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Introduction: Context, Aims, Figures and Texts 
 
1. Context and Aims: Why Have I Chosen to Write this Thesis? 
 
“The erosion of tradition and the collapse of accepted religious belief leaves us without 
a telos, a sanctiﬁed notion of humanity’s potential. Bereft of a sacred project, we have 
only a mystiﬁed image of a frail and fallible humanity no longer capable of becoming 
godlike.”1 
 
Can religions really offer human beings creative ethical frameworks in the face of 
modernity which deconstructs the self leaving it disengaged from tradition? My thesis is 
defined by this question because I intend to focus on how Shī‘ī-Islām and the Western 
philosophical tradition can offer the seeds to construct a practical framework by which 
an individual’s self can be accessed, understood and applied within the domain of 
human rights. Why is this important? Charles Taylor argues modernity has caused an 
internal displacement within human beings resulting in a “titanic change in our western 
civilization.”2 This change involves moving from a simple reality that was part-
Christian, part-pagan, “to one in which almost no one is capable of this, but all see their 
option as one among many. We all learn to navigate between two standpoints: an 
‘engaged’ one in which we live as best we can the reality our standpoint opens us to; and 
a ‘disengaged’ one in which we are able to see ourselves as occupying one standpoint 
among a range of possible ones, with which we have in various ways to coexist.”3 What 
Taylor means by the move to choose different options is a worldview in which religion 
plays an inferior role in public society and in private life it is only one of the many 
options in which to view the nature of the world. Taylor’s focus is how people in 
Christendom, “lived naïvely within a theistic construal  to one in which we all shunt 
between two stances, in which everyone’s construal shows up as such; and in which 
moreover, unbelief has become for many the major default option.”4 Taylor identifies 
three layers to this disengagement from religion as a whole which leads to his notion of 
the secular age. 
 
                                                          
1
 Lindholm, Charles., Charisma (Oxford: Wiley–Blackwell, 1993), p. 11. 
2
 Taylor, Charles., A Secular Age (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 12. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid, p. 14. 
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The first layer is characterised by the withdrawal of the religious worldview from the 
public sphere. This is a move away from transcendental reality to one which is world-
orientated and reduces the role of the mystical and spiritual in people’s lives. Moreover, 
in a transcendental reality, all sciences subscribe to the same worldview. They are 
unified by the same ethical and transcendental goals. In a secular worldview, however, 
all sciences are free to follow their own worldview and epistemology of the world. The 
second layer involves the decline in religious practice and the rise of individualism over 
communal bonds. People are less bound by communal and familial structures and are 
driven more by their own personal choices. The third layer, according to Taylor, is the 
way in which people conceive of social order. Religion is no longer a default status in 
people’s lives nor does it have to play a role in public society. Rather religion is one 
option amongst many in which to understand the world. Whilst people are free to choose 
their own faith, the decline of importance given to religion has resulted in the loss of a 
pivot or centre by which we can view our lives and the cosmos as a whole. The self, 
therefore, is left without a cohesive worldview of the cosmos i.e a cosmos that was 
cohesive precisely because it was formulated by religion, its doctrines and practices.5 In 
this context, a secular age is, “when self-sufﬁcing humanism becomes a widely available 
option, which it never was in the ancient world, where only a small minority of the élite 
which was itself a minority espoused it.”6 
 
In light of Taylor’s comments, our cosmos today is created by technological 
advancement, celebrity culture, corporatism and “managerialism”7 that in some respects, 
replace the worldview offered by religion and hinder an individual’s personal connection 
with his/her self. Here, our human rights culture empowers human beings to pursue their 
claims as prima facie rational agents that deserve to enhance their dignity in accordance 
with whatever social and moral vision they follow. Rights, therefore, become tools by 
which human beings can negotiate their immoral desires rather than acting as 
foundational moral codes. This is because “modernity does not just enthrone the 
individual. It is the epoch of the free reign of will and its darker companion – desire.”8 
                                                          
5
 Ibid, pp. 299 - 322. 
6
 Ibid, p. 19. 
7
 A term extensively used by Richard Roberts to denote the manipulation and imposition by human 
resources management on the self. See: Roberts, Richard., Religion, Theology and the Human 
Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) as well as his recent article, ‘Contemplation 
and the ‘Performative Absolute’: Submission and Identity in Managerial Modernity’, Journal of 
Management, Spirituality & Religion, 9:1 (2012), pp. 9-29. 
8
 Douzinas, Costas., Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism 
(Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), p. 34. 
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Desire in itself is not a negative quality in a human being but rather if it is not nurtured 
or guided, it can bring out the worst qualities in human beings; instead of positive 
desires like yearning for excellence or harmony, baser desires such as greed and 
domination can drive human identities.9 The fundamental aim of human rights is to 
remind human beings of their natural moral bonds with each other. However, in our 
current climate, human rights can be regarded as a garb for both individuals and states to 
terrorise others in order to advance personal and political agendas.10 Moreover, they 
reverse the purpose of human rights from restraining individuals to giving them the 
power to promote their rights.  Human rights then become independent claims of human 
beings which can rise above legal systems, Muslim or Western.  
 
My question, which runs throughout this thesis, is how can any human rights be 
protected and implemented correctly when human beings do not understand the source 
of their rights and the manner in which to use them? How can any legal system nurture 
or control an individual that decides to subvert the state by initiating violence against 
innocent human beings? What happens when a state unilaterally invades a country to 
promote human rights – what mechanism is able to nurture a greater self-awareness in 
those leaders so that human rights are used ethically? All of these questions are 
significant because the answer lies in tackling the root notion of the self. I believe the 
task should be to create a practical framework for the self which allows human beings to 
understand their own nature and the rights-claims which they intend to advance better. 
By accomplishing this, human beings would be able to evaluate what kind of moral 
codes they wish to live by, how they form real identities driven by a vision of 
transcendence and a deeper understanding of where human rights come from and how 
they should be implemented. Previously this connection was offered by religions such as 
Islām, Judaism and Christianity in providing a salvational God-centric worldview but in 
our arguably human-centric world, who and what offer this connection? This question is 
significant because we are witnessing a trend towards “believing without belonging”11 
and a shift from organised religion to “spiritualities of life.”12  
                                                          
9
 For discussion on different forms of desires including ill-informed desires, irrational desires, base 
desires, poorly cultivated desires, pointless desires, artiﬁcially aroused desires, and the desire to be 
badly oﬀ, see: Heathwood, Chris., ‘The Problem of Defective Desires’, Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 83, No. 4 (Dec 2005), pp. 487 – 504. 
10
 See Douzinas: Human Rights and Empire, pp. 51 – 90. 
11
 See: Davie, Grace., Religion in Britain Since 1945: Believing Without Belonging (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 1994). 
12
 See: Heelas, Paul., Spiritualities of Life: New Age Romanticism and Consumptive Capitalism 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008). 
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This is in addition to the apparent duality between religions and non-religious 
worldviews such as ‘Islām’ and ‘the West.’ These worldviews are pitted against each 
other in order to create a dichotomy between Muslims and non-Muslims as well as a 
barrier against the creative amalgamation of Islamic and Western ideas. Anver Emon has 
commented on this dichotomy arguing, 
 
“Well before the onset of the twenty-first century, academic and popular debates have 
either implicitly or explicitly positioned Muslims, Islām, and Islamic law as the 
paradigmatic “Other” to be managed and regulated through policies of multicultural and 
human rights. This is especially the case in societies identified by such labels as western, 
liberal, democratic, or some combination thereof.”13 
 
This above attitude has resulted in an aggressive discourse between some Muslim and 
non-Muslims scholars on the issue of human rights which is seen as non-existent or 
minimal within the Islamic tradition but firmly present and successful within the 
Western philosophical tradition.14 This kind of discourse is an oppositional one which 
does not eradicate misconceptions in both Islamic and Western understandings of human 
rights and moreover, restricts the discourse to law and politics. 
 
What I aim to do in this thesis is to break this oppositional discourse and attempt to 
provide an answer as to what the “telos, a sanctified notion of humanity’s potential” 
could be for human beings using key scholars from Shī‘ī-Islām and the Western 
philosophical tradition – namely, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, Søren Kierkegaard 
and Immanuel Kant. I believe this telos lies in constructing a practical framework for the 
self that attaches a different set of rights to it by first conceiving of the self as an 
identifiable and observable entity in everyday affairs and secondly, to attach a unique set 
of rights to one’s biological organs that impose duties on the self. This interaction 
between one’s biological organs and the self enable greater self-awareness and a 
constant evaluation of how rights are implemented in the world. For example, my hand 
has a right over me in order that I do not terrorise and correspondingly, I owe a duty to 
my hand to use it peacefully. This highly personalised relationship between rights and 
                                                          
13
 Emon, Anver M., Religious Pluralism and Islamic Law: Dhimmis and Others in the Empire of Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 1 
14
 For a thorough analysis of these attitudes, see Sachedina, Abdulaziz., “The Clash of Universalisms: 
Religious and Secular in Human Rights”, The Hedgehog Review 9, no.3 (2007), pp. 49 – 62. 
13 
 
biological organs has not been explored as a potential framework by which to shift the 
Islamic-Western human discourse from a social contract perspective of rights to one that 
is rooted in a kind of a personal contract, the latter of which I term as the ‘Internal 
Human Contract.’ By setting the Islamic-Western human rights discourse as the 
overarching context for this thesis, I can carve out a role for the self in the understanding 
and implementation of rights, amalgamate law with ethics, philosophy, metaphysics and 
theology and construct a harmonised and universal approach to rights that is rooted in 
the entity of the self. 
 
I aim to accomplish this by ‘upbuilding’15 ideas present within four texts that stem from 
the Shī‘ī-Muslim and Western philosophical tradition. These are Nahj al-Balāgha (Peak 
of Eloquence), which contains the sermons, letters and sayings of the first Shī‘ī Imām 
and cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Muḥammad, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib; Risālat al-Ḥuqūq 
(Treatise of Rights) by Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, the fourth Shī‘ī Imām and great grandson of 
Prophet Muḥammad; Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses by the Danish philosopher, Søren 
Kierkegaard and finally, The Metaphysics of Morals by the German philosopher, 
Immanuel Kant. ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn were Muslims, specifically 
Imāms (leaders), who are associated with the Shī‘ī-Muslim tradition which emphasises 
the explicit nomination of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib by Prophet Muḥammad as his rightful 
successor at Ghadīr al-Khumm (pond of Khumm) in 10/632. His teachings form the 
bedrock of Shi‘ism today, which the remaining eleven Shī‘ī Imāms followed, including 
Zayn al-‘Ābidīn.16 Kierkegaard originated from the Christian tradition and the influence 
of the religion on his philosophical ideas is significantly observable in his works, 
particularly in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses.17 Kant also originated from a Christian 
                                                          
15
 ‘Upbuilding’ is a term often associated with Kierkegaard to denote the capacity and authority of the 
reader to reflect on a piece of writing in order to transform his/her existence and creatively construct 
ideas. See: Kierkegaard, Søren., Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses (trans. Hong, Edna and Hong, 
Howard) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
16
 For a concise summary of the doctrines and teachings of Shi‘ism, see Shomali, Mohammed., Shī‘ī 
Islām: Origins, Faith and Practices (London: ICAS Press, 2003) and Tabatabāī, Mohammed., Shī‘īte 
Islām. (State University of New York Press, 1979). For more a detailed investigation of its history and 
practices, see: Halm, Heinz., Shi‘ism  (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004). And, for a 
specific analysis of the formation of Shi‘ism within the context of aḥadīth (narrations), see: Newman, 
Andrew J., The Formative Period of Twelver Shi‘ism: ḥadīth as a Discourse between Qum and 
Baghdad (Taylor & Francis Group, 2010). 
17
 For an analysis of how Kierkegaard uses and reinterprets Christian doctrines, see Moore, Charles 
E., Provocations: Spiritual Writings of Kierkegaard (Farmington: Plough Publishing House, 2007), 
Podmore, Simon D., ‘Kierkegaard as Physician of the Soul: On Self-Forgiveness and Despair’, 
Journal of Psychology and Theology 37, no.3 (2009), pp. 174 – 185 and Heinecken, Martin J., 
‘Kierkegaard as Christian’, Journal of Religion 37, no. 1 (Jan. 1957), pp. 20 – 30. 
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background and despite reinterpreting and perhaps setting aside Christian doctrines in 
his works, it can be argued the religion had a distinct impact on his thought-processes.18  
 
The value of the aforementioned texts is that they contain the seeds for the ideas which I 
wish to amalgamate into a practical framework for the self within the context of human 
rights. There is a great likeness of ideas within these four texts which merits comparison, 
despite them being written from different religious backgrounds and time periods. The 
key points of comparison are the nature and role of the self in ethical dilemmas in the 
texts of Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses and Nahj al-Balāgha and the framework given 
to the self by Kant and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn in The Metaphysics of Morals and Risālat al-
Ḥuqūq respectively. By comparing the first two texts by Kierkegaard and ‘Alī b. Abī 
Ṭālib together, I will arrive at a foundational understanding of what the self is and how it 
can be regarded as a practical entity and not just a metaphysical one. With that 
understanding I can proceed to apply the framework initiated by Kant and Zayn al-
‘Ābidīn where they attach rights to the self through a person’s biological organs or 
formulate duties to curtail baser biological desires such as avarice and lust. When these 
ideas are combined, a practical framework can be constructed for the self in the Islamic-
Western human rights discourse. 
 
The secondary aims of the thesis are accomplished by the comparative examination 
above. They are to bring the intellectual ideas in Shī‘ī-Islām and Western philosophy 
closer together using the aforementioned four texts. In addition to this, the thesis aims to 
give importance to the four texts which have arguably been understudied in both Islamic 
and Western scholarship, particularly within the context of human rights. The use of the 
four texts to upbuild philosophical concepts would further show the creative potential of 
the Islamic tradition to not only evaluate its position within the field of human rights but 
also the approach of the Western philosophical tradition towards human rights. Here, 
Islām’s intellectual ideas would be presented in a universal capacity with the capability 
                                                          
18
 For an analysis of Christian influences on Kant’s philosophy, see: Benner, Drayton C., ‘Immanuel 
Kant's Demythologization of Christian Theories of Atonement in Religion within the Limits of 
Reason Alone’, Evangelical Quarterly 79, no. 2 (April, 2007), pp. 99-111 and Garrett, Green., ‘Kant 
as Christian Apologist: The Failure of Accomodationist Theology’, Pro Ecclesia 4, no. 3 (1995), p. 
302. There is also a useful set of lectures by Onora O’Neill entitled, ‘Kant on Reason and Religion’, 
published as part of the Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1995-6 by the University of Utah. See: 
http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/oneill97.pdf (Accessed 22nd December 2012). 
Finally, for analysis on the similarities and differences between Kierkegaard and Kant themselves 
(which is not the subject of this thesis), see Williams, Marc., ‘Kant and Kierkegaard on Faith: In 
Service to Morality and a Leap for the Absurd’, Logos 2, no. 1 (Fall 2004), pp. 82 - 97 and Green, 
Ronald., Kierkegaard and Kant: the Hidden Debt (Albany: New York, 1992). 
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of working in conjunction with the Western philosophical tradition. Finally, there are 
further implications that one can draw from the framework that I have constructed in 
chapter four for the areas of international law, bioethics and education but these will be 
commented upon in my conclusion. 
 
2. Structure and Methodology of the Thesis 
 
The key objective of this thesis is to explore the role of the self in the Islamic-Western 
human rights discourse through a comparative examination of Shī‘ī-Muslim and 
Western philosophical texts, as stated above. In order to accomplish this, this 
introduction will give an outline of the historical background, authenticity and key 
features of the four texts I am using, their points of comparison and the main ideas 
which I intend to use to construct a practical framework for the self. In chapter one, I 
will examine the nature of the Islamic-Western human rights discourse by analysing the 
arguments of contemporary scholarly voices who have attempted to unravel the points of 
tension between the two worldviews. Here, I will tackle the current approaches used to 
view human rights by key Muslim scholars which consists of the dialogue, spiritual, 
legal and jurisprudential perspectives. I will then argue why I believe these perspectives 
are limited and proceed to carve out a role for the self in this discourse by showing what 
the self could potentially contribute to the nature and implementation of human rights. 
This will provide a necessary context for chapter two where I begin my comparative 
examination of Shī‘ī-Muslim and Western philosophical texts.  
 
Chapter two is devoted to comparing the nature and role of the self in spiritual and 
ethical dilemmas as understood by Kierkegaard in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses and 
‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib in Nahj al-Balāgha. I will analyse how both authors conceive of the 
self as not just a metaphysical and spiritual entity but one that is necessary for resolving 
personal ethical dilemmas. The transition they make is crucial for my thesis because it 
demonstrates that the self can be looked at practically and therefore offers the first 
window by which we can regard the self as relevant in our worldly affairs and situations. 
This will provide me with a foundational understanding of the self and a way in which 
the self can be contextualised within human rights situations. 
 
In chapter three, I engage in a comparative analysis of The Metaphysics of Morals and 
Risālat al-Ḥuqūq. Having understood what the self is in chapter two, it is necessary to 
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see how Kant and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn provide a framework to the self by attaching certain 
rights to it which are related to a person’s biological organs or at the least, biological 
desires. The value of both authors is that they look at the self within the discipline of law 
and practical ethics. This is important for me because it gives me the next window by 
which the self could potentially operate within the domain of law and thereby within the 
scope of human rights. Chapters two and three, therefore, provide the theoretical 
foundations of the thesis. 
 
In chapter four, I combine the ideas which I extracted in chapters two and three and 
systematise them in a practical framework for the self, which I have named as the 
‘Internal Human Contract.’ The Internal Human Contract is a framework that uses the 
definitions of the self in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses and Nahj al-Balāgha and the 
concept of attaching rights to the self from The Metaphysics of Morals and Risālat al-
Ḥuqūq. The end result is a mechanism by which a human being can engage with his/her 
self through his/her biological organs and develop a greater awareness of how to behave 
and implement rights. Chapter four therefore substantiates the potential of my four 
chosen texts to offer universal ideas that can break the oppositional discourse between 
Islām and the West and harmonise some of the intellectual ideas within Shī‘ī-Islām and 
Western philosophy. My conclusion will summarise my key arguments as well as 
introduce some potential offshoot strands of research that can be pursued after this 
thesis.  
 
Therefore, the four chapters directly correlate with my thesis title which is to explore the 
role of the self in the Islamic-Western human rights discourse using key texts from the 
Shī‘ī-Muslim and Western philosophical tradition. The four texts provide the 
cornerstone of this thesis and that is why I am also using a seminary (hawza) mode of 
analysis in my arguments. Muslim and Christian seminaries both consider the usage and 
analysis of texts and words as central to conceptual development and this tradition has 
continued till the present in seminaries throughout the world.19 This is particularly the 
case in the Shī‘ī-Muslim tradition where many years are spent studying classical texts by 
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 For the history and philosophy of Christian education, see Anthony, Michael J & Benson, Warren 
S., Exploring the History & Philosophy of Christian Education: Principles for the 21st Century 
(Michigan: Kregel Publications, 2003) and Astley, Jeff., The Philosophy of Christian Religious 
Education (Birmingham, Alabama: Religious Education Press, 1994). For a specific re-evaluation of 
Christian seminary education, see Calian, Carnegie Samuel., The Ideal Seminary: Pursuing 
Excellence in Theological Education (Kentucky: John Knox Press, 2002) and Warford, Malcolm L 
(ed)., Revitalizing Practice: Collaborative Models for Theological Faculties (New York: Peter Lang 
Publishing, 2008). 
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notable scholars to complete the levels of muqaddamāt (preliminary stage), ṣutuḥ 
(intermediate stage) and finally, baḥth al-khārij (final advanced stage) to become a faqīh 
(jurist).20 However, some have argued that despite the value of this approach, it needs to 
be widened to include newer subjects and a more independent level of analysis that does 
not always require close recourse to the text.21 As such, I am also using Kierkegaard’s 
technique of upbuilding to creatively combine ideas from the texts (while attempting to 
stay faithful to the authors’ understanding of the ideas which I am extracting) and 
construct my own framework for the self. This could be termed as a “critical caretaker” 
approach which attempts to remain true to the core notions of the religion whilst trying 
to critically recontexualise them.22 Thus, both in the substance and style of this thesis, I 
aim to show how Islamic and Western worldviews can come together in a positive spirit 
when thinking about the self and human rights.23 I will now define and outline the 
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 For information on the development and nature of the Shī‘ī seminary tradition, see: Ende, Werner 
and Brunner, Rainer., The Twelver Shī‘a in Modern Times (Leiden: Brill, 2001) and Litvak, Meir., 
Shī‘ī Scholars of Nineteenth Century Iraq: The Ulama of Najaf and Karbala (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). There are also useful chapters devoted to the educational processes of Shī‘ī 
seminary education – see: Mottahedeh, Roy., ‘Traditional Shī‘īte Education in Qom’ in Rorty, Amelie 
Oksenberg (ed)., Philosophers on Education: New Historical Perspectives (London: Routledge, 
1998),  pp. 449 – 455., Bahrululoom, Sayyid Fadhil. ‘The Development of Shī‘ī Scholarship before 
and after Mirza Shirza and his Intellectual Legacy in Samarra’ in Panjwani, Imranali (ed)., The Shī‘a 
of Samarra: The Heritage and Politics of a Community in Iraq (London: I.B Tauris, 2012), pp. 107 - 
125 and Browers, Michaelle & Kurzman, Charles (eds)., An Islamic Reformation? (Oxford: 
Lexington Books, 2003), pp. 79 – 97. 
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for reform. See: Walbridge, Linda S (ed)., The Most Learned of the Shī‘a: The Institution of the Marja 
Taqlid (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 161 – 183 and pp. 205 – 16 and Moussavi, 
Ahmed Kazemi., Religious Authority in Shi’ite Islam – from the Office of Mufti to the Institution of 
Marja’ (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1996). See also 
the recently funded three-year project entitled,  ‘Clerical Authority in Shiite Islām: Culture and 
Learning in the Seminaries of Iraq and Iran’ (2009-12) by the British Academy, British Society for 
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22
 The term “critical caretaker” was discussed by Atalia Omer as a viable approach in the study of 
religion. The approach denotes finding a balance where, “the religious scholar must both recognize 
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gatherings that have compared Shī‘ī and Christian seminary modes of education. See: 
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various aspects of this thesis which involve the nature of the Islamic-Western human 
rights discourse and the role of the self within it, personal backgrounds of Kierkegaard, 
‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, Kant and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn and the comparative value of their texts. 
This is in order to specifically clarify how I am using the figures and texts in this thesis. 
 
3. The Islamic-Western Human Rights Discourse and the Role of the Self 
within it 
 
The mention of the term ‘human rights’ evokes several meanings because of the way in 
which it is conceived and implemented. The rational agency, moral worth, creative 
potential, natural dignity, contractual obligations and innate commonness of all human 
beings are amongst the reasons why human beings are entitled to rights. At the same 
time, human rights need to be enforced and so they become legal and socio-political 
entities actualised by state machinery. Here, human rights refer to the political 
aspirations of a government in promoting a particular moral vision, political 
mobilisation of human beings, citizenship, welfare, rights education, rights claims and 
ultimately, creating a vision of society in which human beings would be happy to 
inhabit. This makes the subject of human rights diverse because it relates to law, politics, 
ethics, sociology, history, philosophy, metaphysics and religion. All of these areas have 
a relevant voice in the construction of human rights precisely because we are dealing 
with the very nature and entitlements of human beings.  
 
However, when we mention the phrase, ‘Islamic-Western Human Rights Discourse’, we 
move from abstractness to concrete ideas about what human rights are in ‘Islām’ and in 
the ‘West.’ These two notions, often juxtaposed against each other, relate to broad 
interpretations about rights within their own traditions and in relation to each other. The 
subject of this thesis is the latter; I am examining how Muslim scholars have responded 
to the notion of human rights, a predominantly Western term, as well as criticism by 
Western scholars towards Islām and its scholars about the way in which human rights 
are regarded. At the same, the West has been criticised by Muslim scholars in the way it 
has conceived and used human rights. Thus, there is a tension between how Islām and 
the West deal with human rights situations from their religious, philosophical, legal and 
political traditions. The mere mention of ‘Islām’ and the ‘West’ throws up 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Catholic-Shi’a Engagement: Reason & Faith in Theory and Practice (Hertfordshire: Melisende, 
2006) and A Catholic-Shi’a Dialogue: Ethics in Today’s Society (Hertfordshire: Melisende, 2008). 
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generalisations and misconceptions because we are attempting to confine diverse 
interpretations in two broad terms. I do not wish to pursue this generalised enquiry but 
for the sake of brevity, I am using ‘Islamic-Western’ for one reason. There does exist an 
animosity between the two apparently divided worlds on the issue of human rights 
(which will be explained in chapter one) and perhaps the only way to unravel the 
dilemmas that exist is to analyse the very discourse itself which pits two worldviews 
against each other.  
 
I will tackle this discourse in chapter one but briefly, I aim to explore the role of the self 
in Islamic-Western human rights discourse as a tool which has the potential to shift the 
dialogue from one of animosity to constructiveness and secondly, shift the paradigm of 
human rights in both worldviews. The paradigm of human rights which currently exists 
in both worldviews is based on viewing rights as legal entities. In Islām, the subject of 
uṣūl al-fiqh (the principles of jurisprudence) is the primary framework in which human 
rights are currently discussed, at least by Muslim reformist scholars. The rights available 
to lay Muslims depend on the interpretation of the Qur’ān and sunnah (tradition) by 
jurists (fuqahā) through the tool of ijtihād.24 These rights are also affected by the 
political attitudes of a Muslim state. Yet Muslims who live in the West or in secular 
societies also independently understand and claim their human rights by the mechanisms 
provided by their government.25 In the West, human rights have originated within the 
fold of international law and are regarded as legal, moral and political entities that are 
capable of being interpreted by jurists and lawyers, advanced by politicians and 
governments and claimed by lay citizens in the areas of free speech, right to privacy, 
right to life and many more. Despite the difference in the conception of human rights in 
Islām and the West, the fundamental similarity is in their use of law and politics in 
which to view human rights, along with philosophical or scriptural argumentation to 
justify these rights. 
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 In Shī‘ī fiqh, Bāqir al-Ṣadr has defined ijtihād as: “the effort to derive Islamic laws from their 
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Closed?’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Mar., 1984),  pp. 3-41.  
25
 For an analysis of specific cases illustrating how Muslims are claiming their human rights within 
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In my view, however, human rights are deeper than law. Rights relate to the desires, 
aspirations and identities of human beings which means the lens in which to view rights 
must come from a perspective which tackles the very foundation from which rights 
originate. There is nothing new in this statement because as I have indicated, human 
rights deal with the nature of human beings. However, the marked difference with this 
thesis is the explicit use of the self as lens in which to view human rights and more 
importantly, to explore what it can contribute to the meaning, framework and practical 
development of rights. The concept of the self as a notion indicating on the very identity 
and attributes of a human being is often regarded as a philosophical, metaphysical, 
psychological, religious, theological and spiritual term that does not have practical value 
in advancing human rights. It does have a value in giving us ideas of where human rights 
come from but in terms of the implementation of human rights, whether from the Islamic 
or Western worldview, the self has not been used as a legitimate lens by which human 
rights can be practically understood.26 ‘Practically’ is a key term in this thesis because I 
am making a transition from the self as a philosophical concept to a practical one that is 
capable of offering a useful system to view human rights, just as uṣūl al-fiqh or 
international law are used as a system by which to analyse human rights. Thus, when 
viewing the Islamic-Western human rights discourse, I am arguing that the concept of 
the self is capable of reforming the way in which human rights are looked at in both 
systems, thereby rendering the self as a source of unity and mutual dialogue than 
opposition. Moreover, the thesis will attempt to lay the seeds for the kind of framework 
that could be used to implement human rights using the self so that the task of 
understanding human rights does not remain at the level of dialogue only. 
 
4. The Nature of a Comparative Shī‘ī-Muslim and Western Philosophical 
Perspective 
 
I have chosen to engage with the Islamic-Western human rights discourse from a 
comparative Shī‘ī-Muslim and Western philosophical perspective because the texts I 
have selected have similar ideas that can be compared with each other and used 
creatively to inform the discourse. I have chosen the term ‘Shī‘ī-Muslim’ to denote the 
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influence of Shi‘ism on the religion and practice of Islām and its potential to interact 
with the Western philosophical tradition. Being major spiritual and scholastic figures, 
‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn give us a firm insight into the Shī‘ī intellectual 
tradition through their ideas. Likewise, I have chosen the term ‘Western philosophical’ 
to denote the intellectual ideas through Kierkegaard and Kant (who both resided in 
Europe) whose works can be compared with the thoughts of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and Zayn 
al-‘Ābidīn.  
 
There is also an underlying religious worldview which permeates the texts’ intellectual 
themes with ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn writing within the Muslim worldview 
which regards the Qur’an and the figure of Prophet Muhammad as foundational in 
analysing the God-human relationship; Kierkegaard and Kant stem from a Christian 
background which holds the Bible and the figure of Jesus as central in the God-human 
relationship but both figures radically reinterpret what Christianity means to them in 
their own unique ways (with Kant relegating it outside of the domain of philosophy), 
which I will make reference to throughout the thesis. Islām and Christianity are 
fundamentally united as Abrahamic religions that historically can be traced back to 
Prophet Ibrahīm (Abraham). Ibrahīm, a monotheist, connects the two religions as the 
belief in One God is foundational to both them (though the Christian doctrine of the 
Trinity is a variation of the concept of Oneness espoused in Islām).27 Ibrahīm was the 
father of Prophet Ismāīl (Ishmael) and Prophet Isḥāq (Isaac); Prophet Muḥammad and 
Prophet ‘Īsa (Jesus Christ) were descendants of Ismāīl and Isḥāq respectively, which 
means that Muḥammad and Jesus were distant cousins from the same biological and 
monotheistic lineage.28 In both religions, revelation plays the central role of moral, 
social and legislative guidance for believers. Muslims argue the Qur’ān is the unaltered 
word of Allah revealed to Prophet Muḥammad over a period of 23 years; Christians 
argue the Bible is the central scripture of guidance for them. Prophetic teachings are also 
an importance source of guidance. In Islām, this is known as the sunnah (tradition) 
where the authenticated sayings (aqwāl), actions (afāl) and tacit approval (taqrīr) of 
Prophet Muḥammad and the Twelve Imāms have probative and legal force (in Sunni 
Islām, Prophet Muḥammad’s companions, Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, Uthmān as well as ‘Alī b. 
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 For a comparative analysis of monotheism in both faiths, see the conference compilation: Kochler, 
Hans (ed)., The Concept of Monotheism in Islām and Christianity (Austria: Wilhelm Braumuller, 
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 For an examination of the historical relationship between Muḥammad and Christ, see: Robinson, 
Neal., Christ in Islām and Christianity (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991). 
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Abī Ṭālib have legal authority). In Christianity, the sayings and conduct of Jesus are 
regarded as the most important source of guidance after the Bible. Finally, the concept 
of the soul in both religions plays a vital role in the creation of human beings. Human 
beings are meant to cultivate their souls to become spiritually pure servants of God. 
Islām and Christianity, therefore, have core points of comparison which have been key 
influences for the four figures and permeate their work.29 
 
What is also important is that just as Islām has impacted the world through its religious 
ideas and intellectual contributions, so has Christianity.30 It is not the task of this thesis 
to recount the historical impact of both traditions but rather to see how key texts within 
both histories have the capability of providing a mutual source of dialogue and 
intellectual creativity in Islamic-Western human rights discourse. This will help to 
highlight the commonness of intellectual ideas present in Shī‘ī-Islām and the Western 
philosophical tradition rather than using a doctrinal approach which perhaps presents 
scripture and theology as the first lens by which to view the two traditions.31 I have 
chosen not to do this because I believe scripture and theology immediately constrain the 
two traditions within a set of doctrines that define their role in society for a particular 
group of people i.e Muslims or Christians. Rather, the philosophical ideas advanced by 
major figures within Shī‘ī-Islām and Western philosophy show what the two traditions 
are capable of contributing to members outside of their belief systems and to the world 
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as a whole. This goes beyond a comparative exploration and emphasises the value of a 
creative exploration using key texts within the two intellectual traditions.32  
 
5. The Background of my Chosen Figures 
 
Before deliberating on why I have chosen to compare the aforementioned texts and their 
points of intersection, it is important to give a brief background to the lives of these 
figures. The purpose here is not biographical; it is to highlight those aspects of their lives 
which justify my comparative approach in this thesis. Differences are obvious – both in 
terms of the religions they held, the statuses they acquired in society as Imams or 
philosophers, time periods they lived in, audiences they appealed to and how they lived 
their personal lives but in amongst all of these areas, their similar concerns on the self, 
the nature of religion, what morality is and how it should be implemented, bring the 
lives of these four figures closer together. My methodology in this thesis involves 
comparing ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib with Kierkegaard and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn with Kant because in 
each comparison, the two figures have focused on similar ideas in their texts. It is 
common to take the route of comparing a Muslim philosopher (such as Mulla Ṣadra or 
al-Ghazāli) with a Western philosopher (such as Hegel or Hiedegger) and scholars may 
criticise my choice of comparing Shī‘ī Imams with Western philosophers. In my view, 
however, this is does not pose too much of a problem since I am comparing the texts of 
the Imams with the texts of Western philosophers – research of which is rare or non-
existent.33 This is a text-based thesis and so the similarities in the ideas of both sets of 
                                                          
32
 There is already notable research in the area of comparing Islām and Christianity and this thesis 
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Koylu, Mustafa., Muslim and Christian Reflections on Peace: Divine and Human Dimensions 
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Daou, Tamima., Shaykh Mufīd (London: Oneworld, 2005). The Ṣadra Islamic Philosophy Research 
Institute (SIPRIn) has also produced volume 3 on ‘Mulla Ṣadra and Comparative Studies’ (Tehran, 
2002) which includes numerous conferences papers comparing the thought of Mulla Ṣadra, the 17th 
Shī‘ī philosopher, to Heidegger, Leibniz, Kant and Whitehead. Moreover, I am not referring to the 
history and theology of the Shī‘ī school of thought which has been covered by authors such as 
Wilfred Madelung, Etan Kholberg and Moojan Momen. I am specifically referring to the teachings 
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texts are the crucial point of comparison. Moreover, our conception of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib 
or Zayn al-‘Ābidīn as Imams in a spiritual rather than scholastic sense depends on our 
perception of history and what their roles were.34 The same applies to Kierkegaard and 
Kant who although are predominantly regarded as philosophers also have a place within 
Christian scholarship as reinterpting Christian doctrines and contextualising them within 
moral philosophy.35 What I wish to do in this section is to simply show how the personal 
lives of these four figures can be brought closer together which offers a meaningful 
worldview by which a productive analysis of their texts can then take place.  
 
5.1.  ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and Kierkegaard 
 
‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib (24 b.h/600 – 40/661) was the first Shī‘ī Imām, 4th Rightly-Guided 
Muslim Caliph, cousin of Prophet Muḥammad and his son-in-law, having married the 
Prophet’s daughter, Lady Fāṭimah al-Zahrā (d. 11/632). He carries great spiritual 
significance for Shī‘ī Muslims and Sufis and is also respected by Sunni Muslims, 
particularly as he is a member of the Ahl al-Bayt (people of the house).36 It is perhaps 
easy to view ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib as a holy figure only relevant to Muslims rather than as an 
intellectual personality. However, his collection of sermons, sayings and letters in Nahj 
al-Balāgha show knowledge of law, ethics, scriptural hermeneutics, theology, 
metaphysics, philosophy and political philosophy. Whilst these areas may have been 
                                                                                                                                                                    
and works of the Twelve Imāms themselves and their contribution to knowledge and society. For 
example, despite the vastness of History of Islamic Philosophy by Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver 
Leaman (London: Routledge, 2003), only half a page is dedicated on p. 122 to the Shī‘ī Imāms’ 
contribution to philosophy. For recent contributions in the field of the teachings of the Twelve Imāms, 
see Lalani, Arzina., Early Shī‘ī Thought: The Teachings of Imām Muḥammad al-Bāqir (London: I.B 
Tauris, 2004), Shah-Kazemi, Reza., Justice and Remembrance: Introducing the Spirituality of Imām 
Ali (London: I.B Tauris, 2007) and Fatemi, Seyed Mohammed Ghari., ‘Autonomy, Euthanasia and the 
Right to Die with Dignity: A Comparison of Kantian Ethics and Shi
cite Teachings’, Islām & Christian 
Relations 18, 3 (2007), pp. 345 – 53, which deals with rights discourse and human dignity in Shī‘ī and 
Kantian thought. 
34 For an evaluation of how the Shī‘ī Imams were conceived by their followers, see: Modarressi, 
Hossein., Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shi’ite Islam: Abū Ja’far b. Qiba al-
Razi and his Contribution to Imamite Shi’ite Thought (Princeton: Darwin Press, Inc., 1993). I have 
also dealt with how Shī‘ī and wider Muslim scholarship conceive of the Twelve Shī‘ī Imāms, 
particularly the tenth to twelfth Shī‘ī Imāms, in my article: ‘The Compartmentalisation of Holy 
Figures: A Case Study on the Heritage of the Samarran Shī‘ī Imams’, World Journal of Islamic 
History and Civilization, vol. 1 (1) (2011), pp. 15-26. 
35
 See footnotes 17 and 18. 
36
 For biographical information on ‘‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, see: al-Mufīd, Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. al-
Nu’man, Kitāb al-Irshād - The Book of Guidance. Translated by Ian K. Howard (London: 
Muḥammadi Trust, 1981), pp. 1 - 267; Modarressi, Hossein., Tradition and Survival: A 
Bibliographical Survey of Early Shī‘īte Literature – Volume 1 (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), pp. 2 – 17 
and Jordac, George., The Voice of Human Justice (Scandinavia: Meraj Educational Publishers & 
Book Distributors, 2009). 
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understood in a more holistic capacity rather than as separate scientific disciplines, they 
nonetheless show that a so-called Imām is capable of having some relevance in wider 
scholarship. Certainly within the Shī‘ī worldview, the Twelve Imāms are not just 
regarded as spiritual guides but scholars as well and they cannot fulfil the function of an 
Imām without having taqwā (God-consciousness) and ‘ilm (knowledge).37  
 
Edward Gibbon (1737 – 1794) has commented on ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s multi-faceted 
personality stating, 
 
“The zeal and virtue of Ali were never outstripped by any recent proselyte.  He united 
the qualifications of a poet, a soldier, and a saint; his wisdom still breathes in a 
collection of moral and religious sayings; and every antagonist, in the combats of the 
tongue or of the sword, was subdued by his eloquence and valour.  From the first hour of 
his mission to the last rites of his funeral, the apostle was never forsaken by a generous 
friend, whom he delighted to name his brother, his vicegerent, and the faithful Aaron of 
a second Moses.”38  
 
More recently, Reza Shah-Kazemi has commented, 
 
“Our principal way of investigating and meditating upon the spirituality of Imām ‘Ali is 
to consider the corpus of teachings attributed to him…no other companion of the 
Prophet has anything approaching the corpus attributed to ‘Ali. Similarly, even if his 
foundational role in the development of a whole range of sciences be debatable – 
sciences such as jurisprudence (fiqh), theology (kalām), Qur’ānic exegesis (tafsīr), 
rhetoric (balāgha), grammar (naḥw) and calligraphy (khatt), the mystical knowledge 
associated with Sufism, as well as such arcane sciences as numerology (jafr) and 
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 For a discussion on the qualifications required to be an Imām, see: Momen, Moojan., An 
Introduction to Shī‘ī Islām: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi‘ism  (Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 1985), pp. 147 – 161; for a more esoteric analysis, see: Amir-Moezzi, Mohammed 
Ali., The Spirituality of Shī‘ī Islām – Beliefs and Practices (London: I.B Tauris, 2011) and Yasrebi, S. 
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 Gibbon, Edward., The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (London: Dent, 1911), volume 5, pp. 
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to practice”, Stubbe, Henry., An Account of the Rise and Progress of Mahometanism, (London: Luzac 
& Co, 1911), p. 77 – 78. 
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alchemy (al-kīmīya) – the fact that he is considered by later authorities in these fields as 
having provided the initial impetus for their sciences bespeaks the far-reaching and 
penetrating influence of both his formal teachings and personal radiance.”39 
 
The aforementioned interpretations of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib enable us to use him as an 
intellectual personality for the purposes of this thesis. Gibbon’s understanding of ‘Alī b. 
Abī Ṭālib as a diverse personality possessing traits of both a soldier and poet with the 
eloquence to express his thoughts allows me to tap into the scholarly aspect of his 
personality. This is substantiated by Shah-Kazemi’s specific analysis of ‘Alī b. Abī 
Ṭālib’s knowledge which ranges from jurisprudence to mystical knowledge. However 
we may wish to categorise or authenticate this knowledge, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib has inspired 
later scholars such as ‘urafā (mystics) and Sufis to develop ‘ilm al-‘irfān (the science of 
gnosis).40 Moreover, there is a distinct corpus of his teachings which delve into the 
nature of the self and as per Shah-Kazemi, the overall corpus of teachings attributed to 
‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib is unique to him; it is not matched by any other companion of Prophet 
Muḥammad.41 Thus, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib holds a privileged position within Islamic 
scholarship; Prophet Muḥammad is reported to have famously said, “I am the city of 
knowledge and ‘Alī is its gate.”42 This makes him crucially relevant as a scholarly 
personality and specifically as a figure that can contribute to our understanding of the 
self from the Islamic tradition. 
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 Shah-Kazemi, Reza., Justice and Remembrance – Introducing the Spirituality of Imām ‘Ali 
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Dagli, “Ali bin Abī Ṭālib and Sufism” (Tehran: Ṣadra Islamic Philosophy Research Institute, 2006)   
http://www.mullaṢadra.org/new_site/english/Paper%20Bank/Gnosis/Caner%20K_Dagli.htm#_ednref
2 (accessed 13
th
 December 2012). Reza Shah-Kazemi also makes explicit reference to this 
relationship in his article entitled “‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib” in Meri, Josef M. (ed), Medieval Islamic 
Civilization, An Encyclopaedia, (New York-London: Routledge, 2006), volume II, pp. 36-37 and see: 
Murtaḍa., Understanding Islamic Sciences (London: ICAS Press, 2002), p. 101. 
41
 See: Tamīmi, Abdallah b. Muḥammad. Ghurar al-Ḥikam wa Durar al-Kalim (Qum: Islamic 
Studies and Research Centre:, 1987); Ashūb, Ibn Shahr., Al-Manāqib Al Abī Ṭālib (Najaf, 1956); Al-
Harrani, Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan b. Ali b. al-Ḥusayn b. Shu’ba. Tuḥāf al-Uqoul (The Masterpieces 
of the Intellects). Translated by Badr Shahin (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 2001) and Rayshahri, M 
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 Al-Tūsi, Abū Ja’far Muḥammad b. Ḥasan., Amāli al-Tūsi (Qum: Dar al-Tḥaqafah, 1994), p. 558 
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Majlisī, Muḥammad Bāqir., Biḥār al-Anwār, (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Ta’aruf, 1983, 1983), vol 99, p. 
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Using the aforementioned lens, I will be able to compare him to Kierkegaard who was 
not regarded as a prophet or saint (and did not wish to referred to in this way) but is 
viewed as both a pioneering philosopher and a spiritual figure.43 Born in 1813 in 
Copenhagen and dying in 1855, Kierkegaard lived a relatively short life which was filled 
with poignant moments – losing five of his siblings, building a close relationship with 
his father and a romantic engagement with Regina Olsen (which eventually broke). All 
of these deepened Kierkegaard’s reflection of his own being, his view of God, sin, 
society and Christianity.44 Despite writing under various alter-egos, Kierkegaard’s 
reflections are deeply personal and combine philosophy, religion and spirituality which 
give broadness to his scholarship. Akin to the multi-faceted approach of ‘Alī b. Abī 
Ṭālib, it is precisely the philosophical and spiritual aspects of Kierkegaard’s life that 
provide the point of comparison for this thesis. Both personalities articulated their 
thoughts on hope, despair, struggle, worldly attachments, justice, injustice, God, 
religion, society and eternal happiness. Their thoughts were a reflection of their own 
experiences and attempted to tap into the feelings and consciences of the masses; 
Kierkegaard was dismayed at the formalism of the church which harmed the essence of 
Christianity in Denmark, 
 
“We have what one might call a complete inventory of churches, bells, organs, benches, 
alms-boxes, foot-warmers, tables, hearses, etc. But when Christianity does not exist, the 
existence of this inventory, so far from being, Christianly considered, an advantage, is 
far rather a peril…”45 
 
He further says, “the religious situation of the country is this: Christianity does not exist 
... The Christianity of the New Testament does not exist at all,”46 Both these statements 
show Kierkegaard’s disenchantment with the institution of the church, its rituals and its 
damaging impact on the spiritual and ethical essence of Christianity. Moreover, just as 
there is a notable corpus of sayings and reflections on the self attributed to ‘Alī b. Abī 
                                                          
43
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Ṭālib, a similar corpus is attributed to Kierkegaard who under his many pseudonymous 
authors expressed his views on what the self is or should be.47 
 
‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib had a similar but graver battle in his life in dealing with the institution 
of the caliphate (khilāfah) that gradually became cemented in Muslim psyche after 
Prophet Muḥammad’s death in 11/632. According to the Shī‘ī view, the reigns of ‘Abd 
Allāh b. Abī Quḥāfah (popularly known as Abū Bakr, d. 13/634), ‘Umar b. Khaṭṭāb (d. 
23/644) and particularly ‘Uthmān b. ‘Affān (d. 35/656), Mu’āwiyah b. Abī Sufyān (d. 
60/680) and Yazīd b. Mu‘āwiyah (26/647 – 64/683) saw greater emphasis on conquests 
of land, hereditary promotion and the divorce between morality and leadership.48 Islām 
had become associated with military dominance and strayed from the original message 
of Prophet Muḥammad which was to, in his own words, “…accomplish the important 
task of moral perfection.”49 As such, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib had the difficult task of separating 
the essence of religion from the questionable actions of its rulers and this is why in 
sermon 5 of Nahj al-Balāgha he states the caliphate is “like turbid water or like a morsel 
that would suffocate the person who swallows it. One who plucks fruits before ripening 
is like one who cultivated in another's field. If I speak out they would call me greedy 
towards power but if I keep quiet they would say I was afraid of death.”50 This statement 
shows the difficulty when he eventually became the 4th Muslim caliph because he had 
the arduous task of redefining political leadership towards the original message of 
Islām.51 Again, this offers another point of comparison for this thesis because both 
figures’ deep reflections on the religious and social dilemmas of their time position the 
self in a practical arena. 
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The aforementioned comparisons are even more necessary when we consider the lack of 
awareness of Islām during Kierkegaard’s own time. By his own admission, 
‘Muḥammadanism’ as it was known then in Orientalist scholarship represented 
something that was “behind”: 
 
“the relationship is as follows: Christianity is the actual proprietor who sits in the 
carriage; Judaism is the coach-man; Muḥammadanism is a groom, who does not sit with 
the coachman, but behind." He also says, "Muḥammad protests with all his might 
against being regarded as a poet, and the Koran as a poem…he wants to be a prophet. ... 
I protest with all my might at being regarded as a prophet, and want only to be a poet.”52 
 
My point is not to criticise Kierkegaard but rather to highlight the continuing paradigm 
in Western scholarship to consider Islām as the ‘Other’ within a narrative which 
subjugates it towards its own concerns rather than as a creative intellectual force that has 
the potential to solve universal problems. This sentiment has been expressed recently by 
Wael Hallaq in his erudite response to David Powers’ critical review of his book, The 
Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law.53 In critiquing the paradigm of Orientalism and 
the role of scholars, Hallaq argues,  
 
 “If I am granted the proposition that scholars should lead, as scholars, an ethical life 
(and I doubt that many would disagree), then the proposition must encompass a 
discursive ethical involvement in their social order, research, publication, and teaching. 
Their work, in its totality, must be conscious of itself, its place and its implications in the 
“strategies” of power. It must consciously exert the utmost intellectual effort to foresee 
these implications, and must work toward subverting them. It must resist domination (at 
least) as a knowledge system, which means it must at a minimum be aware of any 
possible complicity with a modernist theory of progress, and of subordinating the image 
of the Other to one’s own narrative or to one’s own larger cultural space.”54 
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Hallaq’s statement is significant because it shows a writer always needs to be aware of 
how a particular knowledge system views an idea and the need to evaluate whether that 
narrative adequately brings out the truth or nature of that very idea. I am fully cognisant 
of the fact that several books exist on the historical interaction between Islām and the 
West on the production of philosophical and theological ideas in the classical and post-
classical periods.55 However, there are very few works that look at the philosophical 
potential of the Islamic intellectual tradition to create concepts that can be amalgamated, 
change or influence contemporary Western intellectual ideas, such as human rights – a 
theme which I examine in chapter one. Much of the philosophical discussion within 
Muslim scholarship is focused on reforming its own areas rather than looking at how to, 
in the words of Kierkegaard, ‘upbuild’ ideas globally. My line of enquiry is the latter in 
order to escape both Eurocentric and Islamic-centric worldviews; hence my comparison 
with two Western philosophical texts and the ability of all of these texts to contribute a 
harmonised and universal understanding of the self and its role in influencing the 
Islamic-Western human rights discourse. 
 
5.2. Zayn al-‘Ābidīn and Kant 
 
Comparing Zayn al-‘Ābidīn and Kant has prima facie similar challenges when 
comparing ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and Kierkegaard. Zayn al-‘Ābidīn was an Imām and Kant 
was a philosopher but when we delve more deeply into Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s life we can 
appreciate his deep awareness of the nature of morality and it’s importance in society 
which strongly resonates with Kant’s own life. I would like to comment on both figures’ 
emphasis on developing a moral society as this is the intellectual thread which gives me 
the foundational point of comparison. 
 
Zayn al-‘Ābidīn (38/658 – 95/712), meaning ‘adornment of the worshippers’, was the 
title given to ‘Alī b. al-Ḥusayn. Ali b. al-Ḥusayn was the great grandson of Prophet 
Muḥammad and was born in Madinah. He was the son of al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī (4/626 – 
61/680, the martyr who was brutally killed with his family and companions on the plains 
of Karbalā, Iraq by the corrupt ruler, Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwiyah. After the loss of his father, 
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‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn had to endure the cruelty of the Umayyad regime by being taken as a 
captive. He witnessed the tragic events of Karbala, in particular the massacre of his 
father, companions and children as well as the torture of women at the hands of Yazīd’s 
soldiers.56 This had a lasting impact on his psyche and perception of what society needed 
at the time which was a sense of righteousness, Godliness and dignity. This manifested 
in his personal life first and foremost and that is why he was known as Zayn al-‘Ābidīn 
and al-Imām al-Sajjād (the prostrating Imām) because of his focus on his inner self, 
worshipping God and improving his conduct.57  
 
Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804), born in Konigsberg, Prussia, was also brought up in a 
pietistic household that focused on religious devotion and personal humility. Kant 
himself appeared to be pensive from his younger days especially when he lost his 
mother during his teenage years and would often go for regular walks. The environment 
he grew up in emphasised segregation between men and women and he himself rarely 
travelled outside of Konigsberg. He went into seclusion for over a decade to think about 
the relationship between rationality and metaphysics and after this period he wrote the 
Critique of Pure Reason.58 It appears this was a time of solitude, study, and spiritual 
reflection that allowed Kant to understand the nature of reality as he saw it.59 By 
contrast, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn was taken as a captive of Yazīd and was isolated several times 
during his life because of the fear Yazīd had of the growing influence of Zayn al-‘Ābidīn 
amongst the people. Zayn al-‘Ābidīn used his time of solitude to supplicate to God, 
constructing numerous supplications that reflected his innermost thoughts about God 
and morality. This manifested intellectually in two of his works, the last of which is the 
core text for comparison with Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. 
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The first of these is ‘al-Ṣaḥīfat al-Sajjādiyyah’ simply known as ‘The Book of Sajjad’ 
yet because of its notable spiritual contents, it is known as the ‘Psalms of Islām.’ The 
book is a compilation of Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s supplications and prayers composed during 
the period 38/659 – 95/712 which exemplify his proximity to God and moral 
consciousness.60 In the Shī‘ī tradition, it is regarded to be the most important book after 
the Qurān, along with Nahj al-Balāgha. Al-Ṣaḥīfat al-Sajjādiyyah shows the spiritual 
consciousness of the 4th Imām but in particular, exemplifies his patience in enduring the 
tragic loss of his family at Karbala and living under a corrupt regime.61 
 
This is amplified by his second work, Risālat al-Ḥuqūq (the Treatise of Rights), which 
was also expressed in the 7th century. I will explain this text shortly but briefly, the 
Treatise of Rights is a meta-legal charter of the intricate system of human rights 
stemming from God, the self (nafs), the self’s actions, leaders, subjects, family units and 
finally, members of society such as neighbours and partners. It is a combination of 
metaphysics, ethics, law and personal development, which I will analyse in chapter three 
of the thesis. As a brief example of his multi-faceted approach, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn says of 
leadership: 
 
“The right of your subjects through authority is that you should know that they have 
been made subjects through their weakness and your strength. Hence it is incumbent 
upon you to act with justice toward them and to be like a compassionate father toward 
them. You should forgive them their ignorance and not Ḥurry them to punishment and 
you should thank God for the power over them which He has given to you.”62 
 
Here, the emphasis on having a just and compassionate leader that treats his subjects 
with respect is the hallmark of successful leadership. Zayn al-‘Ābidīn emphasises that 
actually it is the rights of the subject to demand this kind of leadership and for leaders 
not to abuse their strength. This echoes Kant’s concept of treating people as ends, never 
as a means63 and shows both figures were concerned about the dignity of their society. 
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Moreover, Kant himself argued with King Frederick William II about censorship when 
Kant was accused of demeaning Christian teachings. The King decided to censor Kant’s 
writings and Kant later argued against this kind of censorship that whilst certain 
doctrines could be advanced by the state, ultimately philosophy’s purpose was to 
scrutinise all ideas, even religious ones. For Kant, the King had abused his power in 
withholding important information for the public to make rational decisions about their 
faith. All human beings are rational ones and their capability and right to make laws for 
themselves must be respected.64 Effective leadership, therefore, is one that respects the 
intellect of the people and does not use them as a means for particular ends. Zayn al-
‘Ābidīn also suffered censorship from Yazīd as he was against the teachings of Islām 
and therefore imprisoned him. Even after his release, Yazīd did as much to isolate him 
from the public.65 Both figures, therefore, had a concern for increasing people’s 
knowledge about how they perceive religion, morality and society.  
 
Finally, similar to Kierkegaard, there was a lack of awareness of Islām during Kant’s 
time to the extent that it was only given a cursory mention in his works, which at times 
was inaccurate.66 Commenting on Kant’s somewhat condescending attitude and even 
uneasiness towards Islām, Almond argues, 
 
“Not merely because it illustrates what Kant will come to represent for Islām in this 
chapter – a central figure in the Enlightenment footnoting of Islām, a pivotal stage in the 
rationalist reduction of the Muslim Orient to a curious appendix, an eccentric cross-
reference, a pair of problematic parentheses.”67 
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Again, this lack of awareness provides another motivation to show the similarities in 
Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s and Kant’s ideas and to replace the attitude of uneasiness with 
cooperation. The aforementioned strands in both figures lives indicate a leaning towards 
personal reflection, piety, concern for the nature of morality and reform of an 
individual’s intellect and conscience. Just as ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and Kierkegaard have 
provided me with an intersecting point in the thesis in evaluating the meaning of the self 
(particularly in context of the arguably negative influence of political authority on 
religion), Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s and Kant’s vision of how individuals should treat each other 
in society becomes a foundational point of comparison. Their own lives were motivated 
by a deep sense of awareness of their own personal morality and perhaps this was the 
instigating factor in trying to come up with principles that would bring about this 
awareness in other human beings. Thus, Kant’s principles of treating people as ends, 
never as a means or always perform your duty with goodwill is a reflection of Kant’s 
own personal life. Similarly, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s emphasis on effective leadership through 
compassion and justice is a direct reflection of his firmness to prevent the brutalities he 
saw in Karbala from ever happening again. These particular strands in both figures’ lives 
and particularly how they manifested in their works, which is the main subject of this 
thesis, give me a starting point in which to begin a fruitful comparison of their 
intellectual thoughts present in the chosen texts of this thesis. 
 
6. The Nature and Context of the Chosen Texts 
 
Having given a comparative background to the lives my four chosen figures, it is 
necessary to comment on the nature, context and authenticity of their texts. This will 
justify why I have chosen to compare Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses with Nahj al-
Balāgha and The Metaphysics of Morals with Risālat al-Ḥuqūq. I will begin with the 
historical context of the texts and then proceed to comment on the nature and similarity 
of ideas in their texts. 
 
6.1. Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses 
 
Whilst a great deal has been written about Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works such as 
Either/Or, Fear and Trembling or Philosophical Fragments, there is very little literature 
on Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses (Atten Opbyggelige Taler), which represents his 
own signed work. Indeed, George Pattison argues,  
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“For a start, the Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses are undoubtedly the poor relations of 
Kierkegaard scholarship and have been consistently under studied… not even the 
authority of Heidegger has prompted philosophers to pay much attention to these works, 
and those who write about Kierkegaard from a theological point of view have tended to 
pass the early upbuilding works by in favour of his later explicitly Christian works.”68  
Only recently has there been resurgence on this work.69 
 
The discourses within Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses were actually published in 
portions during 1843-44. Two were published in 1843, then three in 1843, another four 
in 1843; two in 1844, then three in 1844 and finally, another four in 1844. There is 
explicit reference to his intentions in writing these discourses, “this little book…is called 
“discourses”, not sermons, because its author does not have authority to preach, 
“upbuilding discourses”, not discourses for upbuilding, because the speaker by no means 
claims to be a teacher.”70 Kierkegaard intended the discourses to instigate a kind of 
meditation or deep reflection in the reader about his/her own self, relationship to God, 
nature of morality and his/her place in society. This is why the very titles of the 
discourses such as ‘Strengthening the Inner Being’ or ‘Preserving One’s Soul in 
Patience’ reflect the innermost traits of the self and how one should cultivate them. 
 
The second aim of Kierkegaard is to make the reader re-evaluate the nature of his/her 
Christian faith. Kierkegaard accomplishes this through analysing famous stories in the 
Bible involving the struggles of God’s Prophets such as John, Abraham and Job. Yet he 
does not just extract the morals of these stories but attempts to enter the minds of these 
Prophets, looking at their psyche, motivations, hopes and fears and relating these to the 
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desires and struggles of human beings in their everyday affairs. Here, Pattison has 
argued that these discourses, 
 
 “…not only offer Kierkegaard’s ‘religion of ethics’ but show that ethics are embedded 
in what might, loosely, be called a ‘spirituality’, a type of sensibility in which moral 
decisions and concrete religious commitments are informed by a larger sense of the 
contours of human life in time.”71 
 
Kierkegaard’s approach, therefore, is to situate human spiritual concerns within a wider 
ethical and religious arena that binds moral decisions within a holistic understanding of 
existence. Pattison situates Kierkegaard’s Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses as “works of 
his right hand”72 (a point that Kierkegaard himself confesses to) thus demonstrating that 
the discourses “constitute his direct communication, as opposed to the indirect 
communication of the pseudonyms.”73 Whilst Pattison argues the discourses are also a 
form of indirect communication, they nevertheless give us a holistic picture of 
Kiergkaard’s existential philosophy which is intertwined with personal ethical 
deliberations and his own view of what Christian faith should be. We can perhaps read 
forwards that Kierkegaard’s whole activity in these discourses and arguably in his work 
as a whole was to demonstrate “how to become Christian” for he says in 1851 in The 
Point of View, “this is how I understand myself in my work as an author: it makes 
manifest the illusion of Christendom and provides a vision of what it is to become a 
Christian.”74 
 
6.2. Nahj al-Balāgha 
 
Nahj al-Balāgha (the Peak of Eloquence) is a compilation which covers diverse themes 
from spiritual techniques, Qur’ānic exegesis, metaphysics, theology, ethics and wise 
sayings, to politics, leadership, history, family advice and more. These are all contained 
in ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s sermons and letters to his society in Arabia during the period 656 – 
661 but also include many other statements from the earlier part of his life. It was 
compiled by the Shī‘ī scholar, Abu al-Ḥasan Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawi, 
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popularly known as Sharīf al-Raḍī (359/970 - 406/1016) who was the brother of the 
notable Shī‘ī jurist, Abu al-Qāsim ‘Alī b. Ḥusayn al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍa (355/965 - 
436/1044). The book contains approximately 241 sermons, 79 letters, and 489 utterances 
of ‘‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib.75  
 
What is unique about Nahj al-Balāgha is the way in which ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib combines 
beautiful Arabic language (hence the name of the book) and penetrating intellectual 
concepts. One of the most famous commentaries written on Nahj al-Balāgha is Sharh 
Nahj al-Balāgha by Izz al-Dīn b. Hibatullah b. Abī al-Hadīd, which is still used to this 
day to understand the concepts behind ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s sermons, letters and sayings.76 
Nahj al-Balāgha is a celebrated book amongst Shī‘ī Muslims, next only to the Qur’ān 
because of its literary and intellectual depth yet within Western academia, scholarship on 
the compilation remains scarce.77  
 
A misconception about Nahj al-Balāgha is that it was intended to be a book of authentic 
sermons and sayings of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and because it is difficult to verify all of ‘Alī b. 
Abī Ṭālib’s statements, it should be rejected. This argument has traditionally come from 
some scholars of the Sunni tradition such as ibn Khallikhan (608/1211 – 681/1282) and 
ibn Hajar al-Asqalānī (773/1372 – 852/1448) but it can be refuted on three grounds. The 
first is that Sharīf al-Raḍī did not intend the book to be an authentic ḥadīth compilation. 
In fact, he has stated,  
 
“the object of this compilation is that I should bring forth Amir al-Mu'minin's greatness 
and superiority in the art of rhetoric which is in addition to his countless qualities and 
innumerable distinctions, and to show that he has risen to the highest pinnacle of this 
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attainment, is singular among all those predecessors whose utterances are quoted here 
and there, whereas his own utterances are like an onrushing and irresistible stream, and 
such a treasure of subtleties in language is unmatched.”78 
 
He has further said,  
 
“in spite of all this I do not claim that I have collected Amir al-Mu'minin's utterances 
from everywhere and that no single sentence of any type or construction has been left 
out. In fact I do not rule out the possibility that whatever has been left out might be more 
than what has been collected, and what has been in my knowledge and use is far less 
than what has remained beyond my reach. My task was to strive to the best of my 
capacity and it was Allah's part to make the way easy and guide me to the goal; Allah 
may will so.”79 
 
The quotes above are important for several reasons. The first is that Sharīf al-Raḍī’s 
intention was not to show the authentic nature of what he has compiled but rather the 
linguistic, spiritual and intellectual beauty of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib. Nahj al-Balāgha, 
therefore, should be taken as a book of inspiration and literature. Secondly, Sharīf al-
Raḍī openly admits that Nahj al-Balāgha does not represent a complete collection of ‘Alī 
b. Abī Ṭālib’s narrations, that statements could have been left out and even repeated. 
This shows that rigorous authenticity wasn’t his primary concern but rather, it was the 
eloquence of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib.80 Thirdly, scholars after Sharīf al-Raḍī have made 
significant efforts to trace the source of each sermon, which existed before Sharīf al-
Raḍī’s time.81 Finally, an argument can be made based on the eloquent language used in 
Nahj al-Balāgha; it is difficult to find an equally eloquent man as ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib in the 
Arab society at the time as he was famous for giving poetic and moving sermons. As a 
result, one ḥadīth by ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib which gives us an indication on how to read Nahj 
al-Balāgha is as follows, “consider not who said [it], rather, look at what he said.”82 
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6.3. The Metaphysics of Morals 
 
The Metaphysics of Morals (Die Metaphysik der Sitten) published in 1797 is one of the 
lesser known works of Kant and has arguably not been analysed as much as the 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Pure Reason. In her 
introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, Gregor comments that the “task he [Kant] set 
himself in the Groundwork was a very limited one. It is therefore unfortunate that this 
work is often taken as his definitive position in moral philosophy and as virtually 
identical with ‘Kantian moral philosophy’.”83 This position has been substantiated by 
Allen Wood, one of the major advocates and commentators of the Metaphysics of 
Morals who argues, 
 
“Despite its brevity, the Groundwork is one of the greatest and most influential 
achievements in the history of philosophy. Nevertheless, it must be said a 
disproportionate amount of scholarly attention has been paid to it. For Kant intends this 
little book not as a complete exposition of his ethical theory but only as an attempt to 
identify and secure the fundamental principle on which a system of ethics might be 
based.”84 
 
It is precisely what Kant intended with the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 
that makes the Metaphysics of Morals all the more important. The Groundwork was a 
somewhat incomplete work that only laid the basic principles for deriving ethical norms. 
Kant in fact intended to write a book on metaphysics later on which would provide a 
holistic grounding to his whole philosophy, “now intending someday to provide a 
metaphysics of morals, I issue this groundwork in advance.”85 
 
We can see this in the difference in approach between the Groundwork and the 
Metaphysics of Morals. In the Groundwork, Kant argued that for an act of the will to 
possess moral worth, it is not enough that it is done in conformity with duty, but the 
action must be done from duty. Here, the action is not the source for moral worth but the 
maxim upon which the action is based. Kant argues that in order for an action to be 
dutiful that action must not be done because of subjective inclinations an agent might 
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have. Instead, in a dutiful action, “nothing remains which can determine the will except 
objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for the law.”86 However, what kind of 
law could it be that could determine the will simply as law? Kant’s answer is the 
categorical imperative: “I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my 
maxim should become a universal law.”87 In this formula, Kant asserts that it is mere 
lawfulness that should determine the will.  
 
This above can give the impression that Kant’s ethics are too formal and cold and do not 
represent the reality by which human beings perform duties or even perceive ethics. 
However, when we read the Metaphysics of Morals, we find that this is a grave 
misconception. In this later work, Kant deals a great deal with a human being’s incentive 
to perform the law and how a person must cultivate his virtue, appetite and desires. This 
is why the Metaphysics of Morals is divided into the “Doctrine of Right”, which deals 
with the rights that people have or can acquire, and the Doctrine of Virtue, which deals 
with the virtues they ought to acquire; “the doctrine of right and the doctrine of virtue 
[i.e. ethical duties] are therefore distinguished not so much by their different duties as by 
the difference in their lawgiving, which connects one incentive or the other with the 
law.”88 This suggests that Kant was aware of the difference incentives by which a duty is  
performed and he readily acknowledges that the moral person must not only be a 
“scrutinizer of hearts”89 but “a moral being must also have all power (in heaven and on 
earth) in order to give effect to his laws (as is necessarily required for the office of 
judge), and since such an omnipotent moral being is called God, conscience must be 
thought of as the subjective principle of being accountable to God. In fact the latter 
concept is always contained (even if only in an obscure way) in the moral self-awareness 
of conscience.”90 
 
The mention of heart, self-awareness, conscience and God shows Kant’s awareness of 
the human self and its various earthly and transcendental dimensions. This has often 
been shunned by Kant’s critics who as Wood argues, 
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 “often call attention to the deep distrust of human nature exhibited in his insistence on 
the opposition of reason and inclination and his reservation of moral esteem only to 
actions motivated by duty…but the critics display short-sightedness when they 
condescend to this feature of Kant’s ethical thought...they overlook the fact that Kant’s 
interpretation of the a priori moral principle itself, as well as his conception of its 
application to the human will, depends on some quite distinctive views about human 
nature and history.”91  
 
These views involve an appreciation of an a posteriori view of the world which is 
exactly what we see in the Metaphysics of Morals when Kant explores the notion of 
‘duties to oneself’ – the focus of this thesis and core point of comparison with Zayn al-
‘Ābidīn’s idea of ‘rights to the self.’ Therefore the Metaphysics of Morals represents one 
of the more practical works of Kant (along with Perpetual Peace92) that explores human 
nature more deeply and gives content to ethical duties. 
 
6.4. Risālat al-Ḥuqūq 
 
Risālat al-Ḥuqūq (Treatise of Rights) is a text by Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, first transmitted by 
Abu Hamza al-Thumāli (d.150/767), a close companion of his. It is arguably one of the 
earliest human rights charters in both Islamic and Western history composed in the 
period 38/659 – 95/712 that sets out the rights of God, the self, biological organs, 
spiritual and ritual actions, parents, brothers, sisters, children, leaders, subjects, teachers, 
neighbours, partners, advisors, masters, slaves and friends, amongst others. Its 
comprehensiveness can be ascertained by the fact that it contains approximately 51 
rights on the aforementioned areas and links back to a narration by Prophet Muḥammad 
which follows a similar pattern, albeit extremely briefly. Risālat al-Ḥuqūq therefore can 
be argued to be the second detailed charter of rights after al-Ṣaḥīfat al-Madinah (the 
Charter of Madinah) of 622.93 
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Despite the fact that Risālat al-Ḥuqūq is recorded in early Shī‘ī sources by major 
compilers such as Shaykh al-Sadūq (d. 581/991), there is little literature on Risālat al-
Ḥuqūq (both in Islamic and Western scholarship), particularly in comparison to al-
Ṣaḥīfat al-Sajjādiyyah where numerous commentaries have been written on it.94 
However, what gives Risālat al-Ḥuqūq its significance is that it was produced after Zayn 
al-‘Ābidīn had witnessed the martyrdoms of his family, relatives and companions at 
Karbala. This gives the text a strong historical background where we can substantiate 
that Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s intention in writing about these rights was to prevent immorality 
and corruption in society. This immediately allows some comparison with modern 
human rights legislation such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
(UDHR) which was drafted after the horrors of World War II. The preamble of the 
UDHR specifically states,  
 
“…whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts 
which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which 
human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want 
has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people…Now, therefore 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all 
nations.”95 
 
This is another reason why I have chosen the narrative of human rights as the context for 
this thesis has it offers a window by which Risālat al-Ḥuqūq can be contextualised for 
contemporary discussions on rights. Finally, whilst the text deals with numerous sets of 
rights, my focus will be on the early part of Risālat al-Ḥuqūq where Zayn al-‘Ābidīn 
introduces a unique set of rights that are owed to the self through one’s biological 
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organs. This will be explained shortly but this part of Risālat al-Ḥuqūq is the crucial 
point of comparison with Kant’s duties to oneself in the Metaphysics of Morals. 
 
 
7. The Comparative Value of Ideas in the Four Texts 
 
Having introduced the background and nature of the four texts, the crucial question for 
this thesis is what is it about these texts that allow me to compare them with each other 
and secondly, what specific ideas do I wish to extract from this comparison in order to 
construct my framework for the self that can be used in the Islamic-Western discourse 
on human rights? I will answer this by first commenting on the points of comparison 
between Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses and Nahj al-Balāgha. 
 
     7.1. Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses and Nahj al-Balāgha 
 
The key point of comparison between these two texts is the attention Kierkegaard and 
‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib pay on the nature and role of the self in everyday ethical dilemmas. 
This is crucial for me because I aim to carve out a role for the self in Islamic-Western 
human rights discourse and require a foundational understanding of what the self is. In 
Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, Kierkegaard’s fundamental aim is to show how all 
human beings need to reflect on their ‘selves’ and cultivate moral and spiritual attributes 
that enable a genuine religious and ethical identity to emerge. He readily admits in He 
must Increase; I must Decrease that “self-knowledge is a difficult matter; although it is 
easy to understand the rest of the world, the understanding suddenly changes very 
substantially when it pertains to oneself.”96 Knowledge of the self is crucial for personal 
transformation and this must be accompanied with practical moral actions that deal with 
conflict and suffering. This is why he devotes three discourses to the theme of patience 
(‘To gain one’s soul in patience’, ‘To preserve one’s soul in patience’ and ‘Patience in 
Expectancy’) to emphasise what the self must be engaged with to develop virtue. 
 
Similarly, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib speaks about the self in Nahj al-Balāgha as an entity which 
is crucial for the moral and spiritual happiness of the individual and society as a whole. 
For example, he tells people: “O servants of Allah! The most beloved of Allah is he 
whom Allah has given power over his self, so that his inner side is (submerged in) grief 
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and the outer side is covered with fear. The lamp of guidance is burning in his heart.”97 
The emphasis on introspection of the self and understanding its various dimensions is a 
theme that runs throughout Nahj al-Balāgha. However, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib also makes the 
transition from a purely metaphysical perspective of the self to one that is practical and 
must engage with society: “Action! action! Then (look at) the end; the end, and (remain) 
steadfast; steadfast. Thereafter (exercise) patience, patience, and righteousness, 
righteousness. You have an objective. Proceed towards your objective.”98 This 
combination of spirituality and practical ethics in Nahj al-Balāgha help me to discuss the 
self within the domain of human rights as it can be observable and identifiable in our 
everyday actions and situations of conflict.  
 
Thus the foundational point of comparison in both texts for this thesis is that 
Kierkegaard and ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib not only discuss the self from a metaphysical and 
theological perspective but position the self in the very human arena in which it 
operates; the arena of worldly attachment, base desires, struggle, despair, enmity, 
character building, patience and more. Here, the content and themes of the discourses 
and sermons in both books correlate with each other. For example, Kierkegaard deals 
with strengthening the inner being whilst ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib talks about knowing one’s 
self in sermon 87 or Kierkegaard deals with overcoming despair and suffering in The 
Thorn in the Flesh whilst in sermon 114, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib deals with the nature of 
destruction and distress in the world.  This arena is crucial for my thesis as I am arguing 
that understanding, respecting and implementing human rights can only come about 
when there is a realisation of the roots of where these rights emerge and how deeply 
connected they are to the human self. Without this basic connection, I argue that the 
project of an endearing set of human rights that is meant to guarantee harmony and 
stability in both the private and public domain of the human being may fail. 
 
The self, therefore, grounds human rights much deeper than rational agency, human 
dignity, social contract, inalienability and political will. Furthermore, when the self is 
positioned in ethical and worldly dilemmas it becomes an accessible entity which can be 
identified by both religious and non-religious people. However a person wishes to term 
the self, it is perhaps difficult to deny that existence of one’s personality or identity 
which changes and reacts over time due to minor and major personal events in an 
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individual’s life. The realisation that this entity, the ‘self’, plays a vital role in the way 
human beings understand and claim their rights is the main task of this thesis but for it to 
emerge as a relevant entity it must be accessible to lay people. Kierkegaard and ‘Alī b. 
Abī Ṭālib laid the seeds of this approach in their works which enables me to use their 
texts as building blocks to thrust the self from a metaphysical and religious arena into a 
practical one. 
 
What further aids this comparison is the methodology and literary technique of both 
authors. Nahj al-Balāgha compromises of sermons which ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib delivered to 
people throughout his life; Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses is not a book of sermons, 
however, it is a book of reflective discourses which instigate the reader to think about 
his/her self deeply. Whilst the means are different, both figures have this latter aim in 
mind and use an interdisciplinary approach in their sermons and discourses respectively 
in order to convey heartfelt messages about a human being’s relationship with the world 
and how he/she should deal with ethical and spiritual dilemmas. They combine 
philosophy, theology, ethics, scripture, metaphysics and mysticism in order to present a 
rounded view of the self. Moreover, their literary styles are poetic, rhetorical, bold and 
insightful which brings both texts closer together whereas previously one would have 
deemed it difficult to compare Arabic and Danish, particularly with the authors’ 
different religious backgrounds. Although I am using the English translation of Eighteen 
Upbuilding Discourses by Howard Hong and Edna Hong, at the least we can appreciate 
and compare the stylistic devices used by both authors to convey their philosophical 
ideas. I will illustrate this in chapter two. 
 
7.2. The Metaphysics of Morals and Risālat al-Ḥuqūq 
 
Having arrived at a foundational definition of the self by comparing Eighteen 
Upbuilding Discourses and Nahj al-Balāgha, the next task is to attach it to rights and a 
potential framework by which it can be actualised as a relevant entity in the Islamic-
Western human rights discourse. Whilst Kierkegaard and ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib made a 
transition in viewing the self from a purely spiritual and metaphysical entity to one that 
was relevant in a practical ethical domain, they did not discuss how rights could be 
attached to the self in a systemised manner. This is where the Metaphysics of Morals 
and Risālat al-Ḥuqūq become crucial for my thesis because Kant and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn 
both attempt to give a practical framework to the self by positioning it within the scope 
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of law. The law they conceive is a combination of hard and in particular, soft law, 
meaning that the self can operate within a system of law.99 It may not be enforceable as 
contractual or property rights are but nonetheless, it is capable of being relevant in the 
legal and ethical machinery of a society. 
 
The key idea by which both authors attach rights to the self and which is the central 
point of comparison in both texts is the notion of ‘duties to oneself’ in the Metaphysics 
of Morals and ‘rights to the self’ in Risālat al-Ḥuqūq. In the Metaphysics of Morals, 
specifically in the section on the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant argues that when we are 
talking about duties to the self, we are talking about internal laws. These internal laws 
must be cultivated in order for the self to achieve qualitative perfection and specifically 
to fulfil, “the supreme principle of the doctrine of virtue - act in accordance with a 
maxim of ends that it can be a universal law for everyone to have.”100 Kant divides his 
duties to oneself in three ways: article 1 deals with killing oneself, article 2 deals with 
defiling oneself by lust and finally article 3 deals with excessive use of food and drink. 
All of these duties are to diminish one’s baser biological desires so that one can perform 
his/her duty with goodwill. By ascribing specific duties to oneself, Kant constructs a 
practical framework by which the self is attached to certain incumbent actions which are 
necessary to perform for it to flourish.  
 
Similarly, in Risālat al-Ḥuqūq, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn explicitly discusses how there are rights 
(ḥuqūq) to the self (nafs), specifically to one’s biological organs which are connected to 
one’s identity. After the right of God upon a human being, these rights to the self form 
the root of a human being and later branch out and impact all other rights which involve 
social interaction. He states: 
 
“The right of your self (nafs) against you is that you employ it in obeying God; then you 
deliver to your tongue its right, to your hearing its right, to your sight its right, to your 
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hand its right, to your leg its right, to your stomach its right, to your private part its right, 
and you seek help from God in all that.”101 
 
Here, rights and duties are not merely based on social contract. Rather, there are a set of 
rights which a human being owes to his/her self before any other human being. These 
rights are owed to one’s bodily organs in order to evaluate the use of one’s organs and 
heighten one’s self-awareness in every biological movement. For example, my tongue 
has a right over me in order that I do not verbally abuse others and correspondingly, I 
owe a duty to my tongue to use it in a kind manner. This highly personalised relationship 
between rights and biological organs has not been explored as a potential framework to 
nurture human dignity, self-awareness and moral growth in Shī‘ī-Islām and Western 
philosophy yet Kant and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn have deliberated on the concept in their works. 
Both these approaches provide a core foundation to this thesis by introducing a new set 
of rights that are linked to the self, which are currently not found in international human 
rights or Muslim jurisprudence – a theme which I examine in chapter one. 
 
Whilst Kant and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn lived in different time periods, 7th and 18th century 
respectively, they conceived of a notion of rights that combined metaphysics, ethics and 
law and argued that the self was crucial in the theoretical and practical construction of 
rights. Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals is a work of philosophy but Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s text 
is a treatise or charter, not a philosophical discussion. However, akin to the difference 
between Kierkegaard and ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, this does not stop the comparative 
examination of duties or rights to the self which exist in both works and are within the 
context of the Abrahamic tradition.  
 
It is here that the four texts, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, Nahj al-Balāgha, The 
Metaphysics of Morals and Risālat al-Ḥuqūq, give me the foundation by which to 
construct my own practical framework for the self in order for human beings to access 
and implement human rights. Kierkegaard and ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib look at the self from a 
metaphysical, philosophical and theological perspective but also position it in real 
ethical dilemmas. Kant and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, whilst acknowledging these perspectives, 
focused more on giving a practical framework to the self by associating certain rights 
and duties with it. I am using Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses and Nahj al-Balāgha to 
provide the definition of the self in this thesis and The Metaphysics of Morals and 
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Risālat al-Ḥuqūq to provide the framework to the self. When these four texts are 
combined, they enable an epistemic transition of the self from a religious and 
philosophical angle to one that is decidedly practical that does not necessarily have to 
possess ties with the religious tradition or scripture to which it is linked – the subject of 
chapter four.  
 
8. Versions of the Four Texts used in this Thesis and the Nature of Sources 
Cited 
 
In this thesis, I will be using the following versions of the texts. For Eighteen 
Upbuilding Discourses, I will be using the widely recognised translation by Howard V. 
Hong and Edna H. Hong102; for Nahj al-Balāgha, I will take a modified approach of 
inserting my own translations for the Arabic text but use Syed Ali Raza’s translation as a 
cursory guide103; for the Metaphysics of Morals, I will use Mary Gregor’s excellent 
translation104 and finally for Risālat al-Ḥuqūq, Chittick’s translation of the Risalat at the 
end of his translation of al-Ṣaḥīfat al-Sajjādiyyah continues to be invaluable and so I will 
not be modifying his translation except to expand on certain terminologies using other 
Arabic sources, which include commentaries and narrations.105  
 
In terms of the manner in which I have cited works in my bibliography, primary sources 
include those works which are central to my thesis such as the original works of the four 
authors and key pieces of international law legislation. This section also includes sources 
in Arabic as well as their translations. Secondary sources include all other books, journal 
articles, chapters, commentaries, theses and conferences, which are all in English. 
 
Finally, with regards to dates, I will be using a Hijri (a.h)/Common Era (c.e) format 
throughout this thesis with the exception of recent dates that occur in the last two 
centuries. 
 
 
                                                          
102
 Kierkegaard, Søren., Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses (trans. Hong, Edna and Hong, Howard) 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
103
 Ar-Razi: Sayyid Shareef ar- Nahj al-Balāgha – Imām ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s Sermons, Letters, and 
Sayings – Arabic and English. Translated by Syed Ali Raza (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 2007). 
104
 Kant, Immanuel., The Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). 
105
 Al-‘Ābidīn, Zayn. The Psalms of Islām - Al-Ṣaḥīfat al-Kāmilat al-Sajjādiyyah. Translated by 
William Chittick. (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 1987) 
49 
 
Chapter 1 
 
The Evaluation of Major Voices in the Islamic-Western Human Rights Discourse 
and Carving out a Role for the Self in the Discourse 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the dominant approaches in the Islamic-
Western human rights discourse. There is a fundamental tension between Islamic and 
Western worldviews on the origin, nature and implementation of human rights in the 
world. This has resulted from, as Arkoun argues, an “intellectual impasse born of a 
frame of mind intent on thinking in terms of the polarity of an imaginary ‘Islām’ and its 
equally imaginary counterpart of the ‘West.’” 106 Several notable scholars have 
attempted to deal with this impasse by proposing various theories that could resolve 
differences in our understandings of what human rights are and should be in Islām. It is 
my contention that despite the merit of these theories, they do not offer a practical 
framework by which the two worldviews can be unified in accordance with an 
overarching concept. I argue that this overarching concept can be the self, which is the 
departure point of this thesis. 
 
Moreover, the discourse of reforming human rights in Muslim scholarship in relation to 
Western conceptions of rights is primarily legal. This discourse, as of yet, has not taken 
into account what the self can offer for the reformation and implementation of human 
rights both within the Islamic worldview as well as the Western worldview. The 
discourse has primarily focused on critiquing Islamic law and theory whilst paying less 
attention to the creativity of Muslim sources in evaluating Western human rights 
systems. The forthcoming chapters will compare two key philosophers from Western 
philosophy, Immanuel Kant and Søren Kierkegaard, with two scholars from the Shī‘ī-
Islamic tradition, ‘Ali. b. Abī Ṭālib and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn. This is in order to see how 
similar or different both systems are in their approaches to the self in relation to rights. 
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This also allows a firm theoretical basis by which to carve out a different discourse for 
the reformation of human rights through the self but which is grounded in both systems, 
rather than only one. 
 
This chapter will examine how scholars within Muslim scholarship or those engaged 
with it are responding to challenges from Western scholarship about the nature of human 
rights within Islām. Scholars that are selected here are chosen on the basis that their 
responses are or were framed within the relationship between ‘Islām and the West’ and 
how Islām is able to or not able to answer these challenges. Thus, jurists and 
philosophers that only operate within their own Islamic or Western legal discourse 
without taking into account what the other has to offer are excluded. The term ‘Islamic’ 
in this chapter denotes the worldview and theories that are linked explicitly and 
implicitly to the Qur’ān and sunnah (tradition). ‘Islamic’ is not used monolithically but 
rather as an umbrella term that includes both scripture and scholasticism within the 
Muslim worldview which holds God, His Prophets and revelation as sacred or at the 
least, foundational to advance any human rights argument. I prefer ‘Islamic’ over 
‘Muslim’ since the latter indicates more on culture, geography and demographic rather 
than the theoretical foundation of the religion (and its scholastic interpretation), which is 
what I am interested in. The term ‘Western’ denotes the worldview and theories that are 
linked explicitly and implicitly to secularism, which reduces the importance of scripture 
and heightens the emphasis on human intellect. This is a human-centric worldview. 
Whilst historically, revelation did hold importance in the Western world through 
religions such as Christianity (which will be explored through the contributions of Kant 
and Kierkegaard in chapters 2 and 3), currently revelation does not have such a status in 
public society.107 Within Muslim societies (as diverse as they are), the Qur’ān and 
sunnah, still hold an abiding relevance in private and public life. These definitions are of 
course not exhaustive but are meant to indicate on the discourse of this chapter. 
 
Finally, I have categorised responses of scholars to the issue of human rights in three 
areas: dialogue, scriptural and spiritual and jurisprudential and legal. In my view, these 
three areas constitute the main lenses by which the Islamic-Western human rights 
discourse is viewed. I will then proceed to critique these categories and justify why the 
concept of the self has an important contribution to make to this discourse. It is here I 
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will give a precursor as to why this thesis significantly differs from current approaches 
in the field. Ultimately, the concept of the self, which will be elaborated in chapters two 
and three, offers a unique lens by which to view human rights. More importantly, it has 
the ability to be used in a meaningful practical framework which may solve the root 
tensions present within the human rights discourse of both systems (the subject of 
chapter four). 
 
1. The Nature of the Discourse: The Concept of Human Rights and Points of 
Contention in the Islamic-Western Human Rights Discourse 
 
There are many books on the history human rights and the purpose of the thesis is not to 
regurgitate the immense literature already available on the idea of human rights.108 
Rather, the question in this chapter is: what are the defining characteristics that have 
been the cause of tension between Islamic and Western worldviews and how have 
scholars approached these points of conflict? A distinction can be made between the 
term, ‘human rights’ and its ethos. The term itself is a modern one since it appears there 
is no historical usage of this term in older civilizations, both religious and non-
religious.109 However, the ethos of rights in society, that a human being or groups of 
human beings possessed certain rights, powers and responsibilities in relation to each 
other is extremely old. The dispute, however, lies in what constitutes an appropriate set 
of rights for human beings and where these rights come from. As human beings saw the 
horrors of wars and various injustices such as that of World War II, a commonly cited 
event that ignited the “conscience” of humanity110, major governments came to one 
basic understanding: that human beings carried an inherent value and this value should 
be respected. However, this value was understood in different ways. To some, it meant 
the natural rights human beings possess as a result of God’s own creation and attributes. 
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Others argued that this quality or value constituted the rights innate within human beings 
as a result of their own humanness, independent of the existence of God. The two 
strands of thought have been in opposition to each other ever since World War II in 
claiming ownership of where human rights came from and how they should be 
implemented. Thus, within the human rights discourse, the ‘religious’ worldview and 
‘secular’ worldview formed. 
 
Here, Islām is no different to Christianity and Judaism since these monotheistic religions 
agree that God is the source of all the intellective and creative power of human beings. 
Where the difference lies is in the current attention given to Islām’s political dimension 
and its ability to meaningfully connect in an increasingly globalised, pluralised and 
technological world.111 This naturally brings the subject of human rights to the fore since 
the issue is whether Islām is able to relate to the way in which the modern human being 
lives. Here, Islām has been seen as increasingly barbaric, terrorist, uneducated, helpless, 
threatening, demeaning to women, isolationist and ultimately, out of place in ‘modern’ 
society.112 The majority of these issues are to do with human rights – the implication 
being that Islām, as a religion, violates modern human rights and the dignity of human 
beings. This is one major reason why Muslim scholars are defending, reconciling or 
reforming Islām’s position on human rights.  
 
Yet there is something more. Criticisms by Western scholars are not merely hollow, bias 
attacks on Islām. They have caused Muslim scholars to re-evaluate the position of Islām 
on key issues such as gender discrimination, slavery, participation in wider society and 
more which today are the subject of much tension within the Muslim world. This is 
primarily because Muslim jurists are using classical methodologies to derive laws for 
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modern problems which do not always have solutions in the Qur’ān and sunnah (since 
Prophet Muḥammad, his family and companions did not encounter some of the problems 
we are facing today). Thus, it becomes a hermeneutical exercise for Muslim scholars to 
re-interpret texts and oral evidence to carve out solutions faithful to revelation as well as 
the claimed universality of Islām. Historically, Islām was able to meet the social and 
moral challenges of its time but with colonialism, displacement, migration, 
globalisation, pluralisation and secularisation, Muslims became scattered across the 
globe and like any other social group or nation, had to re-assess how their religion could 
provide answers in a different environment.113 It is these somewhat natural factors not 
Islām’s inherent rigidity in closing the gates of ijtihād that has resulted in this re-
evaluation.114 
 
The issue of human rights forms a big part of this evaluation process by Muslim scholars 
and Western critics because it is intimately connected with modern life. Thus, the recent 
trends which I have briefly summarised above cause Muslim scholars to develop or at 
least, understand the scope of modern human rights within the worldview of Islām. But 
what have been the defining characteristics that have propelled them to do this? One can 
extract them from the following definition of human rights concisely outlined by Nickel. 
According to him, human rights are, 
 
“Basic moral guarantees that people in all countries and cultures allegedly have simply 
because they are people. Calling these guarantees “rights” suggests that they attach to 
particular individuals who can invoke them, that they are of high priority, and that 
compliance with them is mandatory rather than discretionary. Human rights are 
frequently held to be universal in the sense that all people have and should enjoy them, 
and to be independent in the sense that they exist and are available as standards of 
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justification and criticism whether or not they are recognized and implemented by the 
legal system or officials of a country.”115 
 
I have chosen Nickel’s definition of human rights because it neatly encapsulates the 
defining points of contention in the Islamic-Western human rights discourse. Nickel 
argues there are “moral guarantees” which human beings possess simply because they 
are “people.” This means that human beings have a set of rights which prima facie 
cannot be taken away by anyone, whether their fellow human beings or God Himself. 
These rights arise because of human beings’ humanness. They are people, meaning they 
have the ability to live, communicate and create. These defining qualities of people 
make them special and honoured and it appears there does not need to be any further 
justification for people to possess these moral guarantees. Even countries and cultures, 
as diverse as they are, cannot override these guarantees thus showing that changing 
social contexts of human beings are not a justification to remove these rights. Nickel 
goes so far as to say that compliance with these rights are “mandatory” showing human 
beings can demand and enforce the rights owed to them. This exemplifies the creative 
power of human beings. Nickel’s mention of the universality of human rights suggests 
human rights are aspirational, “that all people should enjoy them.” Human rights 
therefore become a moral project for humanity; they should be promoted and realised 
wherever human beings reside. This is also because human rights are “independent” of 
legal systems and officials, thus indicating on their moral nature as opposed to their legal 
nature. Whilst it may be that legal systems are required for the operation and functioning 
of human rights, they do not give these rights their existence. Human beings possess 
rights in themselves and they can exercise them when they wish. 
 
Thus, we may extract from the above definition the following  features of human rights: 
independent and natural rights, the worth and dignity of human beings, the universality 
of rights and the aspirational and active nature of rights. Humans rights as an 
independent and natural entity signifies that human beings carry a priori rights that are 
not dependent upon any external source. Human beings are the carriers, givers and 
enforcers of rights and so revelation does not play a role in giving or guiding rights. This 
is a particular point of contention for the Islamic worldview since the Qur’ān is regarded 
to be the authentic revelation from God to Prophet Muḥammad as guidance for 
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humankind in their moral and social affairs. Prima facie, modern human rights conflicts 
with this worldview because the Qur’ān and Prophetic tradition do not play an active 
role in guiding these rights. Human beings are accountable to themselves in the way they 
understand and actualise rights in society, which diminishes the role of God’s guidance 
through the Qur’ān. The natural aspect of human rights means that human beings 
possess rights by their nature; rights stem from human beings’ natural biological, 
rational and social constitution. Again, this is in conflict with the notion that God is the 
Creator of human beings and bestows upon them moral and creative attributes. In 
modern human rights, God is no longer the originator or enforcer of human rights. In 
fact, religion is seen as restrictive to the development of human rights. Here, Arkoun has 
commented on the underlying epistemology of European modernity, 
 
“European modernity, at least since the eighteenth century, has left us with the 
impression that reason could finally be liberated from the constraints of dogmatism in 
order to be placed in the service of objective knowledge alone, once a radical separation 
between every institutionalised religious law and the “neutral” state has been 
accomplished.”116 
 
Arkoun’s quote is apt; he describes European modernity has being liberated from 
dogmatism. In the Islamic worldview, God is at the centre of knowledge whereas in the 
Western worldview, God is seen to inhibit human knowledge and reduce humanity’s 
confidence to think for itself, explore and progress within its own bounds. 
 
The second point of contention is that Western human rights presume human beings 
have an inherent dignity and moral worth which entitles them to rights. Human beings 
are regarded as intelligent creatures with rational and moral agency that shows the 
capability for moral-decision making and social responsibility. Moreover, the fact that 
human beings have ownership of the world and make decisions about its progress shows 
they have unique and superior quality of life in relation to animals. This gives them an 
authoritative position in the world and if they are to inhabit and govern the world, then 
each human being requires a basic respect and worth. This is the modern notion of 
human dignity which although interpreted in different ways, is based on the idea of 
human beings’ intellectual, creative and moral agency. The reason this conflicts with the 
Islamic worldview is that the ultimate dignity lies with God. God has to be recognised as 
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the most dignified being who possesses an all-powerful, all-creative and all-moral 
agency. When we speak of human dignity today, it thrusts human beings at the centre of 
the world without recognising whether any other being could possess such a unique 
dignity. Moreover, whatever human beings possess comes from God and is a reflection 
of His worthy attributes. Whilst there is little issue with the creative agency of human 
beings, the notion of human dignity diminishes the dignity of God and severs the 
connection between God and human beings.117 
 
The third issue is the universality of human rights. Human rights are seen to transcend 
religions, cultures, races, regions and governments and therefore cannot be curtailed or 
even challenged by anyone. They are rights which are so embedded within the existence 
of all human beings that they are necessary for the very survival and life of human 
beings. The right to life, shelter, family, privacy and so on define how human beings 
function on a daily basis. Denying these basic rights or making them dependent upon 
cultural interpretations and legal processes would diminish the quality of life that human 
beings enjoy. Thus, human rights are not only innate conditions for the flourishing of 
human existence but they are worthy goods to aspire to. If all human beings cannot be 
equally treated in the world or some are given more access to human goods than others, 
then the world itself would be a source of oppression and social imbalance.  
 
The point of contention with the Islamic worldview is that whilst the ethos of creating a 
moral world through certain rights echoes the mission of Prophet Muḥammad118, the 
question is which rights are universal. Islām continues to theoretically accept the notion 
of slavery. Whilst this may not be practised in the modern world, Muslim jurisprudence 
still permits a slave to be freed in order to compensate for a missed fast. So when 
modern human rights claim that all human beings deserve a set of rights and these 
transcend religion, what becomes of the Prophetic sunnah which permits the practice of 
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slavery? Or, if women are entitled to be free rational and moral agents, then how do 
Muslim scholars reconcile the notion that the husband is given greater legal agency? 
What happens when a women does not want to obey her husband or divorce him out of 
her own will? This creates conflicts with those verses of the Qur’ān and aḥadīth 
(narrations) which indicate on a different set of rights for specific groups of human 
beings. Moreover, these rights stem from the Qur’ān and sunnah and so they cannot be 
said to be universal since modern human rights transcend religion. Thus, we have two 
interrelated conflicts. The first is the content of human rights and which rights are 
universal. The second is in the origin of these rights. Modern human rights stems from 
the human intellect and rational decision-making of human beings as individuals as well 
as a collective entity. This is actualised through legal and political processes such as 
parliament, a sovereign body representing the will of people through elected 
representatives. However, in Islām, the Qur’ān and sunnah give some basic content for 
human rights and act as the origins of human rights. Prima facie, human intellect is 
considered subsidiary here since God’s revelation to Prophet Muḥammad shows God’s 
intellect has priority. Whilst the Qur’ān and sunnah may not contain every human right, 
they nonetheless contain some (such as the legal authority of men and women, 
inheritance laws and modesty) and this already conflicts with the promotion of human 
rights in the world in accordance with human beings’ own rational authority. 
 
The final point of contention is in the aspirational and active nature of human rights. 
Douzinas has argued that modern human rights are actively promoted not just through 
democracy but also military humanitarianism.119 Democracy has been used as a viable 
framework for the flourishing of human rights i.e the executive, legislature and judiciary 
which allow the political will of people to be expressed and enforced in a free market, 
capitalist society. This political will is decision-making over the kind of rights people 
wish to live by and thus substantiates the rational and moral agency of human beings – a 
key feature of Western human rights. Humanitarianism is also explicitly linked with 
human rights because when a certain section of humanity does not possess basic 
amenities such as shelter and education or are the subject of torture and degradation, 
then those who are more fortunate consider it their responsibility to give these amenities 
to those less fortunate or stop injustices from happening to them. Through international 
charities and NGOs, modern human rights can be promoted and realised throughout the 
world. What is paradoxical, however, according to Douzinas is that there has been a rise 
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of military unilateralism since World War II where by nations take it upon themselves to 
impose democracy and human rights in countries which they see as inferior, barbaric or 
simply less human.  
 
The conflict with the Islamic worldview is precisely the propagationist attitude of 
Western human rights. Muslim scholars see an inherent contradiction in the theory 
behind human rights and how it is practiced and implemented by Western states. Arkoun 
critically argues, “the self-promoting West does not even integrate in its geopolitical 
strategies the imposition of its world vision and ‘universal’ values, to counter the 
negative or positive perceptions other peoples and cultures are developing towards its 
policy.”120 The underlying problem is what gives Western states the right to impose their 
understanding of human rights on other nations? Which interpretation of human rights 
trumps others, especially in the face of different religions and cultures that have norms 
unique to them? The issue of ḥijāb (veil) in Islām is one area of particular conflict.121 
The Western worldview believes men and women are equally free to dress and behave 
as they wish thus allowing them to exercise their dignity more subjectively. The Islamic 
worldview, however, believes men and women must dress modestly and behave 
decently in order to reduce sexual corruption and set a virtuous example to their children 
and the rest of society. Here, each human being is morally responsible for the way 
he/she dresses and behaves and so dignity is seen in a more collective sense than the 
Western worldview. Now, if a Western nation decides that human rights are based on 
the empowerment of the human being which moves dignity closer towards autonomy, 
then Muslim scholars may respond by stating that actually dignity is closer to 
responsibility, at least in the area of modesty.122 Notwithstanding the different 
interpretations of dignity in both the Western and Islamic worldview, there is still an 
inherent tension between the worldviews because the former does not use revelation in 
understanding human rights whilst the latter does. What Muslim scholars dislike is the 
lack of consideration given by Western states for their own sources and mechanisms by 
which to understand modern human rights. 
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Linked to this is the human rights record of Western and Muslim states. Western states 
argue modern human rights are something to aspire for and should actively be promoted. 
However, Muslim nations and scholars, such as Abul A’la Maududi, constantly criticise 
Western states for double standards in the implementation of human rights.123 Western 
scholars may criticise Islām as a terrorist religion but we find in history that many 
modern wars and invasions were initiated by Western states. According to Dixon and 
McCorquodale, prior to the United Kingdom’s incorporation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, it had a “dismal record” of protecting human rights.124 
Harris has further commented ‘a state can usually flout international law if it wants to 
and get away with it.’125 Muslim states today are certainly not blameless and we find 
countries such as Saudi Arabia being a major human rights offender in its treatment of 
women and minorities.126 Thus, Western and Muslim states are both guilty of human 
rights violations today but the conflict with the Islamic worldview lies with the 
propagationist attitude of Western states towards Muslim ones who they deem to be less 
humanised when in fact the practice of Western states themselves needs to be critically 
examined. 
 
Thus, the four areas examined here, independent and natural rights, the worth and 
dignity of human beings, the universality of rights and the aspirational and active nature 
of rights, form the basis of conflict between the Islamic and Western worldviews over 
human rights. They reveal different ontological and epistemological standpoints, 
conflicting content as to what human rights are and should be, the manner in which 
human rights should be promoted and finally, how much emphasis should be given to 
human beings over God. This is not to say that there are no similarities in the basic ethos 
that human beings deserve some kind of basic rights such as the right to life, shelter or 
privacy. Rather the issue is in what situations these rights should be applied and to 
whom. At other times, the case is more serious. There are those that argue Islām is not 
compatible with modern human rights and has its own rights discourse for its adherents, 
Muslims. And there are those that intend to reform Islām’s legal theory or at the least, 
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adopt a reconciliatory approach. I will now examine these approaches by focusing on the 
responses by key scholars who have focused on these points of contention. In my view, 
their responses can be divided into three areas: the approach of dialogue, scriptural and 
spiritual approaches and finally, legal and jurisprudential approaches. I will explore and 
critique these areas and then proceed to justify why I think the Islamic-Western human 
rights discourse can be broadened by looking at the concept of the self and how it can 
contribute a different framework for human rights for both the Islamic and Western 
worldviews. 
 
2. The Approach of Dialogue: Problematising the Islamic-Western Human 
Rights Discourse 
 
Arguably, the most common approach to the Islamic-Western human rights discourse is 
to analyse key areas of conflict and identify the possibilities for reconciliation and 
reform. This is the approach of dialogue where the aim is to foster greater understanding 
of both worldviews. It does not necessarily use any specific discipline but is multi-
faceted and draws upon philosophy, theology, law, sociology and politics to deepen our 
understanding of a particular conflict. By doing this, one accomplishes the purpose of 
dialogue. This is because, “the word dialogue is derived from dia (across, through) and 
logos (conversation, word)”127 and through interaction we should aim to cross to the 
other side and understand the other person whilst simultaneously reflecting on who we 
are. There are however those that, in the words of Baderin, believe in an “adversarial”128 
dialogue that is opposite to any form of reconciliation. The works of Robert Spencer are 
an example of this approach which views Islām as an intolerant religion, incapable of 
adapting to other religions, evolving human needs and the Western world in general.129 
Mohamed Arkoun has also criticised scholars such as Bernard Lewis who think in terms 
of a polarity and division in their analyses of the Islamic tradition i.e there is an ‘Islām’ 
and the ‘West.’130 There can also be a significant political element to this adversarial 
approach which aims to organise political opposition and even violence towards Western 
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states and vice versa. The actors in this area, whether from the Western or Islamic 
worldview, argue that Islām and the West are incompatible, not just in terms of human 
rights but in terms of their view of the cosmos, moral and social order, religion, God and 
humanity.  
 
Moreover, the adversarial approach is one that remains in an intellectual deadlock and 
perpetual conflict, which does not help the moral progress of humankind. Here, Arkoun 
argues that the reason why some Muslims take the position of incompatibility is the 
religious imaginary which they have created of Islām. They have created a narrative 
which paints a self-aggrandised and beautiful picture of Islamic history since the birth of 
Prophet Muḥammad. Prophet Muḥammad is seen to be the victor and saviour of 
humankind and his role must be resurrected today in order to repeat his successes in 
spreading Islām. The problem is that in the name of this imaginary, violence is justified 
against people and this presents a disturbing picture of the conception and promotion of 
Islamic human rights. Those who advocate this view are no different to Western 
governments that impose their own sense of human rights based on their imaginary of 
the world and so the world remains in a deadlock. Neither worldview is willing to 
negotiate or engage in dialogue as to the kind of rights that people can live by in 
harmony. Thus, whilst this is a known response to modern human rights, it is certainly 
not the most effective which as Arkoun states, makes humankind trapped in an 
anthropological triangle of “violence, sacred and Truth.”131 Therefore, I aim to examine 
those scholars that in the words of Baderin, have adopted a “harmonistic”132 attitude 
towards the Islamic-Western human rights discourse. These scholars, at the least, believe 
in deep intellectual engagement with both the Islamic and Western human rights legal 
systems. I will now examine and critique Sachedina and Mayer who advocate the 
process of dialogue. 
 
2.1 The Approaches of Abdulaziz Sachedina and Ann Elizabeth Mayer 
 
Abdulaziz Sachedina is a prime example of this approach because his works are based 
on problematising the discourse then finding those values which are harmonious or 
parallel in both worldviews and finally, promoting the use of legal, social and political 
processes to actualise the dialogue process. He comments on the need for Muslim 
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seminarians and secularists to engage in dialogue with each other, the shift required 
from a theological-juridical discourse in Islām to one of personhood and natural rights, a 
multi-disciplinary approach in the Islamic tradition that combines ethics, law and 
theology, the importance of privatising certain aspects of Islām like the involvement of 
Muslims jurists in personal affairs of Muslims, using the historical discourse on rational 
justice and amr bil ma’rūf (enjoining that which is befitting) and nahi anil munkar 
(prohibiting that which is detestable), as advocated by classical Shī‘ī and Mu’tazilah 
scholars133 and finally, the potential use of fiṭrah (primordial nature) in human beings as 
a relevant consideration in human rights discourse. Many of these points of dialogue are 
identified but not explored fully since the aim is to create a broad understanding of the 
Islamic-Western human rights discourse and specifically, “common moral terrain” 
between the two worldviews. He argues, 
 
“To forgo an opportunity to engage traditional Muslim scholars to rethink their anti-
Declaration stance and challenge them on their own terms to recognize that Islamic 
revelation and the Declaration share the common moral terrain to protect individuals 
from oppression will be detrimental to the overall goal of the universality of the secular 
document in garnering support for its implementation in the Muslim world.”134 
 
There is a presumption here that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
(UDHR) provides a standard model of human rights for the world and Sachedina 
expresses his “unflinching support” for it.135 This is in light of international legislation 
such as the Cairo Declaration for Human Rights in Islām 1990, which although is an 
attempt to universalise an Islamic conception of human rights, is limited in it scope. This 
is because its stakeholders are Muslims, rights ultimately originate from sharīʿah and the 
legislation itself is not applicable to non-Muslim and cannot influence wider norms.136 
We are left with the same problem as before – that Islām’s social vision and laws 
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operates within its own paradigm and is disconnected to other valid sources of law 
outside of this paradigm. Thus, Sachedina turns to the UDHR as offering a viable model 
for human rights which although not perfect and is abused by Western governments, 
needs to be engaged with by Muslims. It is here that Sachedina teases out the pliable 
principles from the Qur’ān, sunnah and Muslim scholarship as mentioned above which 
can be used as points of dialogue and further scholarly deliberation within the Muslim 
world. 
 
In a similar vein, Ann Elizabeth Mayer argues that, “Islamic heritage offers many 
philosophical concepts, humanistic values, and moral principles that are well adapted for 
use in constructing human rights principles. Such values and principles abound even in 
the pre-modern Islamic intellectual heritage.”137 This is the same tone as Sachedina; the 
notion that Islamic heritage contains adaptable principles to engage with modern human 
rights. Mayer does not deeply outline what these principles of engagement are but 
emphasises that the Mu’tazilite tradition of elevating the role of reason in guiding human 
affairs is a good starting point. Muslims can also use international human rights law to 
meet their moral, social and political needs and commenting on a somewhat paradoxical 
shift, Mayer argues, 
 
“Thus, a potential shift lies before us; we may be facing decades in which the United 
States will be moving farther away from the international human rights system while 
Islamic thinkers and people in Muslim countries more generally will be growing more 
attracted to international human rights law, seeing in it principles that acknowledge the 
legitimacy of their most pressing concerns and complaints.”138 
 
Whilst Sachedina and Mayer give a great deal of respect to the creative capacity of the 
Islamic intellectual tradition, international human rights law continues to be a modus 
operandi in their works. It is through the fundamental recognition of these instruments 
that dialogue between the Islamic and Western worldview can take place thus allowing 
for necessary reform within Muslim scholarship and for Muslim states to reconcile with 
modern human rights. Presumably, the current socio-political processes within 
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international law and states themselves will offer sufficient space and voice for this 
reform in Muslim scholarship to take place. Emon articulates that, 
 
“By creating and regulating institutions of Muslim civil society, the government will 
provide an equal playing ﬁeld for diverse voices in the Muslim community to articulate 
competing visions of Shari’a values. No single Muslim voice will be empowered by the 
state; rather, the state will provide an equal playing ﬁeld for all voices to be heard, 
thereby contributing to debate and dialogue between competing civil society groups.”139 
 
A similar point is made by Sachedina who argues that Islām needs “functional 
secularity” through citizenship but also through the equality of creation.140 Civil society 
and functional secularity here mean the society which holds the right to free speech, 
democratic participation and privacy as cornerstone legal, political, moral and social 
values – very much in line with the Western worldview of rights. Moreover, it is not 
necessarily the foundation or purported values of Islām as a religion that is part of this 
dialogue. Rather, it is Muslim voices and the plethora of Muslim interpretations that 
form the substance of the discourse on human rights between Islām and the West. 
Overall, therefore, if the Islamic-Western human rights discourse is to tread on the path 
of dialogue it must be given a voice and place of engagement through civil institutions. 
At the same time, the Islamic tradition must tap into its multi-faceted philosophical and 
legal heritage to accommodate the UDHR or at least, positively engage with it. 
 
2.2 Critiquing the Dialogue Approach 
 
Whilst Sachedina does look at key scriptural and philosophical principles within the 
worldview of Islām and Mayer alludes to these, they do not go deep enough in 
specifying a viable framework by which this dialogue can take place. The question 
remains as to exactly who constructs a viable framework to address the points of conflict 
in the two worldviews. In fact, after analysing the points of conflicts and reconciliation 
in the Islamic-Western human rights discourse, Mayer concludes: 
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“Taking stock, we must recognize that the Islām and human rights relationship is 
regularly readjusting in response to a changing environment, so that the questions that 
will be being addressed over the next decades will not likely be the same ones that 
Muslim societies and Islamic thinkers have been wrestling with to date.”141 
 
However, this leaves us in a position of engagement but without concrete solutions. 
Sachedina also leaves us in a similar position where we must “work together to make 
this world an ideal place for all human beings to live in harmony and peace.”142It is here 
that the approach of dialogue becomes severely limited. None of the authors above 
actually articulate what this adaptable and evolving framework for modern human rights 
from the Islamic perspective will look like. They have certainly problematised the 
discourse and identified key areas of conflict and broad points for engagement but none 
of these are cohesively tied together to produce a workable system for Muslim scholars, 
nations and Muslims themselves. Moreover, much of the dialogue that is promoted is 
from the perspective that international human rights are a benchmark for the conception 
of modern human rights. What progress do Sachedina and Mayer want here – the 
progress of international human rights law, the ideals of Islām rooted in mercy and 
justice, the values of the West rooted in liberalism and pluralism or a combination of all 
three? This remains unclear.  
 
In fact, Afshari criticises Mayer for sparing,  
 
“…the liberal Muslims from the vigorous critique that has become her academic 
hallmark. Liberal Muslims help to re-move Islām from the spotlight of criticism. Thus, 
Islām is rendered innocuous and malleable, emptied of its historical essence, which 
centered on the sharp, immutable distinction between believers and non-believers, 
between those who submitted and those who did not. What remains as the only subject 
of inquiry are the many different readings of Islamic traditions, a few of which appear to 
be compatible with universal human rights norms.”143 
 
Secondly, Sachedina’s and Mayer’s approach can be criticised as a Eurocentric and/or 
Euro-American one which considers the historical experience and current understanding 
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of human rights by European and American countries as relevant for all human 
beings.144 Sachedina and Mayer comment on the issue of Eurocentrism but in my view, 
do not go far enough in evaluating exactly what may be wrong with the current 
conception of modern human rights, as framed within a Euro-American perspective.145 
Human rights abuses by Western and Muslims nations are often cited in the 
aforementioned scholars’ works but there is never a sufficient investigation as to why 
this happens. Is there something flawed about modern human rights itself, as promoted 
by the Western worldview? This is a question which Costas Douzinas critically explores 
in his works (which I shall explore later on in this chapter) and thus there needs to be 
open problematisation not just about the Islamic worldview but the Western one as well.  
 
Sachedina’s and Mayer’s approach may be categorised as ‘Islamoromic’, which is a type 
of Western academic discourse of Islam termed by Saied Reza Ameli. Islamoromic 
works “…contextualise Islam in the bosom of the Roman tradition (embodying the West 
in general and from a historical perspective)” and “try to compare Islamic ethos with 
Western values; while the jury is still out on the debate, many works in this category - 
thinking, evaluating and comparing Islam with and in a Western mindset, pronounce 
their favour for Western values and norms as superior, the more practical and less 
ornamental side of the binary.”146 According to Ameli, works in this section represent 
the highest percentage out of all the discourses Western academia uses to analyse 
Islam.147 48.4% of works are Islamoromic which constitutes 11,563 items out of the total 
23,872 academic items Ameli analyses. This significant number shows that a notable 
amount of scholars, Muslim or non-Muslim, may “try to present…the desirable 
domesticated Islam which poses no threat to the Western value system, on the one hand, 
and does not, as a result, engage in the clash of civilisations, on the other.”148 The key 
issue, according to Ameli, is whether the majority of works in this section represent “the 
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post-colonial approach to the Orient’ which shows “a gradual shift from hard 
colonisation in the East to soft colonisation of the East.”149 In the context of human 
rights, such analysis is crucial as it shows that Sachedina’s and Mayer’s conception of 
reforming Islamic rights is understood within the Western paradigm of human rights. 
However, their analysis does not sufficiently engage with Islam’s own sources to 
produce a conception of human rights that is both original and even challenge the 
Western notion of rights. 
 
Thirdly, the approach of dialogue does not deal with the hard cases of conflict in the 
Islamic-Western human rights discourse. Issues such as slavery, modesty, gender 
equality, financial rights, free speech and religious pluralism require greater theoretical 
deliberation. This of course is dealt with extensively in the legal and jurisprudential 
approach (which I will elaborate on shortly) but nonetheless, shows the limited nature of 
viewing human rights discourse the lens of dialogue. It is important to recognise 
observable conflicts within the social mileu of Muslims and Westerns, how Muslim and 
Western states may react to each other’s culture and values, the parallel points of 
discourse in both systems and the need to engage with these values but the approach of 
dialogue does not go far enough in providing solutions to the conflicts. In fact, whilst on 
the one hand, the adversarial approach can lead to an intellectual deadlock and even 
violence, the approach of dialogue can maintain the status quo for the goal is not to 
provide frameworks but only conversations. Conversation is not just the task of this 
thesis; my aim is to construct a practical framework for human rights through the self 
using both Islamic and Western sources. This would create a different discourse 
altogether which goes to the heart of human rights conflicts. As such, despite the merits 
of viewing the human rights discourse through the lens of dialogue, ultimately it is too 
limited to offer practical solutions for the points of contention which I previously 
outlined in this chapter. I will now go on to discuss another popular approach taken by 
scholars in this discourse which is the scriptural and spiritual approaches. 
 
3. Scriptural and Spiritual Approaches 
 
The scriptural and spiritual approaches to the Islamic-Western human rights discourse 
are firmly rooted in using the Qur’ān and sunnah to respond to the points of contention 
in the discourse. This involves using specific verses, historical incidents, sayings, actions 
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and the tacit approval of Prophet Muḥammad and his companions (Imāms in the Shī‘ī 
view) to articulate doctrines about the Islamic worldview towards human rights. There is 
however a distinction I have made here between scripture and spirituality, despite the 
interrelated nature of both areas. By the scriptural dimension, I mean the explicit use of 
the Qur’ān and sunnah as described above to respond to human rights challenges. These 
two core sources offer the content and substance of Muslim scholars’ responses to the 
discourse, independent of Western philosophies and methodologies. The spiritual 
dimension, however, whilst has its roots in the Qur’ān and sunnah is explicitly linked to 
‘ilm al-falsafa (the science of philosophy) and ‘ilm al-’irfān (the science of gnosis). This 
means that the spiritual response to modern human rights is based on the contributions 
and ideas of classical and post-classical Muslim philosophers coming from a range of 
sectarian, cultural and geographical backgrounds. Rūmī (d. 672/1273), Ibn ‘Arabī (d. 
638/1240), and al-Ghazāli (d. 1111) are examples who offer scholars and educators such 
as Fethullah Gülen the content and rational basis for a human rights vision steeped in 
Islām’s long standing spiritual tradition. I will tackle the scriptural approach first. 
 
3.1 Scriptural Approach: Abul A’la Maududi 
 
Abul A’la Maududi is a good example of a scholar who used Islamic scripture to 
respond to the challenge of modern human rights in the 1970s.150 Although now many 
scholars discussed in this chapter have superseded this approach, his style is extremely 
relevant in showing how classical Muslim scholars particularly those operating within 
madāris (schools), hawzas (seminaries) and dār al-ulūm (houses of knowledge) view 
human rights. His approach is also reflective of the attitudes of lay Muslims since the 
use of the Qur’ān and sunnah is not just an intellectual exercise; the two sources are the 
foundation of a Muslim’s social, moral and political life. They are intimately connected 
to Muslims by the interpretations given by traditional Muslim scholars. When the 
shaykh, maulana, mulla and ‘ālim (terms often used interchangeably to denote a Muslim 
scholar who has studied in a traditional Islamic seminary) gives a majlis (lit. seated 
gathering but denotes a lecture) from the mosque pulpit, the Qur’ān and sunnah form the 
basis of the intellectual content of the lecture. Even when one puts the lecture aside, 
every Muslim has access to the Qur’ān or its translation as well as the sunnah. Thus, any 
scholar that responds to the Islamic-Western human rights discourse explicitly using 
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these two sources is actively connecting to and influencing the mindset of Muslims, 
whichever sect they belong to. The scriptural approach therefore is on a different 
intellectual track to the legal and jurisprudential approaches since it closely relates to the 
concerns and attitudes of Muslims. The legal and jurisprudential approaches, which I 
will explain shortly, are closer though to the scriptural approach since the use of fatāwa 
(legal opinions) is based on using ijtihād (the employment of effort to derive a law from 
its sources) to derive laws from the Qur’ān and sunnah for all evolving social situations. 
The difference is that the legal and jurisprudential approach is significantly more 
technical than the scriptural one since the former uses uṣūl al-fiqh (the principles of 
jurisprudence) to explain its position whereas the latter needs only recourse to verses and 
narrations which are easily accessible to Muslims. 
 
Maududi’s response to the Islamic-Western human rights discourse was one of the 
earliest within the folds of both Western academia as well as traditional Muslim 
seminaries. His arguments and style reflected the aforementioned connection with the 
Muslim mindset towards Western powers but more importantly, demonstrated that the 
Qur’ān and sunnah could be used as modern sources to respond to the discourse. 
Maududi’s basic premise is that Islām’s political system is based on tawḥīd (Oneness of 
God), risāla (Prophethood) and khilāfa (Caliphate). These principles directly stem from 
the Qur’ān since God proclaims He is One, Prophets are their to guide human beings 
based on the revelations they receive from God and finally, human beings are seen as 
God’s vicegerents on earth to implement Prophets’ teachings after Prophets pass away. 
In Sunni Islām, caliphs take on this responsibility of vicegerency, hence the notion of the 
al-khulafa al-rāshidūn (the rightly-guided caliphs) and in Shī‘ī Islām, the Twelve Imāms 
continue the role of leadership after Prophets. God is at the centre of the Islamic social 
worldview; He is the possessor and bestower of rights and understands the true nature of 
these rights. Prophets are chosen by Him to spread His message to human beings 
through revelation. The words and deeds of Prophets encompass the majority, if not all, 
of human affairs and therefore should be taken as the first source of practical guidance 
for human beings to live their lives. Finally, khilafa means that human beings are given 
the honour of representing God, being his faithful trustees and are meant to administer 
affairs on earth in accordance with God’s commands. Thus, whilst caliphs or Imāms 
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continue Prophetic leadership, Muslims in general share in this wider authority of 
responsibility to uphold the Qur’ān and sunnah.151 
 
Based on tawḥīd, risala and khilafa, Maududi argues there are two conceptions of human 
rights, Islamic and Western. The latter, he argues, is a modern concept and in fact, 
Western nations were barbaric ones before the 17th century. The Enlightenment period 
signalled the birth of modern human rights but before that, Western nations were more 
backward in their ideas about human rights than Islām. Here, he refers to Islām as a 
religion; concepts contained in the Qur’ān and sunnah were significantly more advanced 
about human rights than Western notions in the 17th century. He further makes the claim 
that even today, Islamic human rights can be considered superior to Western human 
rights not just in their content but because Western powers are hypocritical in their 
implementation of human rights.152 Thus, Maududi sets up a dichotomy between the two 
worldviews. The attitude is not one of reconciliation but critique with a view to establish 
the supremacy of Islamic human rights. Yet, what exactly are these rights? He goes onto 
categorise them as ‘basic human rights’, ‘rights of citizens in an Islamic state’ and 
‘rights of enemies at war.’ All of these categories stem from God’s teachings to Prophet 
Muḥammad and the rights that are derived from here “are not like philosophical 
concepts.”153 Scripture, therefore, is seen as an independent source of knowledge which 
cannot be questioned by human beings. This already makes the Islamic conception of 
human rights explicitly connected to a sacred source which supersedes other notions of 
human rights. 
 
Basic human rights include the right to life, safety, basic standard of life, individual 
freedom, not to be enslaved, to be justly treated, to co-operate with each as well as 
respect for the chastity of women and the equality of human beings before the law. All 
of these directly stem from the Qur’ān and sunnah. For example, the right to life is 
established by the verse, 
 
“That is why We decreed for the Children of Israel that whoever kills a soul, without [its 
being guilty of] manslaughter or corruption on the earth, is as though he had killed all 
mankind, and whoever saves a life is as though he had saved all mankind. Our apostles 
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certainly brought them manifest signs, yet even after that many of them commit excesses 
on the earth.”154 
 
Thus, anyone that kills a person it is as if he/she has killed the whole of humankind. The 
right to life guarantees that everyone deserves to live. With regards to the right to 
freedom, Maududi reports a ḥadīth from Prophet Muḥammad, cited in the classical 
Sunni ḥadīth books, Saḥiḥ Bukhāri and Sunan ibn Mājah where he states, “there are 
three categories of people against whom I shall myself be a plaintiff on the Day of 
Judgement.  Of these three, one is he who enslaves a free man, then sells him and eats 
his money.”155 He extracts two principles here – the right to be free and the right not to 
be enslaved. He also cites the historical practice of Prophet Muḥammad in encouraging 
others to free slaves to expiate sins and when there were slaves in society, he treated 
them well (in comparison to Western powers who initiated the slave trade and put their 
slaves through terrible conditions), as support for this right. A similar methodology is 
employed for all other rights in this category as well as in the other two categories, rights 
of citizens in an Islamic state and rights of enemies at war.  
 
In particular, with regards to right of citizens in an Islamic state, Maududi cites the 
treatment of dhimmis (non-Muslims in an Islamic state) to show Islām’s fairness towards 
non-Muslims in the freedoms it afforded them to practice their own faith as well as the 
freedom of conscience to show that Islām cannot be forced upon anyone. Several other 
rights are cited which broadly correlate to the UDHR but are expressed within language 
of the Qur’ān and context of Islamic history. So the right to the freedom of expression is 
an Islamic human right provided that one’s expression is used for truthfulness and 
justice, otherwise a human being has a right to reprimand that person. Finally with 
regards to the right of enemies at war, Maudidi argues Western nations had little 
conception of international law before the intellectual contribution of the thinker Grotius 
whereas Islām contained principles of how to treat its enemies; Prophet Muḥammad has 
famously said that during wartime, “do not kill an old man, woman or child.156 Together, 
these categories form the content and vision of Islamic human rights which Maududi has 
extracted using the Qur’ān and sunnah. 
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3.2 Critiquing Maududi’s Approach 
 
The scriptural approach by Maududi has some merits in trying to bring the Qur’ān and 
sunnah into the contemporary debate over the content of modern human rights. Indeed, 
this was his aim as expressed in his conclusion.157 It also shows the capacity of the 
Qur’ān to relate to modern human rights issues and gives both Muslims and non-
Muslims an understanding of the kind of rights that existed in Prophet Muḥammad’s 
society. However, when we evaluate the underlying foundations of this approach, it has 
many failings the most important of which is in Maududi’s usage of Qur’ānic verses and 
narrations. When he extracts the various categories of rights, he is assuming that the 
verses had a prior scope to include these rights. Yet when we look at the majority of 
verses and narrations he uses, they were revealed in a specific context. So, the verse on 
taking life as above was addressed to the Children of Israel because they abused the 
Prophets that came to them and committed excesses in their society. Or when he 
comments on the right for people to revolt against government tyranny, he cites the 
verse, “Allah does not like the disclosure of [anyone’s] evil [conduct] in speech 
except by someone who has been wronged, and Allah is all-hearing, all-knowing. 158 
Here, he is extracting the idea of revolt against a government through the notion that evil 
should be noised in public except where there is injustice. This verse is in the context of 
the conduct of hypocrites and nowhere is there mention of a government. Thus, the verse 
stems from a particular context but in its literary construction, is general.  
 
The problem with the above approach is one of anachronism. The rights he specifies are 
in fact modern human rights enshrined in instruments such as the UDHR. These rights 
were agreed by human intellect, agreement and decision-making. Even if they were 
inspired by revelation, the formulation of these rights were independent to scripture. 
Maududi’s claim that these rights are already contained in the Qur’ān is weak because 
the verses of the Qur’ān and narrations can be interpreted differently and do not 
explicitly point to substantive rights. This is the task of the human mind – to come up 
with a set of rights for the harmony of society. If this is the case, what is the difference 
between Maududi’s approach and the epistemological foundations of Western human 
rights? Western human rights are based on the free use of human intellect and moral 
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agency but this is exactly what Maududi has done. He claims that Islamic human rights 
are not like philosophical concepts, that God’s teachings exist in an independent domain 
of knowledge and that all rights must be examined in accordance with the sharīʿah. Yet 
he is creating the sharīʿah through his use of reason and his list of rights become 
philosophical concepts because he has extended the application of verses of the Qur’ān 
to modern issues and conceptual frameworks. His notion of shūra (consultation) is a 
stark example. He argues that the Qur’ān advocates consultation amongst people, that 
people should freely elect the executive, there should be representatives and the mass 
vote carries political weight. Yet this is democracy. What is the difference between 
Islamic human rights and Western human rights here? If Western human rights are 
affording me consultation as well as the right to life, privacy, free speech and more, then 
why should the Qur’ān and sunnah be valuable sources for this guidance? This is the 
major criticism that stares in the face of Maududi’s intellectual methodology rendering 
the scriptural approach one of apologetics and polemics rather than as a consistent and 
substantive approach to modern human rights. Mohsen Kadivar and Mayer have also 
levelled the same criticism of this kind of methodology.159 
 
Whilst Maududi’s attempt is to show the human rights vision present in the Qur’ān and 
sunnah, other verses from the Qur’ān can be used to oppose this vision. He claims that 
the Qur’ān respects the convictions of other religions and social groups and historically, 
protected dhimmis. However, one may cite the verse, “O you who have faith! Do not 
take the faithless for friends instead of the faithful. Do you wish to give Allah a clear 
sanction against yourselves?160, to show that the Qur’ān is not encouraging close 
relationships with unbelievers. Of course this is in a different context involving the 
actions of hypocrites but I have cited the verse to show how the Qur’ān can be used 
against itself if there isn’t a consistent methodology over the selection of verses. There is 
also little mention of the hard cases in the Islamic-Western human rights discourse: the 
disparity between the legal authority of man and woman, the financial inheritance of a 
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woman, the worth of a woman’s intellect, the notion that a slave can be freed in order to 
compensate for a fast, the question of apostasy in Islām and more. Maududi’s approach 
is not self-evaluative; he presumes there is no problem with these issues and is content 
on exploring the problems of Western human rights. He also uses predominantly Sunni 
sources for his approach showing that the contributions or experiences of other sects 
such as the Shī‘a are not important. Thus, his claim that these human rights are ‘Islamic’ 
is relative to his sectarian position.  
 
Overall, what appears to be the fundamental problem in Maududi’s approach is that it 
focuses on a historical version of Islām that is equated as a kind of static utopia. The 
rights that Maududi lists are essentially the actions of Prophet Muḥammad in his own 
society, stemming from the Al-Saḥīfat al-Madīnah (Charter of Madinah) and he has 
merely re-expressed these rights in today’s age when in fact there are new human rights 
problems not dealt with by revelation. Arkoun terms this kind of approach as the 
“Official Closed Corpus.’161 This is the corpus of the aforementioned ḥadīth books 
compiled in the 8th – 10th centuries produced by Shī‘ī and Sunni scholars who are 
regarded by the Muslim community as beyond scrutiny and which provide the base 
narrative of interpreting religion. Arkoun argues that actually there was a gradual 
formation of imperatives, beliefs and cultural norms by classical Muslim scholars using 
these books which cemented an idealised narrative of Islām such as notion that the 
whole ummah (nation) will not agree on an error. This has created a dogmatic 
theological enclosure and propelled the corpus to the level of the Qur’ān itself. Today, 
however, one requires a wider base of intellectual sources to deal with the variety of 
social problems facing human beings and not be restricted by the narrative constructed 
in core books of ḥadīth. The scriptural approach therefore becomes limited because it 
does not offer a deep methodology which can tackle evolving human rights problems. 
Another interrelated approach is the spiritual approach, which I will now comment on. 
 
3.3 Spiritual Approach: Fethullah Gülen 
 
The spiritual approach towards the Islamic-Western human rights discourse aims to 
show the metaphysical and philosophical vision of God for human beings i.e what God 
intended for the life of human beings when He created them and what should human 
beings’ connection be with God. By understanding this vision, human beings would be 
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in a better position to formulate rights about each other, towards God and to create a 
harmonious and just society. Fethullah Gülen is the main proponent of this approach and 
situates his conception of human rights in his overall vision of reviving and reforming 
the global Muslim community. Although his focus is on Turkey, Gülen’s values have 
been turned into an international movement, known as the ‘Gülen movement.’ The 
reason his values have had such a global appeal is because of their universality and 
applicability over the various contexts and problems Muslims find themselves. 
Universality and applicability are key values of modern human rights and there is an 
immediate sense of correlation with Gülen’s ideas. Gülen believes in peaceful dialogue 
with Western nations, interfaith dialogue, emphasis on the spiritual dimension of Islām, 
often known as ‘ilm al-’irfān, the collaboration of faith and science, the compatibility of 
Islām and democracy, working closely with grassroots Muslims and professionals to 
solve social and moral problems (rather than just collaboration with intellectuals and 
politicians) and the development of civil society organisations such as media and 
charitable institutions which promote the welfare of human beings as well as diversify 
Muslims sciences and contributions to the world. Together, these values transform Islām 
from a historical religion to an active, vibrant movement capable of contributing its 
values and heritage to Muslims and the rest of the world. It is for this reason Gülen is 
often known as a “mujaddid” (renewer).162 This ethos is important for Gülen’s approach 
to human rights because they provide us with some key epistemological foundations that 
can be compared with Western human rights. 
 
There are three foundations which Gülen identifies as the basis for an Islamic conception 
of human rights. These are a human being’s freedom of choice and willpower, the 
second is a human being’s capacity for personal and social development and the third is 
a human being’s awareness of both worldly and otherworldly or spiritual rights. What is 
interesting about these foundations and which marks departure from the views discussed 
so far is that they are explicitly based upon key spiritual doctrines of Islām. These 
doctrines are connected to the Qur’ān and sunnah but Gülen builds on them to formulate 
a dynamic spiritual view of the world. This view is not only adaptable to modern 
situations but gives human beings an understanding of their own existence in this world 
and the hereafter. The first foundation, a human being’s freedom of choice and 
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willpower, is based on the notion that God created human beings as the centre of 
creation with unique qualities. 163 He honoured them with freedom, responsibility, 
intellect and creativity. However, God’s purpose for human beings was for them to see 
His beauty, for God’s beauty is the most encompassing. In order to this, human beings 
must become intelligent mirrors of God’s attributes which include al-‘Ālim (the 
Knowing), al-Raḥmān (the Beneficent), al-Raḥīm (the Merciful) and al-Nūr (the Light). 
If human beings exercise their freedom to do this, they would have risen above angels. 
Thus, whilst in the Western worldview of human rights, human freedom leads to rights 
because of a human being’s ability for moral agency, the social contract notion of human 
responsibility on account of human beings’ own negligence and the autonomy of a 
human being to claim for what he/she wishes, Gülen looks at human freedom as the 
opportunity for self-discovery and ultimately, to recognise God Himself.164 If human 
beings do this, they would have manifested God’s perfect attributes in themselves thus 
showing that human rights naturally stem from perfecting their own souls. This makes 
human rights grounded in a spiritual view of human existence that does not see itself as 
the final mirror; rather God is to be reflected in human actions.165 
 
The second foundation, the human being’s capacity for personal and social development, 
is based on the notion that human beings should strive to be al-insān al-kāmil (perfect 
human beings). This primarily Sufi idea which has been expounded by philosophers 
such as Ibn Arabi means that human beings must perfect themselves and transcend their 
existence by joining God’s essence.166 Since God is the ultimate object of desire, human 
beings should mirror this object and be recipients of God’s light and favour. By uniting 
with God, human beings increase their self-consciousness which prompts Divine self-
manifestation. This is the highest pinnacle that human beings can reach. Gülen develops 
this view by not only talking of personal perfection but social perfection. Gülen argues 
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that if human beings are to become perfect, they must mirror all of God’s attributes and 
this includes progress in both worldly and otherworldly life. So, increasing education in 
society, excelling in all sciences and raising society from its shackles of ignorance and 
poverty to one of knowledge and sustenance are all primary rights to be promoted within 
Gülen’s human rights vision. This does not mean that pure material progress is trumped 
over spiritual progress but rather there is a harmonious unification between the two 
views which enables a human being to see that all materials things are instruments for 
his/her own spiritual growth.167 Gülen’s view does in some respects correlate to the 
Western worldview of human rights because these rights give priority to education and 
the welfare of its citizens yet he differs from these rights because the promotion of these 
goods are not ends in themselves; they are linked to the self-discovery of human beings. 
 
The final foundation, human being’s awareness of both worldly and otherworldly or 
spiritual rights, is perhaps the most intriguing because Gülen explicitly adds a spiritual 
dimension to the content of human rights, not just its epistemological foundations. He 
argues that rights are not merely legal, moral or political entities. Rights can also be 
spiritual i.e rights which are to do with one’s existential condition are also valid for 
human beings to abide by. So a human being that is backbitten against and loses his/her 
honour or one that fails to keep a promise thereby breaking the trust of the other are all 
spiritual rights. They are spiritual because they stop a person from reflecting God’s 
perfect attributes in himself/herself. They cannot take on a legal or political character 
because they cannot be enforced in this world. However, according to Gülen, 
enforceability of rights also exists in the hereafter. This is because we are ultimately 
accountable to God and God’s justice is paramount over all of His creation.168 Even if 
human beings do not enforce these spiritual rights, God does. This is a departure from 
the Western worldview of human rights that looks at rights as innate moral, legal and/or 
political capacities of human beings. These capacities, whilst theoretically are claimed to 
be independent of state machinery, are actually actualised by the executive, legislature 
and judiciary of a country. Gülen goes beyond these human processes and broadens the 
scope of enforceability by including God’s own knowledge, power and justice. 
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Together, these three foundations constitute a notable spiritual approach to human rights 
within the framework of the Islamic-Western discourse on rights. What is significant 
about Gülen’s view is that his underlying values of human choice, personal and social 
development and enforceability of spiritual rights actually correlate with values of the 
Western worldview of human rights. Human intellectual agency, the promotion of 
welfare and creating a harmonious social order are all goals of modern human rights yet 
Gülen uses these goals in a spiritual manner to make human beings think of a loftier end 
than themselves, God. It is also meant to unite Western and Eastern civilizations due to 
what the other lacks. Gülen argues, “Western civilization remains paralyzed because it is 
based mainly on science and Eastern (Asian) civilizations are not ‘true’ because in their 
present background they have no scientific background.”169 
 
3.4 Critiquing Fethullah Gülen 
 
Whilst Gülen’s principles are attractive and noble, he does not provide a practical 
framework of how to spiritually develop one’s self. He is clearly inspired by major Sufi 
philosophers such as Ibn Arabi and Rūmi and presumably it is the task of every human 
being to acquaint themselves with the Islamic spiritual tradition, or at the least, their 
own. Yet my question is, for the average human being who may not have access to these 
texts and teachers, lives in a predominantly material and technologically orientated 
world or may not have any recourse to religious tradition, is it too utopian to expect 
everyone to become al-insān al-kāmil? The goal itself is a noble one, one worthy to 
strive for but the question remains of how to do this in a modern world, which appears to 
be divorced from the “sacred.”170 Abrahamic Prophets propagated the teachings of God 
to their people and there was both a universal and contextual character to these 
teachings. The principles of One God, the promotion of morality and the concept of the 
hereafter remained a constant in their teachings yet their applicability and specific laws 
differed. The direction and times of worship, laws pertaining to people’s social 
problems, the nature of political processes and communicating revelation in accordance 
with peoples’ intellects were all important factors in inculcating a spiritual vision in 
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human beings. Gülen emphasises that media and charitable institutions need to be 
developed to reflect the spiritual teachings of Islām (focusing particularly on the values 
of mercy and tolerance) but we are left with the same problem: this assumes that people 
will accept the Islamic worldview of creation. It assumes that these institutions can be 
set up easily in Muslim countries as well as Western ones. The reality is that socio-
political and cultural dynamics make this task difficult, especially when a pre-existing 
religion has been the heritage of a country such as Christianity in the United Kingdom or 
when no religion has been the history of a country. In my view, what is required is a 
pragmatic concept that transcends religious and non-religious frameworks and which the 
layman can easily understand and apply in his/her life. The recognition of spiritual rights 
is again worthy but how many human beings understand the nature of enforceability of 
backbiting, jealousy or failing to keep a promise? In order for this understanding to 
occur, a framework needs to be constructed using the self which is applicable across 
religious and secular contexts. This way the Islamic-Western human rights discourse 
would not just originate from one view or be explicitly associated with a particular 
movement. Rather, the framework would be seen as innate within all human beings and 
which would positively contribute to human rights education as a whole.  
 
The second issue with Gülen’s approach is that he does not deal with the hard cases in 
the Islamic-Western human rights discourse. I have already commented on this problem 
in previous approaches and the same criticism applies here. Gülen provides values but 
not necessarily concrete solutions within Islamic and Western legal systems which is 
where, in many respects, human rights problems arise. Together the scriptural and 
spiritual approaches allow the verses and principles from the Qur’ān and sunnah to enter 
into the Islamic-Western human rights discourse but they do not necessarily tackle 
actual cases of conflict between the two systems with regards to issues such as women’s 
rights, slavery, the rights of non-Muslims in an evolving, globalised and pluralised 
society. Thus, I now evaluate the legal and jurisprudential approaches to the discourse 
which tackle these cases. 
 
4. Legal and Jurisprudential Approaches 
 
The legal and jurisprudential approaches to the Islamic-Western human rights discourse 
are arguably the most extensive since human rights is an essentially legal enterprise. I 
have divided this category into legal and jurisprudential because whilst both come under 
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the category of law and overlap with each other, they explore the discourse from specific 
areas within law. The legal approach focuses on primary and secondary legislation 
(statutes and case law) at a national and international level. It is concerned with legal 
processes and operating within established structures such as international human rights 
instruments, which is in fact a prime focus of this approach. Here, the approach to 
human rights is based on interpreting the scope and application of legislation in relation 
to the existing laws within Muslim jurisprudence, known as fiqh. The jurisprudential 
approach, however, is concerned with the philosophy of law i.e how sources are used to 
derive laws, hermeneutics, what constitutes a legal valid system and the epistemic nature 
of reason. In Muslim sciences, this is known as uṣūl al-fiqh (the principles of 
jurisprudence). This is less concerned with established legal structures; rather the goal is 
to formulate a consistent legal theory which fulfils the goals of the sharīʿah. 
Contemporary Muslim scholars are re-evaluating the goals of uṣūl al-fiqh in order to see 
how the discipline can respond to the questions posed by modern human rights.  Both 
approaches are needed in order to address the points of contention described early on in 
this chapter but they use the subject of law in different ways. I will begin with the legal 
approach. 
 
4.1 Legal Approach (1): Anver Emon 
 
The legal approach is exemplified by the works of Anver Emon and Mashood Baderin. 
Both scholars, whilst commenting on aspects of uṣūl al-fiqh, devote much of their work 
to comparing specific laws of fiqh (historical and modern) with national legal systems 
and the international legal system. Emon focuses on Islamic laws that existed in the 
classical (6th – 10th centuries) and post-classical (10th – 17th centuries) Muslim period, 
particularly in the major Sunni schools of thought (madhab). He pays particular attention 
to Muslim personal law (i.e laws pertaining to marriage, divorce, inheritance and other 
family issues) but also comments on punishment, apostasy and more recently, the 
treatment of dhimmis vis a vis the question of religious tolerance and pluralism within 
Islām.171 He examines the interaction between the historical juristic laws in these areas 
to laws that would later transpire in the British colonial period in Middle Eastern and 
Asian countries (especially India and Pakistan), modern laws enacted by Muslim states 
owing to their own political authority and finally, the place of sharīʿah in Canada as 
                                                          
171
 See: Emon, Anver M., Religious Pluralism and Islamic Law: Dhimmis and Others in the Empire 
of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
81 
 
Muslim minorities require legal redress to their problems based on their own scriptural 
sources.172 The goal of his continuing and in-depth research work is to highlight the 
dynamism of Islamic law on its own merit, its contextual ability to respond to modern 
human rights issues and how this dynamism has been curtailed by colonialist influences 
on Islamic law as well as misconceptions about the nature of sharīʿah and the juristic 
enterprise. The human rights discourse within his work is tackled by an examination of 
classical Islamic laws on the aforementioned issues, notable case law and the need for 
collaboration between Western and Muslim legal systems to accommodate the needs of 
Muslim minorities in Western countries. 
 
Emon’s approach to the Islamic-Western human rights discourse begins by emphasising 
the inherent dynamism in Islamic law. Refuting Orientalists such as Noel Coulson and 
Joseph Schacht, Emon argues that the very concept of ijtihād in Islamic law shows that 
Muslims scholars in the past and presently understand that the laws they are deriving 
evolve over time. This is the very nature of ijtihād – the employment of reason in order 
to derive a law applicable to a new situation. This is substantiated by the legal devices 
used to legislate over varying social and political circumstances. So qiyās (analogical 
reasoning) allowed a freer use of reason in analysing new cases and extracting the 
similarity in facts and/or concepts with legal cases in aḥadīth, istiḥsān (juristic 
preference) gave greater discretion to a judge and in particular, maṣlaḥa mursala (public 
interest, well-being or welfare) was and continues to be evoked to legislate over 
situations for the greater good of society.173 All of these have also been used within the 
framework of maqāsid al-sharīʿah i.e the goals of the law demonstrating that Islamic law 
was not just textual. It considered non-textual methods, rooted in human rationality, in 
order to guide people. In some respects, these legal devices correlate with some of the 
considerations of Western human rights. The utilitarian notion of promoting the greatest 
good for the greatest number can be compared with maṣlaḥa mursala for the latter is 
concerned with the welfare of society. Western human rights emphasises the reduction 
of poverty and accessibility of education and basic life amenities as its core values and 
makes decisions on promoting them by looking at where the greatest number of people 
would benefit. This is clearly a pragmatic concern and brings Islamic law and Western 
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law closer together in the area of social welfare which is definitely a goal of sharīʿah as 
Muslims are expected to pay zakāt (alms) and khums (one-fifth charity tax) in order to 
help poor people. Baderin also makes this argument but broadens it within the scope of 
international law, as I will show below. 
 
Emon further substantiates the aforementioned argument by making case for the 
presence of natural rights within the Islamic legal tradition. By natural rights, he means 
the ability of human beings to speak on behalf of God without recourse to scripture; 
reason can hold an ontological authority akin to scripture.174 Although there are those 
such as Makdisi who argue against the presence of this tradition since Muslims scholars 
looked at (and continue to do so) reason not as an independent source of law but as only 
discovering the Divine law.175 This limits the creative role of reason in guiding human 
beings. Emon however argues that whilst in theory this may have been the case, in 
practice jurists had to legislate over new situations and balance the rights of God with 
the rights of people. They had to have a conception of humanity in order to make a 
judgement about a case for which scripture did not provide a solution. The reliance on 
their own legal judgements with reference to how human beings saw themselves in the 
society they lived in is an example of the natural rights tradition at work. What is 
intriguing here is that if Emon’s argument is to be accepted, it would correlate more with 
the history of Western human rights which often posits Aristotle, Aquinas and the 
development of natural law in the 17th and 18th centuries as the precursors to modern 
human rights.176 This would unify the Western and Islamic legal systems together in 
their historical development which is often a source of conflict since sharīʿah is seen as 
immutable the rights of human beings are decided by God Himself. 
 
The second aspect of Emon’s approach to the human rights discourse is to analyse 
notable cases concerning Islamic law, particularly in the British colonial period, where 
Muslims had to negotiate their rights under a ruling authority. He argues that Anglo-
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Muḥammadan law existed in India where the British Law Lords of the Judicial 
Committee chose classical Muslims texts by which to govern Muslim personal law. Al-
Hidaya, a classical Sunni Hanafi text, was chosen in order to address legal problems of 
Muslim subjects in accordance with their own sources. However, British common law 
still played a huge role in interpreting the applicability these texts and so Muslims’ 
rights resulted from a hybrid approach combining Islamic and Western law. Using the 
Baker Ali case177, Emon argues that this combination actually restricted the dynamism of 
Islamic law as it became text based, not context based. Thus, the negotiation of Muslims 
rights resulted from one particular school of thought (Hanafi), were bound by that text 
(or a few selected texts), had little recourse to supplementary Arabic sources to aid court 
judgements, were influenced by the British approach to law, community life and 
political authority and finally, other Muslims such as the Shī‘a were excluded from 
using their own legal sources. This debilitated Islamic law and affected both Muslims 
and non-Muslims understanding of the capability of Islamic law to evolve and adapt to 
new situations.  
 
The negative effect of British colonialism adds an important dimension to the Islamic-
Western human rights discourse because it shows that the entity of Islamic law that 
jurists and reformists are commenting on is partly a product of the colonial experience of 
Muslims. So the breadth of legal texts in Arabic and Persian in seminaries (both in the 
Shī‘a and Sunni world) are not necessarily due to the dynamism of the Islamic tradition. 
Rather it is the influence of British colonial authorities that led Muslim jurists to 
emphasise text over context. Moreover, many of these texts repeated the same ontology 
and epistemology about the world, the reductive nature of reason, the nature of the four 
sources of Islamic law178 and the type of legal devices used to produce solutions for new 
situations. Thus, when we evaluate the human rights discourse, we are not necessarily 
dealing with Islamic law as an independent entity in itself; rather it is an entity 
influenced by British colonialism. At the other end of the spectrum, Makdisi has argued 
Western law has also been influenced by the Islamic legal tradition and should not be 
                                                          
177
 Baker Ali Khan v. Anjuman Ara (1903) 30 IA 94, reprinted in Asaf Ali Asghar Fyzee, Cases in the 
Muḥammadan Law of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, 2d ed. By Tahir Mahmood (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 4–16 
178
 According to the Shī‘a, the four sources of law are: Qur’ān. sunnah (tradition), ijmā’ (consensus) 
and ‘aql (reason); in the Sunni legal tradition, qiyās (analogy) replaces‘aql as the fourth source of law. 
For an analysis of why the Shī‘ī and Sunni tradition differed on the fourth source of law, see: al-Ṣadr, 
Muḥammad Bāqir., Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence – according to Shī‘ī law (London: ICAS 
Press, 2003), pp. 25 – 38 and pp. 49 – 53. 
84 
 
considered as only originating from Greek and European origins.179 Emon’s point is 
valuable in broadening the human rights discourse showing that the Islamic and Western 
worldviews are not as far as part as many may think. The notion that Anglo-
Muḥammadan law existed before and despite the somewhat limiting effects on Islamic 
law, it should give both Muslim and Western scholars inspiration that two legal systems 
can work together to address the legal problems of diverse religious, cultural and racial 
groups.180 The former Archbishop of Canterbury’s, Rowan Williams, encouragement 
that there was a place for sharīʿah in British law is an example of this seldom optimism 
within the discourse.181 Yet not only was there a backlash towards his comments in 
Britain but in Ontario, a similar backlash occurred in 2005.182 Thus, whilst theoretical 
collaboration in both systems may be possible to address the points of contention in the 
human rights discourse as above, practically there needs to be greater acceptance by the 
wider public to remove the idea that Western human rights is an independent legal 
system that cannot accept any collaboration with other non-Western legal systems.  
 
The final argument by Emon is that the points of contention in the Islamic-Western 
human rights discourse and in particular, the accommodation of Muslim minority rights 
can be fostered by civil institutions. If the government of a country creates social and 
political space for Muslims to debate about how they want to interpret their laws in a 
country, positively interact with government institutions to accommodate these laws, 
increase the understanding of Islām amongst the public and operate within a 
“marketplace of Islamic legal ideas”183 that takes into account the numerous Muslim 
sects, then Islamic law would be digestible by those that oppose it. It would also foster 
creativity within Islamic law itself amongst public institutions rather than only being 
attached to Muslim communities, mosques and seminaries. This would reflect the 
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history of Islamic law which was fundamentally plural and acknowledged the different 
schools of thought and varying contexts which Muslims found themselves in.184 This is a 
practical approach by Emon and his suggestion is one of the few that provides a 
workable solution that can be implemented today to combat the distrust that exists 
between Islamic and Western legal systems. Thus, even before tackling the various 
points of contention in the human rights discourse, a positive understanding needs to be 
generated between the two systems. Whilst this echoes the approach of the dialogue 
exemplified by Sachedina and Mayer, Emon has suggested a practical solution rather 
than only saying that both systems need to engage with each other. Emon has also 
created this solution within the ambit of his conception of rights discourse between the 
two systems which means he is simultaneously tackling legal methodology and the 
implementation of that methodology. 
 
4.2 Critiquing Emon 
 
Emon’s approach is multi-faceted and does more than problematise the Islamic-Western 
human rights discourse. Emon clarifies the kind of Islamic law we are dealing with 
today, the inherent dynamism of Islamic law through legal devices and cases decided by 
Muslims judges (qāḍis) and jurists (fuqahā) and the role civil society can play in 
bringing greater engagement between the two systems. However, the primary criticism 
of Emon’s approach to the discourse is what happens in the marketplace of ideas when 
Muslim sects conflict with one another? The entrenchment of legal schools of thought 
amongst the Sunni and Shī‘a means that there will be a competing set of legal principles 
and values. If civil society manages this dialogue, who benefits? Can a government 
remain impartial to different Muslim sects in light of Emon’s own admission that the 
British colonial authorities in India chose a Hanafi text to manage particular legal 
disputes within Muslim communities, whether they were Sunni or not? If there is no 
effective management of this marketplace of ideas then human rights issues become 
caught up in sectarian disputes. Secondly, despite the plethora of Muslim interpretations, 
the idea that Islām has a scriptural foundation and a vision for humanity is important. 
There must be an acknowledgement that plurality does not mean an Islām without any 
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essential foundation or at least the quest for it. Human rights then become cultural rights, 
changing with every context but never really grounded in any core vision of humanity, 
which is the line of reasoning employed by Douzinas (this will be outlined at the end of 
the chapter).  
 
4.3 Legal Approach (2): Baderin 
 
Mashood Baderin’s approach is unique in that he is arguably the only scholar to make an 
article-by-article comparison of international human rights instruments and relevant 
Islamic laws. Baderin’s aim is for Islamic law and international human rights law to 
engage with each other but not just as a matter of dialogue; to see where specific areas of 
conflict lie in international human rights legislation and which solutions can be used to 
remedy these areas using both juristic devices such as maṣlaḥa and maqāsid al-sharīʿah 
as well as devices and institutions within international law. He goes beyond Emon in 
suggesting ways in which articles and aḥkām (rules) can interact in a world which 
operates using international law. Fiqh is a kind of international law in that Muslims are 
expected to abide by the laws derived through uṣūl al-fiqh wherever they may reside. 
Whilst certain laws may be under dispute owing to a new social context and a relevant 
jurist gives guidance here, laws pertaining to personal law, punishment, apostasy and 
legal relations with non-Muslims remain the same – at least in spirit. However, these are 
key areas of contention within the Islamic-Western human rights discourse and this is 
why Baderin argues that the only way Muslims and non-Muslims can evaluate the moral 
and legal validity of these areas is to see how they interact with each other in the 
international community today. 
 
Baderin’s principal approach to the discourse is to make a distinction between the 
universality and universalism of human rights. The Western worldview claims that 
human rights are universal but Baderin argues the content, interpretation and 
applicability of human rights differs across regions, cultures and religions. Thus it is 
more accurate to say that human rights may conceptually be universal but they are not 
universal when it comes to their applicability for each country or religion claims that 
their understanding of human rights is universal. 185 By making this distinction, Islamic 
law can be engaged with since just like any other legal system, Islamic law is making a 
claim that its conception of human rights is universal. Baderin then goes on to list all the 
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articles on human rights from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) including the right to self-determination, life, prohibition of torture, freedom 
from slavery, right to liberty and security of the person, the right to fair hearing and 
more. Within each of the rights, Baderin makes a comparison with the Cairo Declaration 
of Human Rights in Islām 1990 and relevant jurisprudential laws, verses of the Qur’ān 
and aḥadīth to show the similarities and differences between the two legal systems. He 
then goes onto suggest ways in which these differences can be reconciled using, in 
particular, the legal devices of maṣlaḥa and maqāsid al-sharīʿah. Thus, Baderin takes a 
trilateral legal approach to the discourse by using international human rights law, 
Muslim international human rights instruments and Muslim jurisprudential laws. 
 
Baderin argues that since the ICCPR has 74 signatories and 167 parties (this includes 41 
of the 57 member states of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC))186 and 
Muslim states have responded to the ICCPR by creating the Cairo Declaration of Human 
Rights in Islām 1990, it shows the international legal system is the natural system to be 
engaged with.  In fact, Muslims do not evoke the sharīʿah to respond to the social and 
political problems; rather human rights instruments are evoked because these are the 
rights accessible to them in their countries.187 At the same time, however, international 
law needs to engage with both the Cairo Declaration as well as Muslim jurisprudential 
laws in order appreciate the religio-ethical and family norms associated with Islamic 
law. This would allow Western human rights lawyers to appreciate the universalism of 
their own rights discourse which is a necessity if Islamic law is to be engaged with. 
Baderin cites numerous examples by which this can be done. For example, under 
Western human rights, men and women are equal yet in Islām, whilst they are spiritually 
equal, there is a difference in the legal rights and duties they possess. Women are 
obligated to observe ḥijāb (the head covering and bodily modesty) whereas men are not 
necessarily under the same obligation. There is a direct conflict here because Western 
human rights empowers men and women to make their own decisions as to their 
personal and social life and affords them the right to privacy. Baderin argues this can be 
resolved by giving a choice to women to observe ḥijāb. If they do not, no rights regime 
can force them to wear it. The Islamic law should remain in tact but should not be forced 
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upon individuals.188 This echoes the verse of the Qur’ān, “there is no compulsion in 
religion”189, which Baderin also uses to show that in the area of pluralism, nobody can 
be forced to become a Muslim.  
 
This pragmatic approach is also present regarding article 6(1) of the ICCPR, the right to 
life. Whilst everyone deserves the right to life and this is supported by many verses of 
the Qur’ān, article 6 also says that women should be given support when aborting their 
child. This is a clear clash with Islamic law since abortion is prohibited in Shī‘ī and 
Sunni law with the exception if the mother’s life is in danger. Baderin argues Islamic 
states and Muslims should continue to prohibit abortion but if an abortion does occur, 
then social and financial help should be available to the woman. With regards to ḥudūd 
(limit) punishments such as theft, fornication and adultery (zina), consumption of 
alcohol (khamr) and apostasy, there is again significant tension between Islamic and 
Western human rights because ḥudūd punishments are considered as rights of God with 
fixed punishments, not as rights of the people. Here, Baderin states that since the 
standard of proof is high for ḥudūd punishments, procedure can be an effective way of 
stopping ḥudūd punishments if they clash with particular moral and social values of a 
country or the international community in general. The ḥudūd punishments can be 
retained but their application can be severely restricted by procedural obstruction.190  
Many more examples can be cited here but in general, Baderin uses the technique of 
pragmatism drawing upon useful legal devices within the Islamic and Western 
international legal systems to solve the conflicts. 
 
Baderin finally suggests that in order to reconcile both systems of law and areas of 
conflict, greater human rights education needs to be initiated worldwide. Put simply, 
Muslims think Western human rights are a conspiracy or if they agree with them, they 
are not knowledgeable enough of how to use them.191 Moreover, Muslim jurists need to 
be predisposed in thinking about human rights when they make judgements, derive laws 
or issue fatāwa.192 Baderin also suggests creating Human Rights Watch Committees 
under international law to see how Muslim and Western states are applying human rights 
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in their countries and whether they are abusing those rights.193 This will ensure constant 
review of the implementation of human rights in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. 
This can be aided by setting up regional human rights bodies that monitor this 
implementation as well as unifying Islamic states which have a common heritage such as 
Middle Eastern countries like Saudia Arabia, Iraq, Bahrain.194 Even though these 
countries may have significant tensions with each other, regional human rights 
institutions that aim for cohesiveness rather than conflict are a noble enterprise. In 
amongst these institutions, there must also be an interpretive organ that is capable of 
interpreting the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights 1990 because Muslim states 
constantly abuse the rights contained in the document or when new legal situations arise, 
there is little guidance for Muslims as to how to deal with the Cairo Declaration and the 
laws pertaining to their own school of thought. Baderin argues that this is why the Cairo 
Declaration has remained a dormant, static international instrument in the Muslim 
world.195  
 
Furthermore, there should be a creation of a Wilāyat al-Madhālim (commission of 
wrongs) which is a kind of international human rights commission or court to resolve 
human rights abuses, adjudicate on cases and set precedent.196 This would allow Islamic 
law to evolve in international law and allow the international community to appreciate 
that Islamic law needs time to adapt to international legal institutions and norms. Here, 
Baderin cites the value of using the doctrine of margin of appreciation to allow national 
authorities and states to implement and interpret a particular human right in relation to 
their culture. This does not mean cultural relativism, as some would criticise but 
allowing a transition for that right to occur in a Muslim society – particularly in cases 
like apostasy, homosexuality and freedom of expression.197 All of these suggestions 
would positively engage Western and Islamic legal systems on the issue of human rights 
which Baderin terms as the “complementary approach.”198 Thus, Baderin’s approach to 
the discourse is one of pragmatism but in particular, a trilateral approach using 
international human rights law, Muslim international law and classical Islamic law or 
fiqh. 
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4.4 Critiquing Baderin 
 
Baderin should be commended in attempting to collaborate between the aforementioned 
three systems and the willingness to tackle the majority of hard cases that are the heart 
of the Islamic-Western human rights discourse. This marks a difference with Emon’s 
approach whose discourse is arguably more historical. However, when we look at the 
underlying methodology of Baderin, we find that he does not tackle the moral validity of 
both Islamic and Western international law. Granted that his thesis is not a 
jurisprudential exercise as such (though he mentions jurisprudential devices to deal with 
cases of conflict) but the pragmatic approach of Baderin only provides temporary 
solutions to deep-rooted points of contention in the Islamic-Western human rights 
discourse. Baderin still argues that many of the classical Islamic laws should remain in 
force in Muslim countries or for Muslims but that they should be suspended or modified 
in order for Islamic law to adapt to human rights conventions and to allow further human 
rights education to occur. Yet, for how long are we to suspend or modify Islamic laws 
that currently are a source of tension between Muslims and non-Muslims? Moreover, 
these laws are causing hardship for Muslims in how they actualise human rights for their 
lives. Thus, Baderin’s approach of pragmatism is a rather surface based approach to the 
points of contention discussed in this chapter.  
 
Secondly, whilst Baderin admits certain failings of international human rights law, he 
ultimately argues that this is the law that is accepted by the majority, including Muslims. 
He doesn’t initiate the same level of investigation into the problems inherent within 
international human rights as he does with Islamic law. If punishment or gender 
inequality is criticised in the Islamic tradition, the same level of analysis must be 
produced for Western human rights; otherwise the comparison can suffer from relativity. 
My thesis is to provide a concept by which a more foundational comparison can take 
place, which is through the concept of the self. Thirdly, Baderin uses certain verses and 
ḥadīth to show that rights such as the right to life are present in the Qur’ān or at the least, 
the Islamic legal tradition. However, like Maududi, these verses are highly contextual 
and Baderin can be criticised for using the scriptural tradition selectively. This is 
substantiated by his seldom use of Shī‘ī sources, which is another point of departure for 
this thesis as I explore the Shī‘ī viewpoint through ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and Zayn al-
‘Ābidīn. Finally, Baderin looks at Islamic law from a defensive point of view – it’s 
potential to adapt or be modified. He doesn’t look at what Islamic law can offer Western 
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human rights – a key strand of this thesis. Baderin’s approach makes Islamic law look as 
if it is playing ‘catch-up’ with Western international human rights and this reduces the 
capacity for Islamic law’s own creativity. In order for a deep level of investigation to 
occur, at least in Islamic law, I now tackle Abdullahi An-Na‘īm and Mohsen Kadivar 
who delve more deeply into uṣūl al-fiqh in order to tackle the points of contention in the 
Islamic-Western human rights discourse. 
 
4.5 Jurisprudential Approach (1): An-Na‘īm 
 
An-Na‘īm is arguably one of the most recognised voices in the Islamic-Western human 
rights discourse. This is because out of the many, he has suggested a new jurisprudential 
framework to tackle human rights issues through the notion of naskh (abrogation)199 in 
the Qur’ān, which was essentially the methodology of his notable teacher, Mahmoud 
Taha.200 An-Na‘īm’s argument is three-fold: re-defining sharīʿah, using Makkan verses 
over Madinan verses201 to allow greater rights discourse within Islamic law and 
promoting constitutionalism to safeguard human rights around the world. He begins by 
analysing the nature and historical circumstances in which sharīʿah developed. He 
argues that sharīʿah should actually be defined as “historical Islamic law”202 since the 
law made was a historical construct, influenced by its own social circumstances and 
local Arab customs. Whilst this law is relied on today, it is detached from evolving 
moral and social considerations and as such, it should be regarded as a historical law 
conducive for its own time. Today we are living in a time of “hybrid law”203 where legal 
systems and values intermesh and interact with each other. A prime example is the 
interaction between national, European and international law. Sharīʿah cannot be 
included in this hybrid law because it is failing to adapt to it and continues to rely on its 
historical notions of law, humanity and society. An-Na‘īm cites the example of slavery 
as proof of this. Western human rights has abolished slavery but today, were the 
conditions for slavery to be actualised, sharīʿah would still recognise it as a legal 
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institution. Sharīʿah was correct in dealing with slavery in the 7th – 9th centuries but now, 
its approach is immoral and illegal.204 Even ijtihād is restricted as a tool to reform 
sharīʿah because the epistemological framework in which it operates limits the use of 
reason in solving new issues. It is difficult to go against explicitly clear verses (nass) of 
the Qur’ān (and the nature of ḥudūd punishments are expressed in these types of verses) 
and its legal devices such as istiḥsān and maṣlaḥa do not go far enough in providing 
value-based solutions to human rights dilemmas.205 From this argument, An-Na‘īm 
proceeds to suggest a new hermeneutical theory in interpreting the Qur’ān in order to 
revolutionise Islamic law. 
 
An-Na‘īm argues that virtually all jurists believe the verses of the Qur’ān revealed in 
Madinah supersede the verses revealed in Makkah. This is because the Madinan verses 
were revealed later in time and therefore constitute the continual development of Islām 
as a religion and law. What jurists usually do is that they abrogate the Makkan verses in 
favour of the Madinan verses giving the latter legal and probative force. The Makkan 
verses and whatever content is contained in them (as far as the law is concerned) is 
reduced in value. Thus, the Madinan verses takes precedence in setting the scope and 
content of legal enquiry in Islamic law.206 However, an-Na‘īm argues (quoting Taha) 
that naskh or abrogation means cancelling, repealing or postponing verses because they 
are no longer operative for a particular time. Abrogation is not intended to be final or 
conclusive but merely postponement until the appropriate time. 207 So, when we want 
sharīʿah to evolve, we must consider the rationale beyond the text. What was the 
rationale for the Makkan and Madinan verses? According to Taha, the Makkan verses 
were and still are universal in nature whilst the Madinan verses were relevant for 
Prophet Muḥammad’s society in Madinah. The Madinan verses were suitable for a 
particular context but now they should be abrogated in favour of the Makkan verses 
since the latter contains the original vision and values of Islām which are adaptable to 
changing contexts. Jurists continue to abrogate the Makkan verses but really they should 
be abrogating the Madinan verses since these verses are context-specific and related to 
incidents such as wars, punishments, gender rights and interactions with different 
religious groups. The Makkan verses, however, addressed people as ‘O humankind’ (in 
contrast to the Madinan verses which addressed people as ‘O believers’) and promoted 
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the fundamental values of justice and equality amongst all human beings.208 If this new 
approach were to be adopted, the nature of Islamic law would have an ethos driven by 
core values of humanity which also correlate to the Western system of human rights. 
More than that, Islamic law would be adaptable to an evolving society and the true spirit 
of Islām would guide the derivation of law. 
 
An-Na‘īm then gives an idea what values should be at the foundation of this reformation 
of Islamic law as well as augur a reconciliatory approach with international human rights 
law. He identifies the principle of reciprocity, the will to live and the will to be free as 
three key values that form a constitutionalist approach to both Islamic law and 
international law. A constitution not only enforces effective limitations on the powers of 
government and imposes positive obligations on it but must do so to achieve certain 
objectives. Citing the definition of Lord Bolingbroke, he states “a constitution is that 
assemblage of laws, institutions and customs, derived from certain fixed principles of 
reason, directed to certain fixed objects if public good, that compose the general system, 
according to which the community has agreed to be governed.”209 This definition is 
crucial for an-Na‘īm because it allows him to set values for Islamic law which would 
shift it from its historical construct to a modern, constitutional one. He dismisses that 
Islamic history had shūra (consultation) because according to him caliphs such as Abū 
Bakr, d. 13/634 acted on his own discretion (going against the majority view of the 
leading companions of the Prophet) in deciding to fight against the Arab tribesmen who 
rebelled after the Prophet’s death. Similarly, ‘Umar b. Khaṭṭāb (d. 23/644), the second 
caliph of Islam, went against the majority of companions in deciding to distribute the 
lands taken as spoils of war in southern Iraq.210 Thus, one cannot revert back to history 
to claim that the Muslim community had agreed to be governed in a particular way. This 
allows an-Na‘īm a clean slate to formulate values on how Muslim communities in an 
international legal system would should govern themselves and adapt to the evolving 
human rights discourse.  
 
It is here we find direct correlation with the Western human rights system because he 
argues that the principle of reciprocity should drive a Muslim constitution and any 
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constitution for that matter. The principle of reciprocity is based on the golden rule, the 
idea that one should treat others as one would wish to be treated. We cannot deny 
anyone rights that we believe we are entitled to and this rule forms the basis of any 
rights discourse and governance of a society. He acknowledges that both Muslim and 
Western nations abuse this principle and more needs to be done not to abuse this basic 
rule of law. He substantiates this by adding that every human being desires two things: 
the will to live and the will to be free. The will to live includes the right to shelter and a 
decent quality of life and the will to be free means the desire for personal excellence.211 
These two qualities are fundamental for any human being and should spearhead the 
Islamic-Western human rights discourse. All of these values which would constitute the 
‘public good’ of a constitution can be justified from the Islamic and Western 
philosophical tradition and in his words, “minimise the suffering”212 around the world.  
 
4.6 Critiquing An-Na‘īm 
 
An-Na‘īm’s approach to the Islamic-Western human rights discourse set the tone for 
later contributions because he did not just criticise sharīʿah but attempted to reform it. 
Using the theory of abrogation of Taha, An-Na‘īm provides a different jurisprudential 
framework which Muslim jurists can use to develop sharīʿah in the modern age. An-
Na‘īm goes further in citing values that are common to both Islamic and Western 
conceptions of human rights and this forms the basis of his notion of constitutionalism. 
However, An-Na‘īm’s approach has some limitations. Firstly, as has been a somewhat 
been a reoccurring theme with Sachedina, Mayer and Baderin, international human 
rights law is seen as the benchmark for the conception of a human rights order in the 
world. In fact, An-Na‘īm calls it a “glorious achievement.”213 Of course this was in the 
1990s when the culture of military unilateralism was starting to grow i.e when states 
decided it was their right to invade a country to pursue a particular moral or political 
agenda. Now this culture has gathered significant moment with the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively by the United States and United 
Kingdom. Thus the glorious and binding nature of international human rights is now 
under question which is why in later writings an-Naim states,  
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“In my view, the invasion and continued occupation of Iraq by the United States and the 
United Kingdom is tantamount to 19th century colonialism. The legal definition of 
colonialism is the usurpation of the sovereignty of a people through military invasion 
and occupation by one or more foreign powers, which is exactly what the United States 
and United Kingdom have done in Iraq since April 2003. Such repudiation of the 
foundational principles of international law itself deprives international human rights 
law of the basis of its legal authority and binding force.”214  
 
However, he also continues to admit that the United States and United Kingdom still 
have a better human rights record than other governments. My question here is how can 
international human rights continue to be a standard by which to understand human 
rights when it is being abused by powerful nations and carries little binding force in 
international law? An-Na‘īm does not sufficiently address this question which is one of 
the motivating reasons for his reformation of Islamic law thesis. Secondly, An-Na‘īm’s 
aim in reforming Islamic law is to alleviate suffering and enlighten Muslims on the 
backwardness of sharīʿah as a public law. Yet the alleviation of suffering requires a 
mode of enquiry deeper than law. Whilst An-Na‘īm admits Taha’s reform methodology 
had a “strong mystic orientation”215, he does not develop this further. The mystical side 
of human rights as commented on earlier under the heading of the ‘spiritual approach’ is 
equally important and had An-Na‘īm also developed this, the alleviation of suffering 
could be done through concepts pertaining to the self – the main thrust of this thesis. 
Despite these limitations, An-Na‘īm provides a stronger approach to the Islamic-
Western human rights discourse than many of those evaluated so far. I will finally 
examine Mohsen Kadivar who has also pursued a similar line of jurisprudential enquiry 
to An-Na‘īm. 
 
4.7 Jurisprudential Approach (2): Mohsen Kadivar 
 
Mohsen Kadivar has become a prominent voice in the Islamic-Western human rights 
discourse in the last decade. This is not only because of criticisms of Iran’s human rights 
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policies (both to its citizens and its approach to the international community) for which 
he has extensively written about but also Kadivar’s understanding of both Islamic and 
Western human rights systems and their philosophical underpinnings. Combining a 
seminary approach to his work (similar to An-Na‘īm who delved into the theory of 
abrogation), Kadivar advocates reforming Muslim jurisprudence in order to develop 
Islamic law for modern human rights situations.216 Kadivar begins his enquiry with the 
nature of sharīʿah akin to An-Na‘īm but then proceeds to show the status of reason (aql) 
within the Islamic tradition. His main argument here is that Islamic law has restricted the 
use of reason to discover norms and specifically, human rights. This is the core part of 
Kadivar’s thesis – the resuscitation of reason within uṣūl al-fiqh. The final aspect of 
Kadivar’s approach is to examine specific cases of conflict in the Islamic-Western 
human rights discourse through an analysis of human rights issues such as gender 
inequality and slavery. 
 
Kadviar begins his approach to the discourse by arguing that much of the conflict with 
Western human rights lies in Islamic aḥadīth (narrations), rather than the Qur’ān itself.217 
Whilst there are explicit verses of the Qur’ān which conflict with certain human rights 
norms (for example, in the areas of punishment), most areas of contention are found 
with narrations. This is because the body of narrations constitute evidence of historical 
norms in Prophet Muḥammad’s, the companions’ and Imāms’ periods which they had to 
address within their epistemological framework. Many of these narrations cannot be 
used today in setting universal norms for rights because they were highly context-
specific and the commands issued by Prophet Muḥammad were relative to the cases that 
he encountered. Thus, the first task for Muslim scholars is to reduce the status of 
narrations as source of law in our understanding of a universal notion of human rights. 
This reduction must be understood within the “epistemic constellation” of sharīʿah i.e 
the four sources of Islamic law.218 This classical constellation which provides the 
cornerstones of sharīʿah actually contain an inherent presumption about how the cosmos 
should be viewed. God is at the centre of creation and thus there is a preoccupation with 
His rights or finding out what sharīʿah should be i.e what God’s way should be.219 
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However, Western human rights have a human-centric view of the world i.e what human 
beings require to live their life morally and successfully. This concern of Western 
human rights positions the legal decision-making process towards the rights and needs 
of human beings where as Islamic legal decision-making is concerned more with 
pleasing God rather than attending to the needs of human beings. Whilst of course 
Islamic law contains many chapters on financial, contractual, social and political 
situations, these areas have not been developed today for the evolving needs of human 
beings. Thus there needs to more concentration on the humanness of human beings i.e 
the kind of dignified life a human being requires in order to live in the modern world. 
Here, Kadivar argues that jurists have been preoccupied with a historical Islām whereas 
the task should go back to the spirit of Islām in order to meet the needs of human 
beings.220 
 
It is here Kadivar cites the main obstacle as to why jurists have not made this transition – 
their understanding of reason. He argues that reason is treated merely as a discoverer of 
God’s law, not as an independent source for deriving norms. This is because in uṣūl al-
fiqh, human reason is regarded as unreliable – it does not yield certainty when 
understanding a subject.221 By coming to this conclusion, Muslim jurists have taken the 
position of the Asharites instead of the Mutazilites who elevated the role of reason in 
guiding society. This reduces the ability of the human mind to grasp moral concepts 
since it will always fall foul to base desires and corruption. As a result, human beings 
should turn to their Divine law-giver, God, who has already formulated perfect laws 
through scripture. The task therefore is for the human mind to discover these laws and 
this is the way to attain human felicity.222 This is why sharīʿah is considered to be 
unchangeable since God, as the perfect Being, can never change and His decisions are 
perfect. Thus His law remains fixed until the Day of Judgement. The overall effect of 
this is sharīʿah becomes unresponsive to new situations and this is worsened by the 
greater importance given to fiqh in seminaries, both Shī‘a and Sunni, in relation to other 
important fields which use a greater rational and empirical enquiry such as sociology 
and politics.223 Western human rights, in contrast, are based on a posterior approach and 
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norms arise from human beings’ collective decision-making. Western human rights 
empower human beings’ capacity for reason and this is where the real conflict lies in the 
Islamic-Western human rights discourse. 
 
Kadivar concludes in a similar vein to An-Na‘īm that today, Western human rights are 
preferable to Islamic human rights since the former effectively deals with human rights 
dilemmas whilst the latter remains inadaptable. Here, Kadivar deals with specific cases 
of conflict. He states that Islamic law fosters inequality between Muslims and non-
Muslims such as a Muslim cannot marry one who does not believe in God, there are also 
certain impositions or restrictions if they attend Muslims’ places of worship and in terms 
of religious pluralism, non-Muslims are accorded a lower spiritual status. However, 
Kadivar argues religion should not lead to discrimination. Good deeds will be judged by 
God in the hereafter but in this world, non-discrimination on basis of religion is closer to 
justice and in fact, in conditions of equality people will turn to religion sincerely. Thus, 
the fairest way is to reject the special rights which all religious believers claim, including 
Muslims. This approach is closer to the mercy of God since, “if God has put the 
blessings of nature at everyone’s disposal without any distinction or discrimination, why 
should we not proceed on the same basis? What rational argument could possibly justify 
discrimination on the basis of religion and faith?”224  
 
Kadivar then goes on to tackle gender inequality arguing that currently, Islamic law 
believes women have biological, psychological and intellectual defects. However, not 
only are women capable in all social fields but if racial differences do not lend to 
inequality, why should gender? Kadviar argues this goes against the spirit of the Qur’ān 
which accords the same spiritual status for men and women in this world and the 
hereafter and both genders are meant to aspire for the same level of piety in this 
world.225 Finally, Kadviar also argues slavery cannot be considered a legal institution 
anymore and goes against the human dignity of the individual and that Muslim jurists 
have been afforded more rights than the human beings which they legislate over. He 
questions why jurists have been given so much power to intrude in Muslims’ personal 
lives and issue fatawa about the way they dress and interact with other human beings. 
Rather, they should be put under a greater level of public scrutiny through democratic 
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processes.226 The methodology in Kadivar’s approach here is to allow reason to judge 
the morality and immorality of a human rights case without necessary having any 
recourse to scripture. This would put him must closer to An-Na‘īm (Kadivar also uses 
the Makkan and Madinan distinction in his analysis227) as the interpretation of Makkan 
verses requires a freer use of reason. Overall, Kadivar’s solutions to human rights 
dilemmas involve examining the experiences of human beings in the areas of race or 
gender and then seeing whether human beings’ decision-making has been successful 
here. If they have, then they can act as a sufficient source to reform jurisprudence. 
 
4.8 Critiquing Kadivar 
 
Kadivar’s approach to the Islamic-Western human rights discourse echoes many points 
of An-Na‘īms methodology but where Kadivar differs is in his focus on the role of 
reason within Muslim jurisprudence. As a Shī‘ī intellectual, he brings the Shī‘ī tradition 
within the discourse which many have not done but his use of the Shī‘ī tradition is in 
terms of its philosophical use of reason and some of the universal narrations of the 
Imāms. He has not examined the Shī‘ī tradition in terms of what it can offer to Western 
human rights; it is used in terms of reforming uṣūl al-fiqh and reconciling with the 
Western philosophical viewpoint. There are major Shī‘ī sources such as Nahj al-Balāgha 
and Risālat al-Ḥuqūq which have a rights discourse within them but these do not figure 
in Kadivar’s deliberations, nor Sacehdina’s – despite both scholars coming from a Shī‘ī 
background. These texts are the focus of my thesis showing another point of departure 
with the authors discussed thus far. The second criticism of Kadivar’s approach is that if 
he is elevating the role of reason, just as Western human rights does, what is the 
difference between Islamic human rights and Western human rights? What becomes of 
sharīʿah and what is the true spirit of Islām? Why not simply follow Western human 
rights and abandon the project of reforming Muslim jurisprudence? This is a similar 
criticism levelled at Baderin and my thesis departs from them by constructing an identity 
for the Islamic rights discourse that is both independent of Western human rights but is 
capable of providing a unifying perspective to it through the concept of the self.  
 
Ultimately, the legal and jurisprudential approaches have a lot to offer to the Islamic-
Western human rights discourse because they attempt to carve out solutions from a 
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multi-jurisdictional viewpoint. This is inevitably difficult because of the differing 
epistemological positions of the international, national and Muslim legal systems. 
Emon’s discourse is significantly historical but he comes up with solutions to human 
rights dilemmas using the processes and institutions of civil society. Baderin is more 
practical; he uses both jurisprudential and international legal devices to reconcile the 
human rights conflicts in the Islamic and Western worldviews yet these are mainly 
pragmatic and do not go the heart of human rights dilemmas. An-Na‘īm is perhaps 
singled out as offering a new jurisprudential framework through the theory of abrogation 
and cites common values between the two worldviews in his understanding of 
constitutionalism. Finally, Kadivar echoes much of what An-Na‘īm says but focuses on 
the role of reason in his approach thus emphasising a key epistemological problem in 
Islamic law within the human rights discourse. I will now show how my thesis departs 
from the approaches discussed so far and comment on the need for the self in Islamic-
Western human rights discourse. 
 
5. Re-evaluating the Notion of Human Rights in the Islamic-Western Human 
Rights Discourse and Shifting it towards the Concept of the Self 
 
It is my contention that despite the merit of the aforementioned approaches in this 
chapter, they all have key limitations the primary of which is the lack of attention given 
to the self in human rights discourse and coming up with a practical framework in order 
to tackle the evolving understanding of human rights that is neither about Islām or the 
West but about “boundless desire”228 which empowers individuals above and beyond 
legal and social institutions. The scholars analysed in this chapter operate on an 
understanding that human rights are moral and legal entities that honour individuals, are 
meant to be promoted throughout the world through international law, operate as social 
contract between individuals, are jus cogens and therefore are peremptory norms for the 
maintenance of the international legal order and are constructed through an empowered 
notion of reason that entitles human beings to various categories of social and political 
rights. This understanding views human rights through political and legal lenses, not 
through the lens of the self. Scriptural and spiritual approaches, as valuable as they are in 
providing a worldview of human rights based on God and revelation, are impractical 
because they cannot be integrated into the current international legal order which is 
secular and devoid of any revelation. The scholars in this chapter assume that the Islamic 
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and/or Western conception of rights through either sharīʿah or international human rights 
law have valid conceptions of what rights are. Despite their notable attempts to reform 
the discourse, the underlying problem of human rights as a tool by which to empower or 
construct the human being to pursue immoral desires are not tackled. It is to this issue I 
now turn which will allow me to sieve the role of the self in the Islamic-Western human 
rights discourse as well as identify the points of departure for my thesis. 
 
The first criticism in the way the Islamic-Western human rights discourse operates is in 
its notion that human rights constitute entities which help human beings by increasing 
their own dignity, personhood and social well-being – an argument supported by 
Sachedina, Mayer, Kadivar and Baderin. Though these scholars argue human rights can 
be abused, none of them actually question this basic premise. Costas Douzinas has 
devoted much of his work in questioning this premise and I outline his key arguments 
here. Firstly, far from human rights being natural and innate within human beings, they 
are in fact institutional entities that are negotiated through political agreements of states. 
He argues, “rights are tools and strategies for deﬁning the meaning and powers of 
humanity…the law and rights make a central contribution to the project of becoming a 
subject through the reciprocal acknowledgement of self and the (mis)recognition of 
others.”229 The promotion of human rights is often promoted in the language of what is 
owed to human beings, what allows them to prosper and what is moral for them but the 
reality is that rights are used as a discourse to accomplish political objectives and 
construct subjects around the world to serve those objectives. So when Third-World 
countries do not have access to rights it is because powerful institutions that promote 
human rights have made these countries as subjects that need rights. A long as this 
power relations remains (echoing Foucault’s argument), human rights becomes a 
valuable tool for dominant nations and “jurisprudence and natural law seem to be ex 
post facto rationalisation of workings of power.”230 
 
Secondly, scholars in the Islamic-Western human rights discourse such as an-Na‘īm 
attempt to define human rights through dignity, reason, reciprocity, the will to live and 
the will to be free. According to Douzinas, however, the reality is that human rights are a 
“floating signifier”231 that is subjectively used by the will of the individual or the will of 
the state. In the name of human rights, invasions and abuses occur and thus rights are not 
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grounded in anything intrinsic. In fact, human rights occupy a position between an ideal 
and law – always aspiring to guide human beings in their endeavours but rarely 
implemented procedurally and fairly. Thus the human rights discourse is merely a 
language for aspirations of a particular social group to enforce its vision of humanity on 
others. This is where international law does not become a helpful mechanism to 
actualise human rights. In fact, Douzinas argues international law does not aid human 
rights in providing basic amenities to those that need it. Rather it is concerned with 
upholding rights claims of a country and this shifts the human rights discourse from one 
of humanitarianism to patriotism.232  
 
Thirdly, despite the claim that human rights are universal, many groups such as 
refugees, those considered alien under international law and those who are stateless are 
not granted human rights. They may possess rights in theory but they are not actualised 
under international law because human rights are only granted to citizens of states.233 
This makes human rights an enterprise of states and rich individuals rather than those 
that truly need them.234 Linked to this is the notion that since human beings are 
sovereign decision-makers of rights, human rights are not self-evaluative concepts. 
Douzinas argues that as God and revelation became severed from the rights discourse, 
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Tom Paine advanced the idea 
that natural law was not abstract but inherent in citizens. These natural rights didn’t have 
a transcendental purpose and so could be manipulated by society.235 Maududi and Gülen 
were trying frame the human rights discourse within the sovereignty of God based on an 
epistemology which posited God as the true interpreter of rights. As human beings are 
limited in their intellect and capacities, they can never have real sovereignty over rights 
and this is similar to Douzinas’ argument as above.  
 
Here, Douzinas believes there has been a paradoxical development in human rights. 
Human rights has become like a religion, a new world order where, as Tom Farer 
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argues, the wars are “between believers in free peoples and markets, on the one hand, 
and inﬁdels on the other; it is a war between democratic capitalism and its enemies.”236 
Thus, whilst human rights is often seen as being independent from religion in the 
Islamic-Western human rights discourse (hence the apparent tension between the Islamic 
and Western worldviews), it has taken on some characteristics of religion by espousing 
beliefs in democracy, secularism, rights and human sovereignty. These become the 
“religious” values of human rights though they are severed from the traditional notion of 
religion as being a system which worships a greater transcendental being or entity such 
as God. 
 
Fourthly, human rights are a product of modernity and Douzinas argues, “modernity 
does not just enthrone the individual. It is the epoch of the free reign of will and its 
darker companion – desire.”237 Human rights empower the individual to claim his/her 
desires and do so through legitimate legal processes which validate his/her will. Human 
rights are seen as a social contract notion and so when I claim my right to life or privacy, 
I enjoy the subject-matter that I am claiming – my life, my privacy etc… However, 
through this process I become an autonomous agent constructed in my legal relationship 
of claiming my human rights. Thus, I obtain more than my right; I define myself through 
the process of claiming my right and become a fully fledged human rights claimant 
which both defines me and actualises me as a legal agent. However, this can be 
dangerous because the traditional conception of human rights as setting moral standards 
for individuals actually become tools for expressing one’s own social, political and legal 
needs, independent of any measuring criterion. In fact, human rights is a “a subversive 
theory destined to foster tension and conflict among states”238 because human rights 
treaties explicitly protect persons, not as citizens or representatives of a state but as 
human beings regardless of state affiliation.239 Legal and political processes may 
validate peoples’ claims to rights but it does not stop their expression in society.  
 
Today, we are seeing individual terrorism (for example, the 7/7 and 9/11 bombings), 
people claiming their right of free speech even though they may abuse another person or 
religion and people wanting to abort babies in the name of their own dignity. These very 
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expressions need to be evaluated because they are spurred by a human rights discourse 
that endlessly empowers human beings without giving them any deeper moral or 
spiritual worldview in which to assess the very rights they are claiming. If this 
evaluation does not take place, human rights become artificial legal constructs which are 
not concerned with human motivations. For example, when you sell someone faulty 
goods you are liable or when you kill someone, you commit a criminal offence. 
However, the inner motivation of why the human being committed the offence in the 
first place is adjunct from legal processes. How can law provide a remedy to a situation 
of conflict when it is not concerned with what led the human being to commit the 
offence in the first place? This is the domain of the self, the focus of this thesis, which is 
where a human being’s motivations lie. I argue this needs to be tackled first in the 
Islamic-Western human rights discourse because it is so fundamental to one’s 
enforcement of a right. This is a line of enquiry which the aforementioned scholars in 
this chapter have not pursued with the exception of Gülen who has alluded to the idea in 
his notion of al-insān al-kāmil. 
 
Finally, Douzinas states that law can never capture the complexity of individual 
differences, needs, histories and claims. Human rights advance the claim that all human 
beings are united together with their capacity for dignity, honour, reason, creative power 
and sovereignty in this world. The reality is that many human beings feel they do not 
possess such dignity or are not given the capacity for this creativity because of poverty, 
injustice and denial of human rights. Human rights generalises the poor socio-economic 
conditions of individuals and assumes that everyone can access rights. However, our 
differences construct our identities and the rights we claim. A poor person may not 
understand the right to privacy but may understand his right for food, right to advance 
his/her own cultural ethos and the right to not be invaded. These rights are personal to 
his/her own circumstances and may not be advanced by the human rights agenda of the 
international community. Thus, if one’s claim to a right is outside the definitions of the 
international community, one’s right is not upheld.  
 
This is where Douzinas argues that states advance “military humanitarianism” in order 
to promote a particular conception of human rights and ignore the differences of human 
beings in claims for specific rights. Military humanitarianism is where states intend to 
invade a country in the name of human rights, democracy and what is ‘good’ and at the 
same time, give that very country humanitarian aid after the bombing. This is 
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paradoxical because the promotion of human rights is not done in accordance with the 
needs of the invaded country in question and the humanitarian aid sent afterwards 
merely reflects what the invader psychologically lacks. America may consider Iraq to be 
a suffering victim at the hands of an evil-doer, Saddam Hussein, so it considers itself the 
moral rescuer. All of this, however, is a reflection of our own limitations as human 
beings and how we wish to satisfy our insecurities by creating human beings that 
become “infinite collector of rights.”240 If there is a human rights problem in the world, 
the solution is to give people rights, whether these rights are actually suitable for them or 
not. The real problem, Douzinas express, is “we present the Other as radically different, 
precisely because he is what we both love and hate about ourselves, the childhood and 
the beast of humanity.”241 We, as human beings, are the suffering victim needing 
fulfilment and justice in our lives, we create our own problems by promoting injustice 
and hence we are the evil-doers. However, we are also the rescuers since only we can 
stop this vicious circle. Until we appreciate the Other as an equally honourable human 
being, we will be trapped in our conceptions of suffering, evil and rescue and this 
widens the gap of justice and injustice in the world.  
 
Thus, Douzinas’ five arguments are rooted in shifting the human rights discourse to 
evaluating human desires, psychological insecurities, empowerment and identity. If 
these are not tackled, any theory or framework to combat human rights dilemmas, 
particular those in the Islamic-Western discourse, may fail. Moreover, all of these relate 
to how a human being sees his/her self i.e his/her identity, consciousness, personality, 
soul or ‘I-ness.’ This is a strand that is seldom discussed in the Islamic-Western human 
rights discourse which gives a major departure point for my thesis: the relevance of the 
self in the Islamic-Western human rights discourse. It is to this issue I now turn. 
 
6. The Role of the Self in the Islamic-Western Human Rights Discourse and 
Points of Departure of this Thesis 
 
The contribution of my thesis which makes a marked difference from the approaches 
discussed thus far to the discourse is looking at human rights from the lens of the self. 
All of the scholars have admitted that human rights are abused by both Muslim and 
Western states, sharīʿah needs to be reformed or at least, modified in some way to meet 
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the evolving needs of human rights, the suffering of human beings should be the 
foremost concern of international law and a criteria needs to be suggested in order to 
provide a unifying worldview to human rights and make them meaningful to people – 
not as merely as claims but as moral entities. Douzinas argues, “the other comes ﬁrst. I 
exist through my relating to the ‘existence of others, to other existences, and to the 
otherness of existence’. To be just to the other we need criteria but those available 
misﬁre.”242 Sachedina opens up the enquiry of looking at one’s fiṭrah, soul and 
personhood within human rights discussions243, Baderin argues there needs to be greater 
human rights education244, An-Na‘īm roots his reformation of Islamic law in the 
alleviation of suffering around the world245 and Gülen argues human beings must strive 
to become al-insān al-kāmil.246 My question is how will this be accomplished if human 
beings are not educated on the nature of the self and in particular, a framework in order 
to access that self?  
 
In line with Douzinas, it is my contention that human rights are fundamentally 
expressions of human wants and desires. They are not just legal and political entities 
though they are certainly influenced by legal and political processes. Today, however, 
we see a major shift in human rights. Human rights can subvert state machinery and do 
not require political processes for their expression. Where does this leave human rights 
today? Human rights become independent claims of human beings and these claims can 
rise above legal systems, Muslim or Western. I believe the task should be to create a 
practical framework for the self which allows human beings to understand their identity 
and claims better. This can only be done by adding a new group of rights inspired by 
Kant and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn which are termed as ‘duties to oneself’ and ‘rights to the self’ 
respectively. This group adds to the common division of rights as expressed by Baderin 
where rights are essentially civil and political rights (for example, the right to self-
determination and the right to life), economic, social and political rights which are 
aspirational in nature and based on positive action (such as the promotion of wealth, 
education and voting rights in the world) and finally, collective rights which emphasise 
the solidarity of all human beings in working together to for a better world which 
                                                          
242
 Ibid: p. 294. 
243
 See: Sachedina: Islām & the Challenge of Human Rights, pp. 93 – 100. 
244
 See: Baderin: International Human Rights, pp. 222-3. 
245
 See: An-Na‘īm: Toward an Islamic Reformation, pp. 186-7. 
246
 See: Thomas Michel, S.J., ‘Sufism and Modernity in the Thought of Fethullah Gülen’, The Muslim 
World, vol. 95 (2005), pp. 341-58. 
107 
 
includes helping the environment.247 None of the scholars have viewed rights in relation 
to the self. 
 
I argue that first, the self needs to be defined and factored into the Islamic-Western 
human rights discourse to ground human rights in a more intrinsic concept. This would 
broaden human rights from being merely legal and political entities to entities related to 
the self. However, in my view, the analysis cannot end there and Douzinas has already 
commented on the need for this. What he has not done and what the scholars in this 
chapter have not provided is how to give a framework to the self which can be sieved 
within human rights discourse and even legal and social mechanisms. I argue that this 
framework stems from an analysis of key works of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, 
Kierekgaard and Kant who define the self but in particular, help lay the seeds for a 
framework for the self so that it can be practically understood today. I will construct this 
framework in chapter four using the contributions of these four scholars.  
 
Zayn al-‘Ābidīn in particular has a notion of rights to the body through the self. For 
example, a person owes a duty to his/her eyes, ears, tongue, hand, stomach, private parts 
and legs before he/she owes duties to other human beings. At the same time, these 
bodily organs have rights over us. So my hand as a right over me in order that I should 
not use it to terrorise others or my tongue has a right over me in order that I do not use to 
speak obscene language. This relationship between the self, body and rights is unique 
and was expressed in the 7th century yet it is crucial today in nurturing a different notion 
of rights amongst human beings. Whereas Western human rights empowers people’s 
desires and Islamic human rights may restrict the use of reason in deriving norms, the 
framework to the self that I am proposing may be able to nurture a self-reflective 
understanding of rights. This is accomplished through a reflective interaction between 
bodily devices, the duties a human being owes to them and how in this process he/she 
can understanding his/her own identity better as well as the rights and duties he/she 
owes to others. My argument is that before any social contract notion of human rights, 
there must be an ‘internal human contract’ which educates a human being through 
his/her own self as to what rights are, his/her own capacities and his/her notion of 
morality. This reflective approach of rights through the self is the major departure point 
of the thesis from the approaches discussed in this chapter. 
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Therefore, the defining points of departure for this thesis are the following. Firstly, I am 
looking at the Islamic-Western human rights discourse through the concept of the self, 
which will be defined through the works of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and Søren Kierkegaard. 
Secondly, I am providing a framework in which to access this self through the notion of 
rights to the self which forms the internal human contract of the human being. This has 
been inspired by the works of Zayn al-‘Ābidīn and Immanuel Kant. The use of bodily 
devices in the discussion on human rights is almost non-existent and I am attempting to 
include it in the Islamic-Western human rights discourse. Thirdly, I am moving away 
from the classical legal paradigm in which the Islamic-Western human rights discourse 
has been looked at. The use of uṣūl al-fiqh in reforming Islamic law or engaging it with 
the Western system of human rights has been the primary approach as seen in the works 
of Emon, Baderin, An-Na‘īm and Kadivar. I argue that there needs to be a paradigm 
shift in the way law is looked at and how rights are conceived. Thus I am starting from a 
philosophical and metaphysical viewpoint but then integrating it with law. This multi-
disciplinary approach was not found in the works of Gülen, despite his elaboration on 
the metaphysical view of human rights.  
 
Fourth, I am laying the foundations for a framework in this thesis that can positively 
contribute to both the Islamic and Western worldview of rights. The scholars examined 
in this chapter have looked at what the Islamic tradition lacks when it comes to engaging 
with human rights and so they engage in reforming it. However, I am looking at what it 
can positively contribute to the Western human rights system as well and therefore I do 
not consider international human rights law to be only way in which human rights can be 
seen, which has been the view of Sachedina and Mayer. Thus, I am attempting to unify 
both worldviews under my framework for the self through a comparative analysis of the 
four aforementioned authors that guide this thesis. Fifth, my aim is to increase the 
education of human rights amongst all individuals including world leaders, which was 
an area that virtually all scholars cited as a problem in the realisation of human rights 
around the world. This education can be accomplished by formulating a practical 
framework for the self, which at the least, increases awareness of what rights are to 
people in a meaningful way without taking away their own identity, culture and history. 
Sixth, I am specifying a specific tool in order to accomplish this education – rights of the 
self, which can transcend religious doctrines and secularism, even though it is inspired 
from religious sources. This allows the tool to appeal to a broad cross-section of human 
beings.  
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Finally, I am highlighting the potential of the Shī‘ī tradition in contributing to the 
Islamic-Western human rights discourse which has not been focused upon with much 
depth by the scholars discussed in this chapter. In fact, the Shī‘ī perspective is often 
dismissed as a minority view. This is strange considering the honoured status ‘Alī b. Abī 
Ṭālib holds amongst the Shī‘a and Sunni as well as the potential for comparison with 
Søren Kierkegaard. The same applies to Zayn al-‘Ābidīn and comparing his thought to 
Immanuel Kant. I will therefore be going back to primary classical sources to not only 
show the potential of the Shī‘ī tradition in the human rights discourse but its ability to be 
compared to the Western philosophical tradition. I will now proceed to define the self 
using a comparative analysis of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and Søren Kierkegaard which will help 
to position it in the Islamic-Western human rights discourse. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The Nature of the Self in Kierkegaard’s Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses and ‘Alī b. 
Abī Ṭālib’s sermons in Nahj al-Balāgha 
 
Having identified the lack of deliberation on the role of the self in the Islamic-Western 
human rights discourse, this chapter aims to explore a conception of the self which can 
be used in relation to human rights. The focus here will be on offering an authentic 
meaning of the self for a human being based on the works of two authors – the 
discourses of Søren Kierkegaard in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses and the sermons of 
‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib in the compilation of Nahj al-Balāgha. These authors have been chosen 
because of the attention they give in analysing the self in everyday human affairs which 
positions the self in a wider context; the two authors connect the self to the very human 
arena in which it operates; the arena of worldly attachment, base desires, struggle, 
despair, enmity, character building, patience and more.248  
 
This arena is crucial for my thesis as I am arguing that understanding, respecting and 
implementing human rights can only come about when there is a realisation of the roots 
of where these rights emerge and how deeply connected they are to the human self. 
Without this basic connection, the project of a universal set of human rights that is 
meant to guarantee harmony and stability in both the private and public of the human 
being may fail. The self, therefore, grounds human rights much deeper than rational 
agency, human dignity, social contract, inalienability and political will (themes analysed 
in the previous chapter). Interestingly, Kierkegaard makes this acute connection in 
Strengthening the Inner Being: 
 
“If the human being is to rule, then there must be an order in the world; otherwise it 
would be mockery of him to assign him to control brute forces that obey no law. And if 
he is to rule then there must be a law within him also; otherwise he would be incapable 
of ruling; either he would disturbingly interfere, or it would be left to chance whether he 
ruled wisely or not.”249 
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After commenting on those traits needed to develop the self morally in sermon 176, ‘Alī 
b. Abī Ṭālib also connects the self to the arena of injustice. He states that “the injustice 
that will not be left unquestioned is the injustice of men against other men. The 
retribution in such a case is severe.”250 It is precisely the “law within him” and effect of 
an unjust self towards other men, which provides the bridge to the discourse of human 
rights. This has a corresponding effect on how a human being rules or in our modern 
world, governs.  
 
My chapter aims to analyse how Kierkegaard looks at the self when it is faced with 
moral struggle, hope and despair. The Discourses offer the most accessible entry point in 
which to comprehend Kierkegaard’s view of the self in practical circumstances. By 
exploring a holistic meaning of the self based on the two aforementioned authors, I will 
be able to construct a notion of the self that can be used in a practical framework which 
can be sieved in the Islamic-Western discourse on human rights. The chapter will be 
based on the two texts mentioned, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses and Nahj al-Balāgha; 
however, other works by the authors will be used where necessary. The authors’ 
definitions of the self will be contrasted and then the way in which they position the self 
in relation to three themes will be examined. These themes are: the self in relation to 
God, the self in relation to self-knowledge and moral development and the self in 
relation to suffering. 
 
7 Kierkegaard’s and ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s Definition of the Self 
 
7.1 Kierkegaard’s Definition of the Self 
 
As has been oft-quoted, Kierkegaard defines the self as that “which relates itself to its 
own self . . . is that in the relation that the relation relates itself to its own self.”251 Many 
have pointed to the complexity of this definition describing it as “paradoxical”252 but 
ultimately, the self in Kierkegaard’s eyes is always in the process of becoming. It is a 
personal consciousness that is relational – relational to what it was before and what it 
can become. It is precisely this constant activity and stream of consciousness that 
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constitutes the self. Moreover, this dynamic and dialectical synthesis should always aim 
for an upward movement in which there is a continual redefining of the self which aims 
for an authentic existence; one that has an honest commitment to understanding his/her 
self and striving for greater moral ideals. As Evans argues: 
 
“[Kierkegaard’s] emphasis on the relation of the self to itself is not a claim that the self 
can be understood in isolation. Rather, even when we focus on the individual self, we 
find not a simple entity, but a complex relationship. As spiritual beings, humans are 
relational right down to the core, even on the “inside,” so to speak.”253 
 
This complex relationship involves a spiritual journey to authenticate itself. Here, 
Kierkegaard believes a human being must traverse from an ‘aesthetic’ existence, a 
lifestyle as Moore argues, “in which people are absorbed in satisfying their ‘natural’ 
desires and impulses, whether physical, emotional, or intellectual” to an “ethical” 
existence and then finally, a “Christian” existence.254 An ethical existence is one in 
which a person takes responsibility over his/her actions and makes a choice between 
moral and immoral actions. Here, a human being tries to continually transcend his/her 
own worth by building a life based on moral values and fulfilling their obligations. It is 
at this point that a person realises who he/she is in front of God. This is the beginning of 
a Godly but specifically, Christian existence – a life in emulation of Christ.  
 
Yet Kierkegaard goes deeper in articulating the spiritual and moral transformation that 
should occur in the Christian existence. This involves appreciating the “movement from 
the aesthetic, the metaphysical, to the ethical, the religious and the Christian-
religious.”255 Moore argues this involves three things:  
 
“(1) Infinite resignation – dying to the world, the willingness to sacrifice any finite good 
for the sake of God. (2) Suffering – undergoing a transformation of the self, though not 
by the self. It is the process of undergoing “self-annihilation” so that God, not self, can 
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do his transforming work. (3) Guilt – the feeling of one’s inability to give oneself 
completely, unreservedly, to God.”256 
 
These three themes are actually explored in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses to the 
extent that they drive the transformation of the self through God. In Every Good Gift and 
Every Perfect Gift is from Above, Kierekgaard states, 
 
“What he drives home is that just as God’s almighty hand made everything good, so he, 
the Father of lights, ever constant, at every moment makes everything good, makes 
everything a good and perfect gift for everyone who has enough heart to be humble, 
enough heart to be trustful.”257  
 
It is only by trusting God and making the heart humble that this self-annihilation occurs. 
The journey from the aesthetic to the ethical and Christian is an arduous process where 
one experiences suffering but one which truly captures Kierkegaard’s definition of the 
self as a relational activity to what it was before and what it can truly become; a kind of 
synthesis of actuality and ideality in constant motion. This journey must be motivated by 
passion i.e a human being must have a zeal to gain knowledge of his/her self. This can 
only come about by choosing to initiate a journey of moral commitment and 
responsibility. Passion and choice, two very subjective factors, are actually the core 
drivers for self discovery. Whilst the self is a constant process of becoming, it must be 
driven to undergo this continual change and only a human being’s passion and willed 
choice can accomplish this. Kierkegaard beautifully sums up this motivation in 
Either/Or: 
 
“The individual . . . becomes conscious of himself as this definite individual, with these 
talents, these dispositions, these instincts, these passions, influenced by these definite 
surroundings, as this definite product of a definite environment. But being conscious of 
himself in this way, he assumes responsibility for all this.”258 
 
Thus, Kierkegaard advocates becoming an authentic individual by choice and this means 
being conscious of the self and its capacity to continually trancscend its own existence. 
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1.2  Kierkegaard’s Understanding of the Relationship between the Self 
and the Spirit 
 
When the individual ‘authenticates’ himself/herself in this way, he/she becomes a 
responsible person – one that engages in constant examination of his/her self and the 
actions emanating from his/her self. At times, Kierkegaard uses the terms ‘spirit’ and 
‘self’ interchangeably whilst at other times he appears to use them distinctly. For 
example, he says in Strengthening the Inner Being, “but God is spirit and therefore can 
give a witness only in the spirit; it is in the inner being.”259 Here God appears to be the 
spirit thought it is admittedly difficult to decipher whether the self and spirit constitute 
two separate entities. However, when looking at Kierkegaard’s philosophy as whole, one 
could conclude that both terms acquire the same status in a human being’s process of 
becoming and transformation. As such, it may only be a linguistic concern but others 
such as Stack have attempted to differentiate the two: 
 
“Consciousness, as spirit, is that by which the psychophysical, dynamic synthesis of 
individual being is sustained. That is, it is in its relational activity. Self-consciousness is 
capable of synthesizing the various aspects of the self in such a way that one's existence 
has a semblance of continuity and integral self-being. The self is a particular dynamic 
synthesis, a dialectical relationship among body, consciousness, and spirit. Ultimately, 
the spiritual intensification of personal existence is the ethical goal for man.”260 
 
What is interesting about Stack’s analysis and a point which I will elaborate in my 
comparison with ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s thought on the self is that the spirit is seen as a kind 
of sustaining force whilst the self is the product of the synthesis arising from that force. 
This is much closer to the Qur’ānic understanding of the spirit (rūḥ) and soul (nafs) 
where the spirit is an energising life force – a power which no created thing can do 
without. Hence, in the Qur’ān, God proclaims in the creation of Adam that He “breathed 
into him of My spirit”261 showing that it was His spirit that gave life to Adam; whilst the 
soul is regarded as a personal entity, capable of progression to God or regression away 
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from Him.262 Nonetheless, Kierekgaard’s emphasis on self-consciousness as a dynamic 
process of discovering one’s identity is always geared towards an expansion of the 
subjective inward self, the Egoitet. Kierkegaard explains that, 
 
“We forget that egotism [Egoisme] is one thing and I-ness or subjectivity [Egoitet] is 
another, and that although God is infinitely far from being an egotist, he nevertheless is 
the infinite subjectivity (he cannot be otherwise).”263 
 
The development of one’s Egoitet is connected to God’s infinite subjectivity – again 
showing Kierkegaard’s very distinct epistemological position of the self as the 
interpreter of its own existence as well as God’s. This close relationship which is meant 
to be cultivated by a human being is the loftiest type of relationship in which personal 
expression, authenticity, ethical existence and transcendence are combined which again 
exemplifies the benefits of discovering one’s self. Overall, we find that Kierkegaard’s 
definition of the self is based on the continual process of transformation, driven by one’s 
passion and choice. This makes this process a subjective one but based on objective 
ideals to journey from the aesthetic to the ethical and Christian. The self, therefore, is a 
dynamic personal entity that must be examined, engaged with and harnessed to realise 
its full potential which elevates a person from a linear and/or unethical existence to a 
passionate and/or ethical one.264 
 
1.3 ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s Definition of the Self 
 
The word in Arabic for self and/or soul is nafs. Others have argued nafs also means 
one’s identity and ego.265 It is commonly identified as one’s self but looked at in a multi-
dimensional and metaphysical manner that means the soul, which includes one’s 
psychological, ethical and intellectual dimensions. In sum, however, nafs is is one’s I-
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ness.266 This immediately strikes a chord with Kierkegaard’s Egoitet but where 
differences occur is in the way the nafs is presented throughout the Qur’ān and sunnah 
as well as how it is connected with a human being’s rūḥ (spirit).267 ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib is 
arguably one of the best references to explain the self within the Islamic tradition as he 
has many aḥadīth (narrations) on the subject.268 I will use the term ‘self’ in order to 
define nafs because it has wider connotations than the term ‘soul’ which may appear to 
restrict nafs to only a metaphysical entity connected to God. The ‘self’ is also capable of 
including greater psychological dimensions in line with meanings from classical Arabic 
dictionaries and enables comparison with Kierkegaard’s writings. In keeping with my 
methodological approach, I will look at narrations outside of Nahj al-Balāgha first to 
give ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s foundational definition of the self before I examine how he 
contextualises it in his sermons, akin to my approach with Kierkegaard in the previous 
section. 
 
‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib states, “the self is like a precious jewel, whoever strives for its 
protection, it will help him attain exalted positions and whoever acts negligently in its 
protection, it shall pull him towards humiliation.”269 He has also famously said, “one 
who knows himself, knows his Lord”270 and “the inner knowledge of the self is the most 
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beneficial of all such knowledge.”271 These narrations are significant because ‘Alī b. Abī 
Ṭālib makes the self the central entity of a human being – a “precious jewel.” This 
correlates with the root meaning of nafs which is derived from the verb, nafusa, meaning 
to be “precious, valuable and priceless.”272 Moreover, the self is capable of nobility or 
conversely, “humiliation.” The only way to safeguard the self is to “know” it and by 
doing so, one is able to “know his Lord.” This already sets the tone for comparison with 
Kierkegaard; both are passionate about knowing the self and exploring its capacity for a 
more ethical and ultimately, Godly existence. Again, Arabic lexicographers have defined 
the self as possessing a vast ethical range that is capable of progression or regression, 
very much based on how one manages one’s ego, 
 
“The Tadj al-‘Arus lists 15 meanings for nafs and adds two others from Lisan al-Arab: 
spirit, blood, body, evil eye, presence, specific reality, self, tan, haughtiness, self-
magnification, purpose, disdain, the absent, desire, punishment, brother, man. It states 
that most of these meanings are metaphorical.”273 
 
These range of meanings are very much in tune with Kierkegaard’s definition of the self 
in Either/Or where he looks at the individual as possessing a range of “talents, 
dispositions and passions.” All of these traits culminate in the self and give a person 
his/her unique identity. Thus, when ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib describes the self as a “precious 
jewel”, he is informing people to attach an appropriate worth to their ‘selves.’ This self-
worth is actually nobility because in another narration he states, "Whoever discovers the 
nobility of self shall guard him against lowness of passions and false desires.”274 The 
lowly passions and false desires constitute the aesthetic existence of Kierkegaard and in 
the same way, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib is telling the listener to avoid such an existence because 
it is the opposite of the worth and capacity of the self. Indeed, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib 
expresses that the world,, “…is sweet and green surrounded by lusts and liked for its 
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immediate enjoyments. It excites wonder with small things, is ornamented with (false) 
hopes and decorated with deception.”275 
 
There is, however, a difference in the way that ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib elucidates the parts and 
capacities of the self. He talks about the self in terms of its vegetative, animalistic, 
rational and Godly divisions which is akin to the traditional conception of the soul in 
classical Islamic and Western philosophical thought.276 He states, 
 
“O Kumayl, the souls (anfus) are four: the augmentative vegetative [plant spirit] (al–
namiyyah al–nabatiyyah), the sensate animal [spirit] (al–hissiyyah al–hayawaniyyah), 
the sacred rational (al–natiqah al–qudsiyyah) [human spirit] and the universal Divine 
[Spirit] (al–kulliyyah al–ilāhiyyah).” 277 
 
The narration indicates that human beings can uniquely be characterised by the rational 
human soul but in turn possess animal and vegetative souls and have the capacity to 
transcend their own existence through the universal Divine spirit. Not only does this 
show the evolutionary potential of a human being but the self has a multi-faceted 
essence that gives a human being a deeper level self-consciousness. This self-
consciousness does not have genus or proprium but it is a living substance (jawhar), 
always capable of developing itself to God. Despite the distinctly metaphysical 
connotations of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s narration, this has some likeness to Kierkegaard’s 
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definition of the self as an entity that is in constant motion of becoming. The very 
activity of ‘relating to itself’ defines the self and at least by implication, one can argue 
that the four parts of the soul or the four souls (depending on one’s perception of the 
self) provide the foundation for this dynamic evolutionary potential. 
 
This process of evolution has been concisely explained by Mulla Ṣadra, the 17th century 
Shī‘ī philosopher, who argued, 
 
“[Philosophical] demonstration and the Qur’ān agree entirely that learning the divine 
wisdom (al-ḥikma al-ilāhiyya) and the knowledge (ma’rifa) of the human self – I mean 
knowledge of the Origin and the Return – is to win endless subsistence, and rejecting it 
is the source of eternal loss…This knowledge makes man the possessor of a great 
kingdom, because it is the most magnificent elixir. It necessitates universal 
unneedingness (al-ghinā al-kullī), the greatest felicity, becoming similar to the Furthest 
Good (al-tashabbuh bi’l khayr al-aqsā) and assuming as one’s own the character traits 
of God (al-takhallaq bi akhlāq Allah).” 278 
 
Here, knowledge of the Origin and the Return is knowledge of one’s creation and his 
ultimate journey towards God after death. This is the concept of “knowing one’s Lord” 
and when one is purposefully ignorant of this fact, it is an “eternal loss” – again chiming 
with Kierkegaard’s emphasis that a human being must try to take on this ethical 
responsibility of knowing his/her self. This is the height of happiness, “the most 
magnificent elixir” which has its pinnacle in reflecting God’s attributes in one’s self. 
This is why the fourth part of the soul in ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s narration is the universal 
Divine spirit which is a state of unneedingness, a sense of being free from physical and 
personal limitations.  
 
‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib is perhaps more concise than Kierkegaard by saying that “one who 
knows himself, knows his Lord” because this correlates with Kierkegaard’s journey to 
have a Christian existence. ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib is advocating a similar type of existence - 
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an existence that has cognisance of God, what He wants and testifying to His Oneness. 
This is clarified in Nahj al-Balāgha where he states, 
 
“The foremost in religion is the acknowledgement of Him, the perfection of 
acknowledging Him is to testify Him, the perfection of testifying Him is to believe in 
His Oneness, the perfection of believing in His Oneness is to regard Him Pure, and the 
perfection of His purity is to deny Him attributes, because every attribute is a proof that 
it is different from that to which it is attributed and everything to which something is 
attributed is different from the attribute.”279 
 
Here, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib is emphasising acknowledgement of God as the most central 
belief but most importantly, that this belief should be ‘pure’ – not associating God with 
any attributes. This exemplifies the doctrine of tawḥīd (oneness of God) in the 
fundamental pillars of Islām which shows that God should not be attributed with any 
characteristics like human beings are and should be kept free from any conceptual 
divisions – whether by number or thing. This is to avoid shirk (polytheism) and maintain 
the uniqueness and greatness of God’s existence. This immediately shows that for ‘Alī b. 
Abī Ṭālib, an authentic existence is a Godly one and specifically, one must know and 
understand God’s existence.  
 
1.4 ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s Understanding of the Relationship between the Self and 
the Spirit 
 
The final aspect of defining the self concerns the self’s relationship to the spirit (rūḥ). At 
times, these terms are used interchangeably but in the majority of cases, the Qur’ān as 
well as in ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s narrations, there is a firm indication that they are two 
distinct (though connected) entities. Kierkegaard appeared to use the self and spirit 
interchangeably but as I have illustrated, others such as Stack have argued he did make a 
distinction between the two in his works. If we take Stack’s line of reasoning, then this 
is much closer to the distinction between the self and spirit in Islām and specifically in 
the thought of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib. The word for spirit is rūḥ which literally means “breath 
of life, soul, spirit (in al senses).”280 The reality, however, is that the word has remained 
elusive in scripture. The Qur’ān explicitly states, “they ask thee concerning the Spirit (of 
                                                          
279
 Ar-Razi: Nahj al-Balāgha, volume 1, sermon 1, p. 22. 
280
 Cowan: Hans Wehr, p. 365. 
121 
 
inspiration). Say: “They question you concerning the Spirit. Say, ‘The Spirit is of the 
command of my Lord, and you have not been given of the knowledge except a few [of 
you].” 281 Perhaps only those have undertaken the task to discover the spirit, particularly 
in relation to one’s self, constitute the “few.” This underscores the importance of ‘Alī b. 
Abī Ṭālib’s narration, “one who knows his self, knows his Lord”, showing the 
signifiance of understanding the self. The verse above is powerful; the Qur’ān is 
supporting self-knowledge and so apart from philosophical deliberations, we have an 
implication that the journeying towards God is a very personal task.  
 
Yet this is not all; scholars have attempted to extract the various meanings of rūḥ. It is 
seen as among the primary emanations to come from the Divine essence.282 Amongst 
these is the spirit as a creation like the angels but above the ranks of the angels.283 This 
description of the spirit is often used in the context of Lady Mary and Prophet Jesus (as 
well as in relation to other prophets and believers) as a divine aid assisting them. In this 
context the spirit is often referred to as the Holy Spirit.284 Perhaps more fundamentally, 
it is used as a life giving agency of God as in the verses referring to the blowing of the 
spirit into the statue of Prophet Adam and the blowing of the spirit at the immaculate 
conception of Lady Mary.285 The last usage has been specifically elaborated by ‘Alī b. 
Abī Ṭālib in sermon 1 of Nahj al-Balāgha where he states,  
 
“Allah collected from hard, soft, sweet and sour earth, clay which He dripped in water 
till it got pure, and kneaded it with moisture till it became gluey. From it He carved an 
image with curves, joints, limbs and segments. He solidified it till it dried up for a fixed 
time and a known duration. Then He blew into it out of His Spirit whereupon it took the 
pattern of a human being with mind that governs him, intelligence which he makes use 
of, limbs that serve him, organs that change his position, sagacity that differentiates 
between truth and untruth, tastes and smells, colours and species. He is a mixture of 
clays of different colours, cohesive materials, divergent contradictories and differing 
properties like heat, cold, softness and hardness.”286 
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The sermon shows that the spirit is akin to a life-force which illuminates and energises 
the ‘clay’ of a human being. This positions the spirit as a necessary factor in the creation 
and development of a human being which has a continual effect, through the soul, on a 
being’s physical growth and properties. Thus, when God blows His spirit into Adam, he 
develops limbs and organs and is able to appreciate colours and smells. Here, ‘Alī b. Abī 
Ṭālib makes a clear distinction between the spirit as a life force, a kind of sustaining 
energy and the product of that force, “the mind that governs [Adam], intelligence which 
he makes use of, cohesive materials and divergent contradictories.” These latter traits 
can be interpreted as the human being’s self thus showing that actually, the spirit or rūḥ 
gives emergence to the self but is not the self. The self is what a person cultivates with 
its God-given and natural faculties, originated by the spirit on the command of God. 
Here, Kierkegaard’s notion of the spirit as a sustaining force is arguably the same as ‘Alī 
b. Abī Ṭālib’s conception of the spirit. 
 
The relationship between the self and spirit is captured by ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s narration, 
“one who knows his self, knows his Lord” because one who knows his self is accessing 
his spirit and transcendental origin, which is the connector to God Himself. What is 
interesting is that in the Arabic of the narration, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib uses a dhamīr 
(personal pronoun) denoting ‘his’ for ‘his self’ (nafsahu) and another dhamīr for ‘his 
Lord’ (rabbahu). This is a personal relationship and an individual conception of one’s 
Lord. Notwithstanding God’s uniqueness and ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s more theological 
sermons such as sermon 1, a person that accesses his spirit is actually formulating his 
own authentic view of God. This correlates to Kierkegaard’s view of God as ‘infinite 
subjectivity’ which means both scholars favour the notion of individually journeying 
towards God. 
 
Overall, there is great similarity between Kierkegaard’s and ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s notion of 
the self. Both argue it is the most central concern for a human being and when one 
cultivates it, it truly becomes a jewel which reflects the light of God in a human being. 
When one ignores it, one falls foul to aesthetic desires and these corrupt a human 
being’s self. Whilst there are some key differences in the way the spirit is looked at and 
how much Kierkegaard uses it in his works, a clear distinction can be made between the 
self and spirit showing that the latter is a life force for a human being whilst the former 
is uniquely one’s personal identity and essence. The key thread in both scholars’ 
123 
 
worldview is being passionate about the self and understanding its capacity to transform 
itself and journey towards God. Both definitions pave the way for a comparison on how 
they contextualise the self in real human circumstances which will help me in 
elucidating a more practical role for the self in the Islamic-Western human rights 
discourse. 
 
2. Contextualising the Role of the Self in Kierkegaard’s Eighteen 
Upbuilding Discourses and ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s Sermons in Nahj al-Balāgha 
 
Having explored the foundational meaning of the self from Kierkegaard and ‘Alī b. Abī 
Ṭālib, I can now go onto analyse how they contextualise the self in real human 
circumstances. The way in which Kierkegaard positions the self in Eighteen Upbuilding 
Discourses is diverse as he uses theological, scriptural, moral and philosophical 
scenarios. This range is significant; it gives us a firm insight into all the dimensions that 
the self can be associated with. The self is not merely a religious entity but a 
psychological one. At the same time, it has the ability to connect to God and subjectively 
analyse itself. These interactions show that Kierkegaard did not separate different 
environments for the self – as if the self could only be relevant within religion as the 
soul and not in ethics. This is substantiated by the content of the discourses. For 
example, in both One who Prays Aright Struggles in Prayer and is Victorious – in that 
God is Victorious and Think about your Creator in the Days of your Youth, Kierkegaard 
orients the self towards building a relationship with God. Whilst in Strengthening the 
Inner Being and To Preserve One’s Soul in Patience, the focus is more on how struggles 
in life and everyday situations are opportunities to improve moral traits in one’s 
character. These are decidedly practical and given Kierkegaard’s nature of writing as 
awakening the reader rather than teaching him/her287, they cause the reader, whatever 
his/her religious background, to focus on moral improvement. As I will argue that whilst 
these discourses are obviously within a Christian context, they do not reduce their scope 
and influence in non-Christian contexts and in other subjects such as human rights, 
precisely because of the universal themes which Kierkegaard addresses.  
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In a similar vein, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib chooses different theological and non-theological 
themes in which to position the self. For example, sermon 160 entitled ‘Praise of 
Allah’288 is specifically orientated towards enhancing a Muslim’s theological, 
philosophical and metaphysical understanding of God. This is in addition to the specific 
reference made to the Abrahamic Prophets, Muḥammad, Moses, David and Jesus. 
However, when we examine sermon 129 entitled ‘About Measures and Weights, the 
Transience of this World and the Condition of its People’, we find a greater focus on the 
state of morality in this world and how there is a need to cultivate generosity and 
honesty. It therefore appears that both Kierkegaard and ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib are trying to 
strengthen the listener’s two fundamental pillars of life: religiosity and morality. Both 
are required to have an authentic and ethical existence which is constantly gaining 
nearness to God and finding inner contentment. 
 
I have identified three themes within Kierkegaard’s discourses, which also correspond to 
Nahj al-Balāgha, in which the self is contextualised. These are: the self in relation to 
faith in God, the self in relation to self-knowledge and moral development and finally, 
the self in relation to suffering. These themes encapsulate virtually all of Kierkegaard’s 
discourses with some discourses dealing exclusively with one theme. Whilst all of these 
themes intersect and interrelate to each other, I will discuss each theme in turn in order 
to extract the various strands which contribute to an authentic self. Finally, in both texts, 
the self is referred to in different ways; at times it is one’s soul, inner being or heart 
whilst at other times it manifests itself in the hopes and fears of the individual and the 
experiences he/she is going through. 
 
3. The Self in Relation to God 
 
3.1 Kierkegaard’s Approach in Positioning the Self in Relation to God 
 
Kierkegaard positions the self or more appropriately here, the soul and/or inner being, as 
an entity that should be completely focused on cultivating faith in God. In Expectancy of 
Faith, Kierkegaard proclaims that faith is the “highest good, the most beautiful, the most 
precious, the most blessed riches of all, not to be compared with anything else, incapable 
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of being replaced.”289 Far from faith being something that is always spoken of as the 
“same thing”290, it is “qualitatively different.”291 It is actually the “kind of wish the 
perplexed man was seeking, one he could wish for another person with all his might, and 
with his whole soul, a wish he would dare to go on wishing, ever more fervently, even as 
his love became ever more fervent…”292 What Kierkegaard is initially implying at the 
start of this discourse is that faith is considered as out of our reach as it lies in a 
“concealed in a remote place accessible to human beings only at a great risk.”293 This is 
wrong, according to Kierkegaard, because if faith is the highest good which we should 
strive for and it is something that we wish others would have, then in reality we should 
have the confidence to understand and develop faith in God. This confidence must come 
from our self because, “it is something internal that one can only will…”294 This already 
makes the self as the prime driving force for faith; without an attentive and proactive 
self, faith does indeed become “like the water the pool Bethesda, about which we read in 
the Holy Scripture…”295 In his discourses, Kierkegaard desperately tries to connect the 
reader or listener to a more fruitful journey, one that gives him/her “eternal” and “inner” 
stability.296 These two words are used throughout Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses to 
connect the self to God and more importantly, to jolt the reader in engaging in self-
knowledge. For example, Kierkegaard states,  
 
“not until the moment when there awakens in his soul a concern about what meaning 
everything within him and he for the world, about what meaning everything within him 
by which he himself belongs to the world has for him and he therein for the world – only 
then does the inner being announce its presence in this concern.”297 
 
He clearly regards the self as having the ability to transform through God and not on its 
own. Moreover, this transformation must be accomplisjed through an awakening in 
which one considers his/her position in the world that God created. God, His prophets 
and scripture collectively become the necessary guides for human beings without whom 
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our souls would be “trapped like prisoner[s].”298 His extensive use of prophets such as 
John and Job offer the listener practical examples of individuals who developed faith in 
God, in amongst great adversity. The prophets offer a practical template for the self in 
which to navigate through the trials and difficulties of life. So, for the one who is 
suffering in life, Kierkegaard states: 
 
“Job faithfully accompanies him and comforts him, not, to be sure as if had suffered 
once and for all what would never be suffered again, but comforts as someone who 
witnesses that the horror has been experienced, the battle of despair has been fought to 
the glory of God, for his own rescuer, for the benefit and joy of others.”299  
 
Already, for anyone that intends to introspect on their own difficult circumstances, they 
are provided a reflective device through the stories of the Prophets – in this case Job. 
Here, Kierkegaard approaches the self as possessing the ability to engage in a meditative 
journey across time; being able to imbibe the traits of prophets and then apply them in 
one’s present life. He is so adamant in doing this that there is a reoccurring structure in 
his discourses: he begins with a prayer (akin to a du’a or supplication in the Islamic 
tradition300), then a verse from the Bible, then the trials of a particular prophet, the use of 
philosophical, theological and linguistic tools to extrapolate the deeper meaning behind 
the verse in question, a bombardment of rhetoric and imagery and finally, jolting 
questions to awaken the listener. For example, in relation to the trials of Job, he boldly 
adds rhetoric in The Lord gave and the Lord took away: Blessed be the Name of the Lord 
stating, “but does that mean that it should be utterly devoid of meaning or devoid of 
application and not pertain to anyone?”301 This ‘methodological approach’ which 
arguably is a strange phrase to use when analysing Kierkegaard as many have said that 
he is so difficult to read302, makes each discourse like a spiritual stage which one has to 
accomplish before one reads anymore. Parallels can be drawn with the discipline of 
‘irfān (gnosis or mysticism) in Islām where not only spiritual stages have to be reached 
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in order to journey towards God but that these stages are taught by a teacher and through 
emulating the lives of great prophets and saints.303 Kierkegaard does not intend to be a 
teacher but in a way, he implicitly becomes this, even if unintentionally as his discourses 
can be in the words Pattison, “sermon-like.”304 
 
 
3.2  Kierkegaard’s View of Developing Traits for the Self in its 
Relationship to God 
 
Once Kierkegaard is able to connect the self with God, making it an exclusive 
relationship, he develops traits which are essential for this relationship. In Every Good 
Gift and Every Perfect Gift is from Above, Kierkegaard focuses on the trait of 
thankfulness as one of the most necessary tools to not only appreciate the gifts of God to 
human beings but as a source of spiritual elevation as well. He says: 
 
“The Apostle Paul says, ‘Everything created by God is good if it is received with 
thankfulness…yet what does the apostle do? He raises the believer’s mind above earthly 
and finite cares, above worldly shrewdness and doubt, by means of a devout observation 
that we always ought to thank God…”305 
 
Thankfulness becomes a state of being, a state in which one rises above finiteness and 
observes the will of God in every worldly circumstance and object. This is crucial for 
Kierkegaard because a human being expects that God brings out good gifts and “lays 
them away for us in heaven so that we can receive them sometime in the hereafter.”306 
The reality is quite different; this is a fallacy in which we “tempt”307 God because as 
Kierkegaard states, “you wanted God’s ideas about what was best for you to coincide 
with your ideas…and yet if he were to share your ideas, he would cease to be the 
almighty Father.”308 It is only God who knows what is best for us and any gift that 
bestows upon us even if it appears to be a suffering is actually a blessing. When we do 
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not appreciate this, we lose sight of not only God Himself but our inner being, the self. 
Here, Kiekegaard explores the intimate relationship of the self with God: 
 
“The apostle uses two phrases. ‘Every good gift’, he says, and thereby signifies the inner 
nature of the gift, that is sound and blessed fruit with no concealed unwholesome or 
harmful additive. “Every perfect gift”, says the apostle, and thereby signifies the more 
intimate relation into which, by the help of God, the good gift enters with the individual 
who receives it, so that the good in and by itself does not become harmful and ruinous to 
him.”309 
 
The above quote is a pertinent example of Kierkegaard’s philosophising over biblical 
verses – he dissects the basic concept and then broadens it and connects to an 
individual’s life. Here, the good gift “signifies the inner nature of the gift” in which there 
is no harm to the human being. “The perfect gift” by contrast appears to signify a closer 
relationship to God in which the goodness of the gift is used appropriately. If we can 
understand that we are “always to thank God”310, we would “understand one thing: that 
all things serve for good those who love God.”311 Love for God, which is acquired by the 
self overcoming its baser worldly desires and replacing them with an eternal orientated 
desire, a desire for God, is the fundamental quality which Kierkegaard aims to develop 
in the self of a human being. He desperately wants listeners of his discourses to have a 
passion for cultivating faith but this can only be done when one feels love for what one 
is doing. By highlighting thankfulness to God as a key characteristic to appreciate the 
gifts in one’s life, Kierkegaard attempts to nurture love for God in us. 
 
This is substantiated by his emphasis on accepting one’s own limitations and purpose in 
life, thereby reducing one’s ego. In He must Increase; I must Decrease, he says 
“generality is not for upbuilding”312 and proceeds to highlight another important trait for 
the self: “every human being is only an instrument and does not know when the moment 
will come when he will be put aside.”313 Although this is a rather bold statement in 
which he totally reduces the importance of any human being, he is attempting to get to 
the very core of what can lead a human being astray from God. According to 
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Kierkegaard, we think that we are set for a grand purpose in life or that the purpose 
willed for us by God does not apply to us. We are merely in self-denial; using the 
example of John who paved the way for Jesus, Kierkegaard states:  
 
“John said them in humble self-denial. From the very beginning, he understood this as 
his mission in the world; therefore in a way he was diminishing from the very 
beginning… Many a person has been born since that day whose destiny was only to pace 
the way and who early in his life had to realise that this was his work.”314 
 
John’s purpose may be considered less worthy in relation to the mission Jesus had but 
this is a misconception. It was John’s purpose to pave the way for Jesus and because 
John realised this, he replied, “this joy of mine is full. He must increase; I must 
decrease.”315 It is God who requires my attention, my acceptance and I, as John, must 
decrease, must consider myself limited. It is precisely the trait of humility and 
acceptance of Divine will which is the central feature in these discourses. Even when 
struggle befalls a human being, it is more important to “bear the loss”316 than try to 
recapture what was before. He likens John to “the bridegroom’s friend, who stands and 
hears his voice and rejoices greatly…”317 implying that rejoicing in God can only be 
accomplished when we realise our intended position in this world. The self, therefore, 
must acquire the trait of humility if it is to cultivate a genuine faith in what God has 
willed for it. 
 
Therefore, there are key strands in Kierkegaard’s approach in positioning the self in 
relation to God. Faith is the highest good but this can only be accomplished through self-
knowledge; we must engage with ourselves. But the origin of this relational self is God, 
who remains “the actual ground of all selfhood.”318 Thankfulness and humility become 
important traits for the self to acquire and develop a deep and abiding faith in God. The 
self must recognise that, with every undertaking and in every moment, with every failure 
and with every success, God exists and is present. For Kierkegaard, to know oneself in 
one’s own nothingness is to know God in truth, and to know God in truth is to be 
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moulded into a “new human being.”319 I now turn to ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s view of the self 
in relation to God. 
 
3.3 ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s View of the Self in Relation to God 
 
Just like Kierkegaard, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib wants the self to know God and develop faith in 
Him. In sermon 91, he states, 
 
“The confession of the created things that their existence owes itself to Him made us 
realise that argument has been furnished about knowing Him (so that there is no excuse 
against it)… (O' Allah) I stand witness that he who likens Thee with the separateness of 
the limbs or with the joining of the extremities of his body did not acquaint his inner self 
with knowledge about Thee and his heart did not secure conviction to the effect that 
there is no partner for Thee.”320 
 
There is “no excuse” in not knowing God and in fact, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib expresses that 
those who consider God in terms of parts – a theological indication through his 
statement, “separateness of the limbs”, do not acquaint their inner selves with 
knowledge about God. He firmly states, “there is no partner for Thee.” A core part of the 
journey of the inner self is to know God correctly, that He has no partner and cannot be 
humanised in anyway. This is a key theological difference with Kierkegaard who as a 
Christian and in his references to Christ, may argue that the concept of the son of God 
(as part of the Christian trinity) is a legitimate view of God’s being. Despite this 
difference, both are orientating the self towards a correct understanding of God’s nature, 
which is a difficult task but one which should not be avoided and free from all other 
engagements. In sermon 160, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s states, 
 
“He who frees his heart (from all other engagements) and exerts his thinking in order to 
know how Thou established Thy throne how Thou created Thy creatures how Thou 
suspended the air in Thy skies and how Thou spread Thy earth on the waves of water his 
eyes would return tired his intelligence defeated his ears eager and his thinking 
awander.”321 
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The heart (qalb) is a common substitute for the self in Islām or is regarded as a 
manifestation of it.322 When ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib states that the heart must be free from all 
other engagements, he is referring to a person’s state of being – his/her mind, desires, 
attention and will. Yet even when a human being exerts the effort to do this, ‘Alī b. Abī 
Ṭālib explicitly states that it is impossible to know God that his “eyes” (another allusion 
to the heart i.e the eyes of the heart) “would return tired, his intelligence defeated, his 
ears eager and his thinking awander.” In fact, he has pointed to each faculty of the self 
thus substantiating his previous narration mentioned early on in this chapter that the soul 
has four parts relating to animalistic and intellective faculties. The distinction between 
the limitation of a human being and the unlimited nature of God also figures in 
Kierkegaard’s discourses when he states that “you wanted God’s ideas about what was 
best for you to coincide with your ideas…and yet if he were to share your ideas, he 
would cease to be the almighty Father.”323 There is clear affirmation of God’s 
omnipotence and omniscience but this does not detract from the journey of the self in 
knowing God. ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib states, 
 
“He hopes big things from Allah and small things from men but he gives to man (such 
consideration as) he does not give to Allah. What is the matter with Allah glorified be 
His praise? He is accorded less (consideration) than what is given to His creatures. Do 
you ever fear to be false in your hope in Allah? Or do you not regard Him the centre of 
your hope.”324 
 
Again we find that a human being must give due consideration to God. The reality is that 
we give Him less consideration and give more importance to His creatures. This does 
not mean neglecting our moral duties to our fellow creatures, which reflects our 
obedience to God but rather considering the status of our fellow human beings as more 
important than God’s own status; our attachment to God becomes secondary in the face 
of our preoccupation with what God has created. Strikingly, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib also uses 
the examples of the great prophets to illustrate his point. If Prophet Muḥammad found a 
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picture on his door, he would inform one of his wives to, “take it away out of my sight 
because if I look at it I recall the world and its allurements.”325 ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib then 
comments, “thus he removed his heart from this world and destroyed its remembrance 
from his mind.”326 Removing the heart from this world is removing the self from this 
world because if the self remains attached to any worldly allurement, it continues to 
remember it. But for God, this is not appropriate. Only He should be remembered and 
praised – hence the concept of dhikr (remembrance) in Islām where it is recommended 
for every Muslim to remember God through His names. This remembrance is in reality 
“praise which is not veiled from Thee and does not end and whose continuity does not 
cease.”327 The self, therefore, must acquire the trait of praising God and this can only be 
accomplished when it is free from praising the world and all other earthly engagements. 
The mention of the simple lifestyles of Prophets Dawud (David), Musa (Moses), Isa 
(Jesus) and Muḥammad is further proof of this and echoes Kierkegaard’s approach of 
using them as “teachers and guides for humankind.”328 
 
3.4  ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s View of Developing Appropriate Traits to Cultivate Faith 
in God 
 
When Kierkegaard developed the trait of thankfulness in relation to what God gives and 
takes away, he was building an intimate relationship between the self and God. Similarly 
‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib does the same thing and the language is almost similar:   
 
“Allah's verdict is judicious and full of wisdom. His pleasure implies protection and 
mercy. He decides with knowledge and forgives with forbearance… O' my Allah! Praise 
be to Thee for what Thou takest and givest and for that from which Thou curest or with 
which Thou afflictest; praise which is the most acceptable to Thee the most like by Thee 
and the most dignified before Thee;”329 
 
We find the same strand of believing in God’s wisdom, protection and knowledge and so 
every blessing or struggle must be praised. God is the one that “takes”, “gives” and 
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“cures”, very much echoing Kierkegaard’s message and words in his discourse, The 
Lord Gave and the Lord Took Away. But again, appreciation of this must be developed 
through a particular trait. Throughout Nahj al-Balāgha, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib emphasises the 
trait of ‘taqwā’ (God-consciousness) which is the central moral characteristic 
emphasised in the Qur’ān.330 Taqwā can be translated as piety or God-fearing (because 
it’s root, wa-qa-ya, means to “guard or preserve”331) but it is more accurate to translate it 
as God-consciousness since it is the cognisance of God’s presence and will, which must 
be lovingly accepted as well as feared in terms of our accountability to him. This is why 
‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib states, 
 
“O' creatures of Allah! I advise you to have God-consciousness of Allah which is the 
provision (for the next world) and with it is (your) return. The provision would take you 
(to your destination) and the return would be successful.”332 
 
There is a strong emphasis on the next world and returning to God which not only shows 
the transience of this world but that God’s presence is our final end. Similarly, 
Kierkegaard believes the self must be occupied with the future, “the ability to be 
occupied with the future is, then, a sign of the nobility of human beings; the struggle 
with the future is the most ennobling.”333 The future and the next world not only involve 
the accountability of the human being but ultimately, intimacy and closeness with God. 
This is achieved through cultivating God-consciousness because it “save[s] the lovers of 
Allah from unlawful items.”334 When we realise God’s being in our lives, we realise his 
ever presence and eternality. God is aware, God remembers and God knows and so God-
consciousness protects us from immoral actions. Just as thankfulness made us appreciate 
God’s gifts and humility made us understand our purpose in life in Kierekgaard’s eyes, 
God-consciousness keeps the self pure from wrongful actions from the perspective of 
‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib.  
 
We can only realise this closeness through a continual understanding of God’s presence 
which connects the self to God’s very being. ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib emphasises this 
connection when in sermon 87, he elaborates that a person who “did everything only for 
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Allah and so Allah also made him His own.”335 There are distinct mystical implications 
here which later scholars such as Ibn ‘Arabī (d. 638/1240) appear to have developed in 
our perception of God’s Being.336 Whilst ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib made a distinction between 
God and the human being, the closeness that he is trying to demonstrate is “on that level 
of conviction which is like the brightness of the sun. He has set himself for Allah, the 
Glorified, for performance of the most sublime acts of facing all that befalls him and 
taking every step needed for it.”337 The metaphor (majāz) of the sun shows that the 
individual has absolute confidence in God and is guided by Him in every step of his life. 
Interestingly, Kierkegaard expresses the same sentiment in his discourses, “…just as it is 
the same God who, after having led us by his hand through the world, draws back his 
hand and opens his arms to receive in them the yearning soul. Amen!”338 
 
Overall, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib expresses virtually the same sentiments about the self in 
relation to God; that it should be concerned with knowing Him and knowing Him 
correctly. God-consciousness is the key trait to do this and the end goal should always 
be intimacy with God. The key difference is the theological position which the self 
would apprehend. In the Islamic tradition, God is One (the doctrine of tawḥīd) and 
cannot be associated with anything but in the Christian tradition, God does have a 
anthropomorphic connection with Jesus. ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib substantiates this by 
beginning the majority of sermons in praise of God and His simple Divine essence. 
Kierkegaard, however, begins his discourses with a prayer which also praises God but 
does not elaborate on God’s own nature. Finally, the mention of prophets in both 
scholars’ works are present with arguably Kierkegaard building his discourses around a 
prophet’s story whereas ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib build’s his discourses around God’s nature. 
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4. The Self in Relation to Self-Knowledge and Moral Development 
 
4.1  Kierkegaard’s Emphasis on Self-Knowledge 
 
Self-knowledge or in Kierkegaarden terminology, ‘upbuilding’, is the sole focus of his 
discourses. This self-knowledge is meant to lead to greater moral development in one’s 
self. Each discourse explores the anxieties a human being goes through in life – from 
his/her own desires, weaknesses, fears and suffering. These are all rooted in an ignorant 
or cowardly self that is unaware of its own capability, growth and relationship with God. 
He readily admits in He must Increase; I must Decrease that “self-knowledge is a 
difficult matter; although it is easy to understand the rest of the world, the understanding 
suddenly changes very substantially when it pertains to oneself.”339 How apt this is; one 
can see Kierkegaard’s own struggles in his discourses, who he called for help and how 
he saw the world. This is where the uniqueness of his discourses occurs because 
Kierkegaard positions the self as the true controller of the events in one’s life.  
 
Arguably Strengthening the Inner Being, is the prime discourse which focuses on moral 
development yet there are others such as his three discourses on patience: To Gain One’s 
Soul in Patience, To Preserve One’s Soul in Patience, Patience in Expectancy and his 
lengthy discourse, Against Cowardliness, which highlight particular tools one must use 
or be wary of in order to cultivate positive moral growth. As is Kierkegaard’s approach, 
he sometimes highlights particular devices or moral traits that he believes are the most 
important for this growth, which I will examine. Strengthening the Inner Being, 
however, truly sets the tone for what the self should focus on. This is substantiated by 
his opening statement, in “far-fame Rome”…“there lived the Apostle Paul as a 
prisoner”, “he brought with him a teaching…and the unshakable conviction that this 
teaching would be victorious over the whole world.”340 Already the inner being is given 
great confidence, “unshakable conviction” in being victorious. There is a relentless focus 
on the “saving one’s soul”341 and directing it to gain knowledge of itself. Conviction 
must start the journey of self-knowledge and more than anything else, the focus must be 
on one’s self, not others. Moral development, therefore, begins with a firm resolution – a 
resolution that stops cowardliness from trapping an individual in “everydayness and 
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habit”342 – a point repeatedly emphasised in Against Cowardliness: “one such means is 
resolution or coming to a resolution, because resolution joins a person with the eternal 
into time for him, jars him out of the drowsiness of uniformity…”343 
 
But it is a resolution that focuses inwards and acknowledges that self-knowledge is 
“under divine guidance.”344 If God is helping us gain knowledge of ourselves, then we 
must not feel afraid to begin our journey of introspection and ultimately, strengthening 
our moral traits. Using the paradigm of Paul, Kierkegaard wants the listener to gain 
steadfastness, “was he a weak man, then? No, he was powerful. Was he wavering? No, 
he was steadfast; he mightily strengthened by God’s spirit in his inner being.”345 
 
The opposite of this conviction is devastating and Kierkegaard is quite damning about 
this. It is a self that is a slave to worldly desires for Kierkegaard states, 
 
“Only the person who has abandoned his soul to worldly appetites, who has chosen the 
glittering bondage of pleasure and has not managed to extricate himself from its light-
minded or heavy-spirited anxiety, only he is satisfied to let the creation bear its witness 
so that he can shrewdly and prudently use it in the service of the moment. And since the 
human being is the ruler of creation, it obeys even the unworthy authority.”346 
 
This is precisely why the self must be concerned with strengthening itself; it can become 
a “glittering bondage of pleasure” and worst of all, “obey even the unworthy authority.” 
It is a kind of internal chaos which manifests externally as well putting one in a “dark 
abyss” and this is the most harrowing position for the self. It is a place of emptiness and 
despair – the key things which Kierkegaard fears for others and one can interpret, 
himself as well. One can now understand why he devoted three discourses to cultivating 
the trait of patience in the self. Quoting Luke 21:19, Kierkegaard exclaims “in your 
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patience ye shall win your souls.”347 Thus, commitment to understand one’s self and 
possessing moral strength are crucial in Kierkegaard’s process of upbuilding. 
 
4.2 Patience as a Key Trait in Moral Development in Kierkegaard’s 
Discourses 
 
In order to develop this moral strength, Kierkegaard highlights patience as one’s 
“spiritual advisor”348 which stands by a person giving them strength, conscience and 
judgement.349  It is “comforting”350 to an individual who is constantly suffering, 
experiencing all the dangers of life. Here, Kierkegaard is very specific. He is talking 
about the internal will of an individual to “[wrench] himself out of the sufferings.”351 
This is in stark contrast to one who is impatient because impatience is the “old 
hypocrite”352 and “evil spirit”353 that is the root of all sin. Impatience fails to preserve, 
fails to understand the situation at hand. The use of these two opposite traits represent 
the opposite ends of the spectrum for the self. It is here that Kierkegaard delves into 
what the self specifically needs to gain internal moral stability. He makes the trait of 
patience come to life as if it is a counsellor and guardian of the soul thus exploring the 
arena of moral conflict within the self. Not only is this a very specific and metaphorical 
technique in which we are made to understand how the self can attach itself to moral 
traits but it deeply teaches the listener all the gains and pitfalls in the journey of moral 
development. This is succinctly illustrated when Kierkegaard elaborates on the role of 
patience, 
 
“Patience wants to preserve only the soul; it has the courage to give up everything else; 
and when the soul does not believingly aspire to the eternal, does not hopefully Ḥurry 
toward the future, is not loving in understanding with God and human beings, then the 
soul is lost; but if, on the contrary, it announces itself in this powerful presence, then the 
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single individual has indeed saved his soul, however diverse the meanings the words 
may have for different people.”354 
 
Patience is a central virtue here – a trait with a “powerful presence” which explicitly 
connects us to the “eternal” and brings harmony in our relationship with God and human 
beings. It is so crucial that without the soul is lost. Here, it is possible to argue as Rudd 
does that, 
 
“ ‘faith’ in Sickness is not really distinct from “patience” in these discourses, for 
Kierkegaard holds a very strong version of the unity of the virtues thesis; all the virtues 
are fundamentally just the central virtue of faith, that is, the acquisition and maintenance 
of selfhood, seen from different perspectives.”355  
 
As such, patience is merely another word for faith from a different perspective. Thus one 
could interpret Kierkegaard’s aforementioned explantion about patience as in the 
meaning of ‘faith’ which wants to preserve only the soul, not the specific trait of 
patience. I would, however, argue that Kierkegaard’s devotion to three discourses on 
patience shows he aims to dissect the concept as an aid to faith, whereas faith is distinct 
and means love for God. Therefore, a distinction can be made here as the Discourses’ 
focus on those things that increase or decrease faith show a separation between the 
cultivation of a trait and what that trait relates to, which is faith. The arena for all of this 
development is of course the self. Why? It enables a person to reflect on why there is a 
danger, how to overcome it and trust God – crucial components to develop moral growth 
and faith in God. 
 
Finally, once a person is able to stand back from the turbulent waves of his life through 
patience, he must transform his noble intentions into moral actions. Kierkegaard states, 
“it is also wretched…to have an abundance of intentions and a poverty of action, to be 
rich in truths and poor in virtues.”356 Earlier on I mentioned cowardliness as one of the 
traits that Kierkegaard loathes and this is because it halts moral development. It can 
make an individual “forget everything that is noble and sacred and makes him a slave in 
the service of the world…until he, trapped in everydayness and habit, becomes alienated 
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from the eternal and original;”357 Being a slave of the world is the biggest obstacle to 
moral growth and it fosters cowardliness to take responsibility for having an authentic 
and ethical existence. According to Kierkegaard, God dislikes cowardliness; rather he 
loves self-control.358 When the self acquires this resolve, nothing can stop it from 
developing its moral capacity to the fullest. Overall, Kierkegaard emphasises 
strengthening the inner being through patience and resolution in order to detach one’s 
self from base desires, worldly allurements and focus on developing positive moral 
characteristics for one’s self. 
 
4.3 ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s View of the Self in Relation to Self-Knowledge and Moral 
Development 
 
‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib equally focuses on how the self should morally develop itself but does 
so by devoting a lengthy sermon on the appropriate spiritual and moral techniques to 
accomplish this. He does, however, like Kierkegaard mention traits such as patience and 
translating intentions into actions as important tools but then focuses more on 
implementing justice in one’s private and public life. Justice is in fact one of the central 
themes in Nahj al-Balāgha showing that ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s view of internal stability is 
when one is just to his/her own being as well as others (in comparison to Kierkegaard 
who emphasised patience as the defining quality here). In sermon 87, which is arguably 
one of the most mystical sermons in Nahj al-Balāgha359, he tells people: 
 
“O servants of Allah! The most beloved of Allah is he whom Allah has given power 
over his self, so that his inner side is (submerged in) grief and the outer side is covered 
with fear. The lamp of guidance is burning in his heart.”360 
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These lines indicate that the most important technique is to control one’s self. This point 
has already been mentioned in sermon 176 in relation to controlling desires but here, 
‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib elaborates that the person who has power over his self is “the most 
beloved of Allah.” This means beyond any form of worship or religious doctrine, 
morally developing one’s self depends on the practical ability to reduce one’s immoral 
desires – a point repeatedly mentioned by Kierkegaard in virtually all of his 
discourses.361 If a person is greedy or lustful, lazy or deceitful then all of these traits stop 
him/her from progressing towards God. In fact, there is little point in worshipping God 
when all of these traits exist in one’s self. According to ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, Allah would 
rather have a servant of his who is in as much as control as possible over his/her self in 
order that any subsequent spiritual growth is sincere, genuine and motivated only for the 
sake of Allah.362  
 
Here, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib gives us an insight into how should we feel when we attempt to 
control our self. He says our “inner side is (submerged in) grief and the outer side is 
covered with fear.” This means that our inner self constantly feels sad about our ill-
behaviour and negligence. This spurs us to continually improve ourselves and reduce our 
innate passions. At the same time, we must be covered with fear – fear as to what kind 
of action we will perform next. In Arabic, ‘‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib uses the verb ‘tajalbaba’, 
meaning to clothe, which has some beautiful literary implications. When our inner side 
feels grief we are contemplating on our past actions but when we cover ourselves with 
fear, we are protecting ourselves from our future actions. This has some connotations 
with the noun, ‘jilbāb’, which is actually a loose garment that women use to cover their 
body from head to toe.363 We are actually covering our entire being with fear to fully 
protect ourselves from any base passion which may result. Thus, grief and fear are two 
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important traits to have in order to develop morally and spiritually since they reduce our 
carnal desires and focus our attention to God.  
Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the very serious and almost grief-filled introspection on the 
nature of our selves is similar here: “have you really felt how sad it is that you need so 
many words to describe your relation to God?”364 Of course, there is always prosperity 
and victory at the end of Kierkegaard’s discourses, which positions the self on a journey 
of moral success and inner contentment rather than uncertainty:  
 
“He had learned there is distress in life; in cruel misfortunes, he had confessed to 
himself how weak and powerless a person is in his own strength. Yet did not give up 
courage...whether he achieved anything thereby…still he did not know because a great 
darkness had spread around him and it was like a continual night. Yet he exerted himself 
to the utmost strength. See! Then the sun of prosperity rose again, illuminated 
everything, explained everything…”365 
 
The human being that struggles through distresses in life is able to to understand why 
these distresses happened and moreover, enters into a period of prosperity which 
illuminates him and everything around him. It is striking that again we find a similar 
tone of prosperity as well as the imagery of the sun in sermon 87 of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib. 
What results when we balance our self through grief and fear is “the lamp of guidance” 
which “burns in [our] heart.” Because we have controlled ourselves in this manner, we 
allow the guidance of God to enter into our hearts providing us with wisdom and inner 
contentment. As our passions are fleeting and worldly, the satisfaction and guidance that 
we obtained from them was false. The real guidance can only come from God and this is 
portrayed by the beautiful metaphor (majāz) of the ‘misbah’ (lamp) in our hearts which 
illuminates us like “brightness of the sun.” 
 
This concept of God as a light entering our hearts is effectively explained by Allāmah 
Tabatabāī who express, 
 
“Since a human being is selﬁsh and egocentric by nature; he loves him-self and 
sacriﬁces everything for the love of his own soul, and does not avoid destroying 
anything for his own survival. Struggle against self-centeredness and elimination of this 
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natural instinct is the most difﬁcult of all difﬁcult tasks. Unless this passion is totally 
eliminated and this instinct killed, the light of God will not manifest itself in one’s heart. 
In other words, so long as the traveller does not free himself of himself, he will not join 
God.”366 
 
According to Tabatabāī, it is precisely our own self that we must be fearful of which has 
the ability to be egocentric thus corrupting our natural moral instincts. Hence, using grief 
and fear as ways in which to improve ourselves are techniques which any person can 
apply. Grief and fear do not mean depression but rather a contemplative outlook on life 
which leads to true, everlasting love, which is God Himself. Here, the self does not lose 
its identity but rather reflects Godly attributes thereby reducing or removing its own 
pride and immorality. 
 
4.4 ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s View of Developing Appropriate Traits for Moral 
Development 
 
‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s tone changes from the mystical to the practical when in sermon 176 
he states: 
 
“Action! action! Then (look at) the end; the end, and (remain) steadfast; steadfast. 
Thereafter (exercise) patience, patience, and righteousness, righteousness. You have an 
objective. Proceed towards your objective. You have a sign. Take guidance from your 
sign. Islām has an objective. Proceed towards its objective. Proceed towards Allah's by 
fulfilling His rights which He has enjoined upon you. He has clearly stated His demands 
for you. I am a witness for you and shall plead excuses on your behalf on the Day of 
Judgement.”367 
 
These words directly echo Kierkegaard’s discourses on patience. The repetition of 
“action” (‘amal) in the context of “righteousness” (wara’un) is emphatic and shows just 
how much ‘‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib intends to translate an individual’s intentions to practical 
moral actions. In fact, these moral actions are “rights” of God which “He has enjoined 
upon you.” When a person is God-consciousness, he is actually cognisant of fulfilling 
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God’s rights towards His creation. This is why the Qur’ān continually emphasises justice 
(‘adl and/or qisṭ) towards human beings as a matter of obedience to God and respect for 
all that He has created.368 
 
The fulfilment of justice requires “patience” (sabr) and so cultivating moral growth in 
oneself is an arduous journey – a reoccurring theme in Kierkegaard’s discourses. There 
needs to be constant attention towards one’s intentions in order to avoid conceit and 
hypocrisy, the strength to translate one’s inner will to practical moral actions and the 
continual acknowledgement of God’s presence in one’s life. When there is laziness in 
attitude in any of these things and one allows desires to overcome his/her self, there is a 
greater chance that he/she will commit injustice. It is here that ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib lends 
more weight to the concept of justice which appears to be the unifying force for the self 
to develop morally. Towards the end of sermon 176, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib explicitly states:  
 
“Know that injustice is of three kinds - one, the injustice that will not be forgiven, 
another, that will not be left unquestioned, and another that will be forgiven without 
being questioned. The injustice that will not be forgiven is duality of Allah. Allah has 
said: Verily Allah forgiveth not that (anything) be associated with Him ...369 The injustice 
that will be forgiven is the injustice a man does to himself by committing small sins; and 
the injustice that will not be left unquestioned is the injustice of men against other men. 
The retribution in such a case is severe.”370 
 
The first kind of injustice is a spiritual and theological kind – associating another being 
with God. Here, transcendence is made very specific in Islām. God is One and this is the 
doctrine of tawḥīd, which all Muslims subscribe to as part of their faith. Although 
Kierkegaard does not wish to reduce the status of the “Father of lights” in any way, he is 
certainly less theologically explicit in calling someone that associates duality with God 
as an injustice. The second type of injustice that will be forgiven is committing small 
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sins. Here, tawbah (repentance) is key to remove these sins because tawbah literally 
means to ‘return.’ It is the act of leaving what God has prohibited and returning to what 
He has commanded.371  However, the third kind of injustice is the injustice done towards 
other men. This will be examined and will carry a punishment. Mischief, corruption and 
suffering – themes analysed in the discourses, are not only prohibited but incite God’s 
anger. God does not love such people and states, “fight in the cause of Allah those who 
fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors.”372 Whilst of 
course God is always gracious (raḥmān) and compassionate (raḥīm), types of injustice 
which hurt others and for which the perpetrator does not ask forgiveness for will not be 
left unquestioned.  
 
Arguably, this is the most difficult part of achieving moral growth in Islām because the 
implementation of earthly justice is meant to be a reflection of God’s justice. Even 
Kierkegaard admits the distance between the two, “human justice is very prolix, and yet 
at times quite mediocre, divine justice is more concise and needs no information from 
the prosecution…”373 ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, however, intends to bring the two planes closer 
together and thrusts his own self in implementing Divine justice. He has uniquely said, 
“I bear witness that He is Justice and He acts justly”374 and repeatedly translated this in 
his lifetime. He not only used to give advice on how to run a just government to close 
companions like Malik al-Ashtar375 but reprimanded those like Mu’āwiyah b. Abi 
Sufyan, the 2nd caliph of the Umayyad dynasty, who flagrantly committed injustice.376 
 
There is a key difference between Kierkegaard and ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib here; Kierkegaard 
was a philosopher not a leader or ruler whereas ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib was. This clearly 
affects their approach and perception of what can be accomplished in society and how 
moral growth can be cultivated. ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s position as an Imām and caliph 
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showed his intention in forming a link between Godly justice and human justice. 
Quoting Prophet Muḥammad, he said, “O' son of Adam, do good and evade evil; by 
doing so you will be treading correctly.” This is perhaps the most explicit link in his 
sermons between the Qur’ān and two key moral principles of Islām – amr bil ma’roof 
(enjoining that which is befitting) and nahy anil munkar (forbidding that which is 
dishonourable). Here, the Qur’ān is meant to pave the way for a moral society in which 
human beings stand “firm for justice.” It becomes the foundation for individual, societal 
and celestial transcendence. Individually, a person can cultivate greater spiritual states 
by engaging with the Qur’ān and removing his/her immoral desires. When he/she 
extends this to society and fulfils moral duties based on his/her clean heart, the society 
becomes a Godly one. 
 
Moral development, therefore, in the eyes of ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib is perhaps more multi-
faceted than Kierkegaard, particularly because of his own position as a ruler. Whilst 
patience and action are associated with the self, specific spiritual techniques are also 
discussed to elevate the self towards God. This is similar to Kierkegaard’s approach in 
his discourses. Yet the mention of justice as an individual and societal trait positions the 
self in a wider context of implementing rights in society. This makes the individual a 
vicegerent of God attempting to emulate Godly justice in society. This can only be 
accomplished when the self has overcome its passions, gained moral stability and is 
attentive to translating intentions to actions. 
 
5. The Role of the Self in Relation to Suffering 
 
5.1 Kierkegaard’s Understanding of Suffering 
 
Suffering is a theme that ingrains Kierkegaard’s discourses as well as ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s 
sermons. More so perhaps for Kierkegaard, this theme drives his notion of upbuilding. 
The discourses are always about learning from the trials of the prophets, applying their 
strength to our lives and looking at all tribulations as a gift or opportunity to develop 
spiritually. The focus in these discourses is suffering vis a vis human struggle, existential 
meaning and spiritual development as opposed to the problem of evil which is related 
more to the concept of morality itself, why evil exists – particularly in relation to a 
benevolent God, how theodicies have responded to this question and how evil should 
affect a religious or non-religious person. In the context of the Discourses, the term 
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‘suffering’ denotes the human experience of any form of difficulty as opposed to ‘evil’ 
which has wider connotations signalling intent by both human and Divine forces. 
Murray has aptly clarified the distinction between the two stating, 
 
“The phrase ‘the problem of evil’ connotes different things to different people. For some 
it points to the existential problem we face when we confront evil directly—the way it is 
experienced when we or our loved ones are its victims. Understood this way, the 
problem of evil is the problem of how we can find hope or meaning when pain and 
suffering threaten to snatch them from us. In these cases, evil is a cause of despair. For 
others ‘the problem of evil’ constitutes evidence that the universe is not a place created 
and providentially tended by an omnipotent and morally perfect father.”377 
 
It is precisely how to find hope and cope with pain that is the central feature of 
Kierkegaard’s discourses. Because it is the self that has the ability to react to suffering, it 
becomes the central preoccupation for Kierkegaard. It is always about our perception 
and reaction in the face of difficulty. In The Lord Gave and the Lord Took Away: 
Blessed be the Name of the Lord, Kierkegaard states “when a person’s innermost being 
groans in despair and ‘in bitterness of soul’ cries to heaven, then Job still walks along at 
the generation’s side and guarantees that there is a victory…”378 He is courageous here – 
he gets to the heart of what the self experiences – despair and bitterness. These are 
harrowing for us to read because he truly presents the self in the most naked way 
possible – as if Kierkegaard himself is showing his own experiences and how he has 
engaged in the very upbuilding he wants us to attempt. The most immediate task for the 
self is confronting suffering. It is to admit that we do feel this bitterness which seems 
insurmountable and makes us lament and cause confusion to our lives.379 Kierkegaard 
wants us to clarify this confusion by understanding suffering. 
 
In order to do this, the prophets of God take a primary position within his discourses 
such as Job in The Lord gave and the Lord took away: Blessed be the name of the Lord 
and John in He must Increase; I must Decrease. He also uses the example of Paul, the 
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Christian missionary, in The Thorn in the Flesh. For example, our sufferings are little or 
nothing in comparison to the Apostle Paul, “so then list your sufferings…you no doubt 
will find the apostle tried in them”380 And in quoting Job, Kierkegaard states, “Job said; 
‘naked I came from my mother’s womb, and naked shall I return; the Lord gave, and the 
Lord took away; blessed be the name of the Lord.”381 Job becomes the paradigm of 
someone that was given abundant blessings but soon this was taken away from him. This 
immediately allows us to relate our life experiences to someone that has gone through 
them. Yet it is not just the experience that is important for Kierkegaard; it is how we 
react when we experience distress that is more significant. This is why he analyses Job’s 
words separately. When Job said, “The Lord gave”382, it was his acknowledgement that 
he didn’t have anything before. Then “his heart first expanded in thankfulness”383 and 
“now he recalled everything the Lord had given…”384. Job “recalled his prosperity; his 
eye rested again upon the rich pastures and followed the abundant herds.”385 
 
The thankfulness that Job shows is appreciation for the suffering which enables Job to 
realise the will of God. Suffering becomes the enabling factor to fully submit to God in 
all circumstances and understand the bounties He bestows upon human beings. When 
Job recalls his former prosperity, it was a prosperity he did not understand. This was 
because he did not suffer. Kierkegaard argues, suffering “scares him out of a sense of 
security drunk with callousness and damnation.”386 Suffering is a necessity to reorient 
the self towards God again and in fact, it is a kind of protection. Kierkegaard states that 
sometimes when you experience tribulation, you are convinced it’s an external force 
such as people or the nature of one’s circumstances.387 Rather, the best way to 
understand suffering is to trace it back to God – as Job did: “Job traced everything back 
to God; he did not detain his soul and quench his spirit with deliberations or 
explanations that only feed and foster doubt, even though the person suspended in them 
does not even notice that.”388 
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Thus, when we suffer, it is easy to vent our angst to people or blame them for our 
misfortune but once we realise the beauty of suffering in testing us in order to become 
Godly, we should submit to the Lord and nurture our soul.389 We should not think about 
what we lost or could have gained – this is only a limited perception that we exhibit. In 
fact Kierkegaard argues that if a person, “had never known happiness, then the pain 
would not have overwhelmed him, for what is pain but an idea that the person who 
knows nothing else does not have but now it is precisely joy that has educated and 
developed him to perceive pain.”390 Suffering therefore is based on our perception of 
pain and correlates directly to the level of happiness we experience in life. If we become 
too comfortable in our happiness, we find pain very difficult to accept and understand 
yet Kierkegaard is emphasising that we should remain balanced about our perception of 
happiness and pain. Failing to do this would ruin a person’s soul; Kierkegaard boldly 
express that “joy became his own ruin…what his soul delighted in, it now thirsted for 
and ingratitude punished him by picturing it to him as more delightful than it had ever 
been.”391 For Kierkegaard, therefore, suffering is a matter of insight in which one’s self 
is affected only by its own limitations in understanding the nature of pain. 
 
5.2 The Role of Satan in Causing Suffering for the Self in Kierkegaard’s Discourses 
 
Finally, Kierkegaard widens the concept existential pain when he looks at the role of 
Satan in misguiding human beings. In The Thorn in the Flesh, Kierkegaard singles out 
Satan’s suggestions and negative influence as the worst suffering:  
 
“It is hard enough for a person to experience the faithlessness of men but to experience 
that there is a change in God, a shadow of variation, that there is an angle of Satan that 
has the power to tear a person out of this beatitude.”392  
 
Satan truly has the ability to stop a person praising God and puts one’s life into 
turmoil.393 This is starkly illustrated by his usage of the Apostle Paul, “when he kicked  
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against the goads with all his might, wounded him for the rest of his life with a 
recollection that festers in the flesh like a thorn, which like an angel of Satan silences 
him.”394 Paul is at the centrepiece of this discourse; the conflict he experiences in his self 
is used to show the impact of Satan in causing internal suffering which weakens the 
inner being. The only way to overcome Satan is to realise that Satan is actually 
beneficial for us: 
 
“But Paul knew that I was an angel of Satan…he does not turn aside but he knew that it 
was beneficial for him that it happened and therefore also knew that this angel of Satan 
was nevertheless an emissary of God. Is this not a marvel – to change an angel of Satan 
into an emissary of God – would not Satan himself grow weary!”395 
 
Satan allows us to see what we have to overcome, the darkness in our souls and gives us 
the opportunity to strengthen our selves. This is encapsulated when Kierkegaard states, 
“a person learns to know himself only with much difficulty.”396 Therefore, we again see 
that self-knowledge is precipitated by suffering which connects the three themes 
analysed in this chapter – the self in relation to God, self-knowledge and moral 
development and suffering. The interplay here makes suffering a core part of the journey 
of self-transformation and allows us to see the practical circumstances in which the self 
can descend into an abyss or emerge victorious, dignified and Godly.  
 
5.3 ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s Conception of Suffering 
 
‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib demonstrates his understanding of suffering more by what he 
experienced as a leader and saintly individual rather than engaging in a philosophical 
exposition of the concept. This is a clear divergence between Eighteen Upbuilding 
Discourses and Nahj al-Balāgha because where previously ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib deliberated 
on the nature of the self in relation to God, self-knowledge and moral development (thus 
showing the similarity between the two texts), he takes a different line in actually 
showing his own trials and difficulties. This allows us to see ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s own self 
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in an arena of existential and practical conflict, rather than viewing the self in a 
hypothetical situation. 
 
In sermon 37, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib exclaims, “I discharged duties when others lost courage 
(to do so) and I came forward when others hid themselves. I spoke when others 
remained silent.”397 He again reiterates in sermon 39, “I am faced with men who do not 
obey when I order and do not respond when I call them. May you have no father! (Woe 
to you!) What are you waiting for to rise for the cause of Allah? Does not faith join you 
together or sense of shame rouse you?”398 The background to these sermons are that 
when ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib was fighting Mu’āwiyah, people abandoned his side or did not 
stand firm on the principles of justice. By being resolute, he is showing the confidence 
one needs to have when there is faithlessness and lack of support around someone. As I 
have argued, Kierkegaard also states that this is a type of distress, something which the 
prophets of God when through. However, those who have strong faith in God such as 
Paul continued to remain steadfast and Kierkegaard emphatically underscores this point: 
“was he a weak man, then? No, he was powerful. Was he wavering? No, he was 
steadfast; he mightily strengthened by God’s spirit in his inner being.”399 It could be 
argued that because ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib is regarded as a saint in the Islamic tradition by 
Shī‘as, Sunnis and Sufīs, what we are witnessing is the first-hand account of dealing 
with suffering. We may extract that courage is required in the face of suffering and 
always being cognisant of God’s will, rather than one’s own. These are themes which 
Kierkegaard discusses in Against Cowardliness and so there is a similarity in the kind of 
traits which the self requires in order to overcome suffering. 
 
There is also the acknowledgement that all suffering is traced back to God and so what 
the self perceives as originating from human circumstances is in reality stemming from 
God’s will. In sermon 47, when ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib is discussing the calamities affecting 
the Kufan society, he states, “O' Kufah as though I see you being drawn like the tanned 
leather of 'Ukazi in the market you are being scraped by calamities and being ridden by 
severe troubles. I certainly know that if any tyrant intends evil for you Allah will afflict 
him with worry and fling him with a killer (set someone on him to kill him).”400 Here, 
there is emphasis on realising the nature of suffering, akin to Kierkegaard who wanted 
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individuals to confront the terror around them. ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib is informing the people 
that God Himself watches over the calamities that befall human beings and thus He has a 
power to set aside these calamities. However, this requires a trust in the kind of 
circumstances that have been willed for us by Him.401 Thus, both scholars are bold in 
their illustrations of suffering showing that the self cannot shy away from distresses – it 
must confront them. 
 
According to ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, it can confront them by, 
 
 “hasten[ing] towards (good) actions and dread[ing] the suddenness of death because the 
return of age cannot be hoped for as the return of livelihood can be hoped for. Whatever 
is missed from livelihood today may be hoped tomorrow with increase but whatever is 
lost from the age yesterday its return cannot be expected today.”402  
 
Good actions and remembrance of death are helpful tools to navigate the self through 
suffering. The remembrance of death, in particular, is mentioned more in Nahj al-
Balāgha with sermons devoted exclusively to it.403 Death becomes the passage to God 
and so when the self focuses on this, it realises that all suffering has a purpose, which is 
to direct one to the attention of God. Indeed, physical suffering comes to an end with 
death but if one can master internal suffering, it can arrive at position of contentment in 
this life and the hereafter with God Himself. Therefore, one should not miss what 
“cannot be hoped for” – a theme tackled by Kierkegaard. Rather suffering should propel 
the person to perform “good actions” and use his experience to better his self and others 
around him. 
 
5.4 The Role Satan in Causing Suffering for the Self in Nahj al-Balāgha 
 
There is however a striking similarity between Kierkegaard and ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib as to 
what is the worst type of suffering. ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib also devotes a lengthy discussion to 
Satan as the most negative influence on a human being. In sermon 192, he states,  
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“You should take a lesson from what Allah did with Satan; namely He nullified his great 
acts and extensive efforts on account of the vanity of one moment although Satan had 
worshipped Allah for six thousand years - whether by the reckoning of this world or of 
the next world is not known. Who now can remain safe from Allah after Satan by 
committing a similar disobedience? None at all.”404  
 
Satan is the enemy of the self, the one who incites the self to disobey God in vanity. He 
creates suffering for the individual because there is no contentment when “Satan infects 
you with his disease or leads you astray through his call…”405 The self becomes ill by a 
spiritual disease which encapsulates the soul. This echoes the “dark abyss” of 
Kierkegaard and is the lowest point of the self. ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib is equally graphic, if 
not more so, in his description of this abyss:  
 
“then they pushed you into the hollows of disgrace threw you into the whirlpools of 
slaughter and trampled you wounding you by striking your eyes with spears cutting your 
throats tearing your nostrils breaking your limbs and taking you in ropes of control 
towards the fire already prepared.”406  
 
The bold language is there to jolt the reader to reflect on the nature of his/her being and 
how much it is influenced by Satan. Here, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib also echoes the three 
categories or states of self in the Qur’ān – “for the [carnal] soul indeed prompts [men] to 
evil”407 (inna nafs la-ammāratun bi al-sū), “And I swear by the self-blaming soul”408 
(al-nafs al-lawwāmah) and “O soul, at peace!” (al-nafs al-mutma'innah).409 This shows 
the fragile nature of the self as an entity capable of being incited but equally has the 
ability to be contended.  
 
This internal suffering, however, can be overcome by the trait of humility – the same 
tool that Kierkegaard used in He must Increase; I must Decrease. ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib 
emphasises this key trait as a weapon against Satan: “make up your mind to have  
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humility over your heads to trample self-pride under your feet and to cast off vanity 
from your necks. Adopt humility as the weapon between you and your enemy Satan and 
his forces.”410 Humility removes pride, ego and vanity from one’s self and all of these 
are the root of moral regression and disobedience towards God. It is interesting that 
within the moral discourse of Nahj al-Balāgha and Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 
virtually similar techniques are used to overcome suffering and one’s own passions. This 
not only universalises both texts within a wider conception of morality but substantiates 
that discussions on the self do not have to be restricted to religion alone. Moreover, one 
could use Hick’s term of “soul-making”411 to describe both of their approaches to 
suffering. 
 
5.5 Does Satan Confer Benefit on Human Beings? 
 
There is a final difference between ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and Kierkegaard in elaborating on 
the benefit of Satan to human beings. ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib does not explicitly say that Satan 
is a benefit to humankind by making human beings aware of their darker self. 
Kierkegaard philosophises about Satan; ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib is more theological about him 
– he is an evil that must be overcome through moral strength. Later Shī‘ī philosophers, 
however, have philosophised on the role of Satan and have come up with a virtually 
identical view as Kierkegaard. Mulla Ṣadra argued that prima facie, Satan’s existence 
and his whispers (waswās) may appear to be a great suffering on humankind. However, 
in chapter nine of his book, Iksir al-‘Ārifīn (The Elixr of the Gnostics), he argues Satan, 
who is created by God, confers a benefit towards human beings:  
 
 “Just as man benefits from the angel’s inspiration, so also he benefits from satan’s 
disquietening in a certain respect, for the latter’s existence inevitable comes from God 
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for the sake of a wisdom and an advantage. Otherwise, he would not exist, since futility 
and ineffectuality are absurd for Him.”412  
 
Basing his reasoning on God always having a wise purpose for everything He does, 
Mulla Ṣadra explains that the wisdom and advantage for human beings are that if it were 
not for the followers of Satan (who are all followers of sense-intuition and imagination) 
and their false gods, “God’s friends would not have been sent out to verify the realities, 
teach the sciences and seek demonstrations so as to clarify tawḥīd…”413 This means 
human beings are blessed to have Prophets who come and teach them the meaning of 
God and goodness. This point is made more explicit by the common interactions we 
have with fellow human beings and the suffering that results from these interactions. He 
says:  
 
“So also is the case with character traits and deeds, for example. Were it not for the 
backbiting of the backbiters and the prying of those who pry into people’s faults, no one 
would totally shun the hidden faults that his loved ones do not see…how many an 
enemy there is, foul in essence, from who enmity man benefits more than from the love 
of his sincere friend!”414  
 
There is an important implication here. Were it not for the suffering endured by the one 
who is backbitten against, there would be no one to make him aware of his faults, which 
often his nearest and dearest may miss or not point out. Hence, suffering has a direct 
connection with removing faults from one’s self and replacing them with good traits. 
Though one may perceive someone to be an enemy of his, the enemy is actually more 
beneficial than his/her sincere friend since he/she can learn more about himself/herself 
through not only how the enemy behaves (which may be ungodly and so one does not 
wish to be like him) but also what the enemy may point out in you.  
 
Therefore, whilst in later Shī‘ī philosophical tradition there is correlation with the views 
of Kierkegaard on Satan and the suffering he causes an individual, this correlation is not 
clear from ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s own sermons. Regardless, the issue of suffering presents 
some similarities and differences between the two scholars in the way they position the 
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self. Kierkegaard makes the self the arena for internal existential conflict whereas ‘Alī b. 
Abī Ṭālib makes himself the very arena for this conflict through sharing his own 
experiences of difficulty. Yet both agree that the self must confront suffering in all its 
ugliness and it is only through this courage that one is able to overcome it by trusting 
God. Just as patience and resolution are key traits within Kierkegaard’s discourses to 
bear suffering, humility becomes an important trait in accepting difficult affairs in life. 
This is particularly in relation to Satan who gives the worst type of suffering to human 
beings because he causes internal despair and confusion within the self. According to 
Kierkegaard, Satan is a benefit to humankind but this is not mentioned in ‘Alī b. Abī 
Ṭālib’s sermons. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to compare the definition and nature of the self in accordance 
with Kierkegaard’s Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses and ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s sermons in 
Nahj al-Balāgha. Starting from a broad position of looking at the overall works of both 
authors, the definition of the self as an entity capable of transformation and as 
representing the very I-ness of an individual is a point that is virtually the same in their 
works. What is central to their definition is that the self is a worthy entity that requires 
personal cultivation. When it is not cultivated i.e not reflected upon through self-
knowledge, it causes a human being to be humiliated and feel empty. This void can only 
be fulfilled by being attentive to God’s will, the contentment moral traits provide and 
removing one’s vanity. Whilst these definitions signal their similarities and give us a 
foundational meaning of the self, it does not immediately position in the self in real 
human circumstances where there is conflict, happiness, struggle and loneliness.  
 
This is the beauty of both Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses and Nahj al-Balāgha because 
they focus on the self not just as a metaphysical entity but as relating to the individual’s 
actions and emotions in a range of personal and public situations. Whilst of course all of 
these relate back to the self, it allows us to see the self in a wider mode of operation – as 
an entity that is capable of being reflected upon by the layman. Kierkegaard constantly 
wants the listener to engage in ‘upbuilding’ and ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib warns against worldly 
allurements and the need for human beings to be attentive to their own selves. This is 
crucial for my thesis because I am aiming to position the self in the wider context of the 
Islamic-Western human rights discourse. The right to uphold or take life, respect 
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someone’s property, the freedom to speak and choose a religion – all of these rights 
express the positive or negative yearnings rooted in the self. This is why Kierkegaard 
talks of the “law from within” which must be respected first before the outer law. ‘Alī b. 
Abī Ṭālib also changes the tone in his sermons from a discourse which initially positions 
the self as an entity requiring reflection and cultivation to an entity directly involve in 
the implementation of justice in society.  
 
It is here that Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses and Nahj al-Balāgha position the self in 
relation to three interconnected themes: the self in relation to God, self-knowledge and 
moral development and suffering. The self has a role to develop faith in God and 
encourage others to do so, to continually reflect on what it is, to develop traits such as 
patience, humility and courage and to strengthen itself in the face of adversity. The need 
to acquire these traits for the self are illustrated in diverse practical scenarios by both 
authors which shows their pragmatism and concern for the development of society as a 
whole. Whilst Kierkegaard is appealing to the individual to engage in upbuilding, the 
context of his discourses relate to his perception of the behaviour of his society in his 
own time – from Churchgoers and preachers to shopkeepers and businessmen. Equally, 
‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib addresses his own society; after all, he is preaching to them in the form 
of sermons and mentions the difficulties the society was going through. These ranged 
from corruption in the government, love of wealth, civil war, leadership and differing 
interpretations of religion. In virtually all of his sermons, he begins by praising God and 
compels the listener to reflect on his own relationship with God. Kierkegaard begins 
with a prayer, setting the tone for an individual to supplicate to God or at the least, 
reflection on the nature of his life.  
 
The uniqueness of both works in bridging the moral and spiritual dimensions of the self 
with its practical application gives me a firm foundation in which to move the discourse 
on the self within the scope of human rights. If the self is the root of the implementation 
of a human being’s right to himself, others and towards God, then it must figure 
prominently within human rights theories. Otherwise, human rights theories are not 
focusing on the driving force behind the very rights which it aims to uphold. I will now 
proceed to comparatively analyse Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s 
Risālat al-Ḥuqūq which give a practical framework to the self. Whilst ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib 
and Kierkegaard looked at the self from its metaphysical and spiritual core in the context 
of our everyday conflicts, they did not give a cohesive practical ethical-legal framework 
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in which one can easily apply duties or rights towards one’s self. This is the domain of 
Kant and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn who exclusively focus on the kinds of rights associated with 
the self and how they can be implemented in society. Thus, I am moving from a moral 
and spiritual discourse to one that is distinctly practical in order to create an opening in 
which the self can be effectively sieved within the Islamic-Western human rights 
discourse. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Comparing Kant’s and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s Framework to the Self in the 
Metaphysics of Morals and Risālat al-Ḥuqūq 
 
The focus of this chapter is to compare the framework given to the self in the 
Metaphysics of Morals and Risālat al-Ḥuqūq. The previous chapter dealt with 
Kierkegaard’s and ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s notion of the self in Eighteen Upbuilding 
Discourses and Nahj al-Balāgha. Their analysis combined spirituality and scripture 
along with an approach of positioning the self in worldly moral dilemmas. However, 
they did not give a framework of how to access the self and attach rights to it. This 
chapter looks at Kant and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn who have attempted to give a pragmatic 
framework to the self that operates within a legal and practical ethical dimension. Both 
authors do this by deliberating on the concept of ‘duties to oneself’ and ‘rights to the 
self’ respectively which enables individual to form duties towards their ‘selves.’ This 
fusion of ethics, law and philosophy is crucial to my thesis as it begins to answer my 
central question: is it possible to give a practical framework of the self that is identifiable 
by the average human being and is capable of being transposed into the Islamic-Western 
human rights discourse? 
  
The grounds for comparison are striking in that despite the difference in religious 
backgrounds of the authors as well as time periods, they deliberate on a notion in which 
rights are owed to the self, not just other human beings. This already shifts the 
discussion of the human rights discourse from a social contract worldview to a new 
sphere in which the self becomes the starting point of any law. Although the notion of 
God is present in both works, the authors approach to God and theology is distinctly 
different thus allowing a useful comparison to take place between the worldviews of 
Islām and Christianity but also within philosophy generally as very few, if any, have 
compared Kant to the works of the Twelve Shī‘ī Imāms.415  
 
The goal of this chapter is to highlight similarities and differences in the authors’ 
approaches to the self, how they give a framework to it, their notion of duties and rights 
to the self and how they eventually branch out rights to others. Secondly, this 
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comparison will help me construct my own framework for the self in order to tackle the 
limitations of the conception of human rights in both the Islamic and Western 
worldviews, as outlined in chapter one. I will begin by exploring the basic foundations 
of Kant and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn in the Metaphysics of Morals and Risālat al-Ḥuqūq in the 
way they approach the self and God. Then I will tackle the crucial concept of duties to 
oneself and rights to the self respectively in both works, which constitutes the authors’ 
main method in giving a practical legal-ethical framework to the self. The last part of the 
chapter will examine how the authors apply their concept of duties to oneself and rights 
to the self in wider society. 
 
5. Laying the Foundations for a Framework to the Self 
 
5.1 Kant’s Understanding of the Role of the Self in Performing Duties 
 
Considering that the notion of the self is central to my thesis, Kant’s and Zayn al-
‘Ābidīn’s understanding of how they give a practical ethical-legal framework to the self 
is an important starting point. In the same vein of the authors, my concern is not what 
the self is (as I have dealt with this in the previous chapter); rather, in what way can the 
self manifest itself in society through a set of rational and practical duties? Kant argues 
that a person’s inner freedom is capable of being subject to laws. By inner freedom, 
Kant does not mean the soul but rather, “the vital principle of man in the free use of his 
powers since the basis of great crimes is merely the force of inclinations that weaken 
reason.”416 Here the self is seen as a tool in the overall framework of performing duties 
and adhering to ends: “an end is an object of free choice, the representation of which 
determines it to an action (by which the object is brought about). Every action, therefore, 
has its end.”417 If the self is weak or incapable in making a reasoned choice that values 
the dignity of itself and others, then not only does it devalue humanity but it is incapable 
of performing external laws as well. It is here that Kant makes a separation between the 
Doctrine of Right, which “only dealt with the formal condition of outer freedom”418 
(such as public and private rights) and the Doctrine of Virtue which deals with the 
condition of inner freedom i.e the powers of a human being which cannot be governed 
by external laws but only internal law-giving through self-constraint. 
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However, can we constrain ourselves? Isn’t a contradiction to say ‘I am bound?’ How 
can the self simultaneously impose obligation but also be put under obligation? Kant’s 
solution is to distinguish man as a sensible being and intelligible being. The intelligible 
being contains inner lawgiving will with the ability to reason. The sensible being is that 
part of man which contains senses and animalism. When we say that we have internal 
laws which govern us or the self imposes obligations on us through conscience, “the 
internal court of a man”419, it is actually the intelligible part of us that is commanding the 
sensible being through reason since the sensible being has no capability of doing so. 
Here, Kant avoids the distinction between the soul and body arguing that,  
 
“the subject that is bound, as well as the subject that binds, is always man only; and 
though we may, in a theoretical respect, distinguish soul and body from each other, as 
natural attributes of man, we may not think of them as different substances putting him 
under obligation, so as to justify a division to the body and duties to the soul. Neither 
experience nor inferences of reason give us adequate grounds for deciding whether man 
has a soul…and even if the first alternative be true, it is still inconceivable that man 
should have a duty to a body (as a subject imposing obligation), even to a human 
body.”420  
 
From this statement, it is clear in the Metaphysics of Morals that Kant does not like to 
mix spirituality, theology and revelation with philosophy. He believes that it is beyond 
philosophy to talk about the soul and its relationship to God (but does make references 
to God towards the end the Metaphysics of Morals, which I will illustrate).421 As I shall 
argue, this stands in contrast to Risālat al-Ḥuqūq in which God, His relationship to 
human beings and specifically the self, is mentioned overtly and fused with legal and 
social rights. Moreover, in Risālat al-Ḥuqūq, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn does believe man should 
have a duty to his body. 
 
What, however, is important from Kant’s statement as above is the idea that the self is 
delineated into a pragmatic form of a human being’s intelligence conquering his/her 
animality. This is why Kant says, “since virtue is based on inner freedom, it contains a 
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positive command to man, namely to bring all his passions and inclinations under 
reason’s control and so to rule over himself.”422 What this does is bring the self out of a 
purely spiritual, mystical ethos and into the domain of reason. Therefore, the ‘I’ to which 
Kant refers is the ‘I’ of choice, reasoned capacity and will and this makes the subject of 
duties “man only.” These are Kant’s initial foundations in giving a framework to the 
self. 
 
1.2  Kant’s Approach to Feelings 
 
It is interesting that whereas the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals appeared to 
remove all types of empiricism from law, the Metaphysics of Morals devotes a lengthy 
section to virtue, feelings and motives. Kant argues the Doctrine of Virtue is more of a 
preparatory stage to “act as though the maxim of your action were to become, through 
your will, a universal law of nature.”423 Here, Kant is focusing on purifying the will so 
that the maxim of one’s action can become a universal law of nature and one can 
consistently act towards it. He is uniting virtue ethics and practical law in the 
performance of universal duties to human beings. This is why Wood argues that Kant 
distinguishes four different kinds of feelings. They include, 
 
“moral feeling (feelings of approval or disapproval directed at actions), conscience 
(moral feelings direct to oneself, in view of some action performed or contemplated), 
love of human beings (i.e., any form of benevolent caring or concern for the welfare of 
another as a person who is an end in itself), and finally respect (for the dignity of a 
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person, or for the moral law as the basis of our own rational self-government) (MS 
6:399-403). These feelings are the direct and natural acknowledgement of moral 
reasons.”424 
 
Wood’s analysis shows us that Kant is tapping into the self through these feelings and 
without cultivating these feelings, no framework that seeks to make society better can 
succeed. The feelings as above depict the non-rational dimension of a human being and 
are very much in line with our innate inclinations towards ourselves and other human 
beings. Our moral feelings manifest themselves instantly when we like or dislike an 
action, our conscience bites when we do something fundamentally wrong, we have a 
natural concern and love for others and finally, we demand respect and give respect to 
those that deserve it. All of these demonstrate Kant’s approach in broadening the 
concept of the self. Without giving a framework to the self in terms of the kinds of 
duties it owes to itself, the self remains a senseless entity without any purpose. This is 
why Kant acutely expresses,  
 
“man has a duty to raise himself from the crude state of his nature, from his animality, 
more and more toward humanity, by which he alone is capable of setting himself ends; 
he has a duty to diminish his ignorance by instruction and to correct his errors…man has 
a duty to carry the cultivation of his will up to the purest virtuous disposition, which the 
law becomes also the incentive to his actions that conform with duty and he obeys the 
law from duty. This disposition is inner morally practical perfection.”425 
 
In light of this statement, whilst perfecting the self is important, it always appears to be 
geared and motivated by the successful outcomes of the categorical imperative which 
stipulates universal maxims. For Kant, mere incentive to perform laws is subjective, 
empirical and untrustworthy. The self must cultivate its “capacities (or natural 
predispositions), the highest of which is understanding, the capacity for concepts and so 
too for those concepts that have to do with duty.”426 This results in a rational being 
whose inner freedom is directed to internal and external lawgiving, motivated by duties. 
This reflects Kant’s initials statement about what a duty of virtue is: “it is the strength of 
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man’s maxims in fulfilling his duty.”427 Therefore, if all of the feelings as above are 
nurtured then man can raise himself from animality towards humanity. 
 
More recently, scholars have reinterpreted Kant’s approach to ethics through the 
aforementioned section on feelings and have argued the Metaphysics of Morals must be 
taken as the leading text to help us understand Kant.428 Baxley argues that the Kantian 
virtuous person is enjoined by duty to maintain and even cultivate certain emotional 
states, all of which can result in a virtuous agent who is “at peace with herself, calm and 
tranquil, and yet always prepared to stand down the potential threat to good conduct that 
her propensity to evil could pose.”429 This presents Kant’s philosophy as more 
sympathetic to human desires. Marshall has gone further in using Kant’s approach to 
feelings to show how this is Kant’s subtle way of expressing the self in philosophy. He 
argues, 
 
“Not many philosophers would turn to Kant for a positive view about the metaphysics of 
the self (the referent of ‘I’). On the contrary, most of Kant’s interpreters read him as 
warning that any attempt to give a positive account of the self’s nature is doom to 
failure, and as building his theories without metaphysics assumptions about the self…I 
argue that not only is the anti-metaphysical interpretation mistaken, but that Kant offers 
us a subtle, plausible metaphysical account of the self that has no direct analogue in the 
contemporary literature.”430 
 
Marshall’s analysis widens the scope for me to compare Kant with Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, the 
latter of whom is very clear in identifying the ontological origin for the self which is 
God. Prima facie, this would have appeared to be a huge difference with Kant’s 
approach to the self but in light of Marshall’s argument as well as Kant’s inclusion of 
the feelings associated with the self, it is possible to compare the two figures within both 
a metaphysical and practical context. Therefore, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s explicit connection 
between the self and God does not necessarily contradict Kant’s conception of the self 
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which appears to situate God in the background, rather than the foreground of his 
philosophical deliberations. 
 
1.3  Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s Approach to the Self in the Implementation of 
Rights 
 
Kant argued that reason must control the self’s passions and inclinations (such as 
excessive eating, drinking and lust) and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn argues the same:  
 
“the right of your stomach is that you make it not into a container for that which is 
unlawful to you and you eat no more than your fill (shib').The right of your private part 
(farj) is that you protect it from fornication and guard it against being looked upon.”431  
 
The self is central in performing morally correct actions towards one’s self and others. 
However, whilst Kant argued that we are only talking about man’s animality here 
(which should be under control of his intelligible part and thus no distinction needs to be 
made between the soul and body), Zayn al-‘Ābidīn makes an explicit connection 
between the self and body. Throughout Risālat al-Ḥuqūq, continual reference is made to 
the ‘nafs.’ As I have demonstrated in accordance the previous chapter, the self can be 
defined in terms of a unique level of identity and self-consciousness that gives a being 
its distinct and dynamic essence when it orients itself towards God. It can be argued that 
Zayn al-‘Ābidīn continues this line of understanding not only because he is the fourth 
Shī‘ī Imām (and thus there is a theological consistency in the Twelve Imams’ of their 
view of the self) but also because he has similar narrations to ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib on the 
self. These narrations depict a similar approach to the self as an entity linked to the 
spirit, requiring self-knowledge and explicitly connected to God.432 
 
When Zayn al-‘Ābidīn comments on the relationship between the self and the body, he 
shows they are explicitly interconnected to each other. This interconnection occurs 
because according to him, the self owes duties to the body (and its various organs) as 
well as its actions (such as prayer and fasting). This is not necessarily in contradiction to 
                                                          
431
 Al-‘Ābidīn: The Psalms of Islām, p. 284. 
432
 Mīzān al-Ḥikmah (The Scale of Wisdom) includes a useful section on knowledge of the self and 
knowledge of God which contains numerous narrations from the Twelve Imams. Many of these 
narrations are virtually identical with each other thus substantiating my point that there is a 
theological consistency in the Twelve Imams’ beliefs about the self and God. See: Rayshahri: The 
Scale of Wisdom, pp. 706 – 16. 
165 
 
Kant who believes that the self must cultivate itself to perform duties because 
throughout Risālat al-Ḥuqūq, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn believes the self must do exactly the 
same. Rather, the difference lies in why a human being should perform duties in the first 
place and the manner in which this takes place. Kant argued that the body can never be a 
subject which imposes obligations on the self; rather we owe duties to ourselves as 
animal beings. Zayn al-‘Ābidīn also believes we have duties to our animal being but 
phrases these duties in terms of the rights bodily organs have upon us. It is always the 
self which perceives the purpose of our organs. Moreover, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s framework 
for the self in order to implement rights is motivated by the belief in God whilst for 
Kant, it is motivated by a heightened understanding of the reasoned duty before him/her 
and the notion of good will; the idea of one who only makes decisions that he/she holds 
to be morally worthy, taking moral considerations in themselves to be conclusive 
reasons for guiding his/her behaviour. Therefore, the self becomes crucial for the 
implementation of rights because according to Zayn al-‘Ābidīn it is an entity in itself 
that requires both moral and spiritual culivation.  
 
1.4     Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s Approach to God and Where our Feelings should 
be  Directed   
 
Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s approach to giving a framework to the self begins with its 
fundamental relationship with God. He states: “the right of your self (nafs) against you is 
that you employ it in obeying God.”433 Although the self gradually begins to operate in 
the domain of rights to itself and others, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s framework is decidedly 
spiritual and theological. God is the root of the self and has the greatest claim upon an 
individual: 
 
“God has rights against you and that these encompass you in every movement through 
which you move, every rest through which you rest, every waystation in which you 
reside, every limb which you employ, and every instrument which you put to work.”434  
 
Here, God is to be worshipped but also acknowledged as being present within His 
creation and deeply connected to His creatures’ movements and actions. Hence, whilst 
Kant saw the self as a tool in the performance of duties and adherence of ends 
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(particularly through moral feeling, conscience, love of human beings and respect), Zayn 
al-‘Ābidīn argues the self must direct itself to worship God without associating anyone 
with Him – the doctrine of tawḥīd (Oneness of God). This echoes the verse of the 
Qur’ān which lays the foundation for man’s purpose in life, “I did not create the jinn and 
the humans except that they may worship Me.”435 There is no epistemological separation 
between philosophy and revelation as in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. However, it 
appears that there is a unifying purpose to Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s approach. Whilst according 
to Kant the framework of the self lies in developing concepts, reasoned choice and 
following duties with a cultivated will, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s approach is heteronymous. He 
wants a human being to cultivate the self not just through reason but through the help of 
God. This is why he expresses, “therefore happy is he whom God aids in the rights 
which He has made incumbent upon him and whom He gives success therein and points 
in the proper direction!”436 The feeling of joy occurs because God aids a person in 
implementing the rights He has enjointed upon him and so a human being is happy when 
he/she successfully fulfils God’s rights in society.  
 
Kant reserves God in the domain outside of philosophy though he makes repeated 
references to God towards the end of the Doctrine of Virtue where a human being is 
required to develop a pure will through his/her conscience:  
 
“Now, since such a moral being must also have all power (in heaven and on earth) in 
order to give effect to his laws (as is necessarily required for the office of judge), and 
since such an omnipotent moral being is called God, conscience must be thought of as 
the subjective principle of being accountable to God. In fact the latter concept is always 
contained (even if only in an obscure way) in the moral self-awareness of 
conscience.”437  
 
Kant’s reference to God is intriguing and has been the subject of much debate.438 It 
appears that God is an internal notion explicitly linked to one’s conscience. At this level, 
there is little difference between Kant and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn in their analysis of what the 
self should appeal to in order to cultivate virtue as God is the ontological root of our 
conscience. Where the difference rises is the extent by which God is used in 
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philosophical deliberation and the production of man-made laws. For Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, 
God is the root of these laws but for Kant, he appears to be a shadow in the background. 
Indeed, Kant states that “this is not to say that man is entitled, through the Idea to which 
his conscience unavoidably guides him, to assume that such a Supreme Being actually 
exists outside himself…”439 Kant argues a human being appeals to an ideal when 
purifying his self but this does not mean for objective purposes or for one’s personal 
belief, that this idea has to be God. Again, this shows Kant’s separation of theology and 
philosophy in looking at the self.  For Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, God stands as the foundation and 
source of all rights thereby creating an origin and telos for all rights-based activity. In 
fact, as the rights to the self are mentioned, along with the rights of actions and then the 
rights of leaders, subjects, relatives and others, these categories are arguably mere 
delineations of God’s own rights i.e how God would behave towards human beings. God 
stands as the figurehead of all rights and the way in which we act towards our self, our 
actions and those around us become representations of actions of God and ultimately, 
His expectations. This may explain the gradual expansion of rights from God, the self 
and actions to numerous categories of people.440 
 
It may further be argued that though the goal of fulfilling our duties to ourselves and 
others is to be performed in a manner of sincerity, valuing the worth of each individual, 
the individual is considered as God’s creature. It is because he/she is God’s creature that 
he/she is respected. Dignity derives by virtue that you are created from God and so all 
creatures deserve the same worth (hence the diverse categories of persons in Risālat al-
Ḥuqūq but all accorded the same level of dignity). Thus, God is the end of all human 
actions but this does not necessarily contradict the idea that human beings are also ends 
in themselves. This is of course different to the Kantian formulation of dignity which is 
rooted in human beings or humanity as ends in themselves (though again one may admit 
that Kant’s writings show an awareness of God as the source of human activity441).  
 
                                                          
439
 Kant: The Metaphysics of Morals, p. 234 
440
 Interestingly, al-ḥaqq, meaning the Truth or Reality is also one of the 99 names of God and 
explicitly shows an ontological connection with God’s conception of rights and the conception a 
human being must have of these rights. 
441
 Though in the doctrine of virtue, reference to God is made as the source, or at least, paradigm of 
perfect ethical behaviour and law-giving. On commenting on malice, Kant says, ‘He alone (namely 
God) can say “Vengeance is mine; I will repay.” It is, therefore, a duty of virtue not only to refrain 
from repaying another’s enmity with hatred out of mere revenge…’ Kant: The Metaphysics of Morals, 
p. 253. Kant also regards conscience to be ‘the subjective principle of being accountable to God.’ 
Ibid: p. 234. 
168 
 
Therefore, from the perspective of Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, one may argue that a human being’s 
dignity has an existence beyond himself/herself since a human being may be a 
destructive member of society (thus reducing his level of humanity and allowing others 
to accord less of a duty towards him/her) but since God is the source of eternal dignity, a 
human being’s dignity never diminishes, nor does our duty to him/her. In fact, it is 
precisely his/her capacity to be Godly or his/her enduring link with God that gives us 
continual incentive to be ‘most gracious’ (raḥmān), probably the most important 
attribute of Allah in the Islamic tradition442, which coincidentally Zayn al-‘Ābidīn begins 
Risālat al-Ḥuqūq with.443 
 
2. The Concept of Duties to Oneself and Rights to the Self 
 
2.1 Kant’s Notion of Duties to Oneself 
 
Both authors expand the notion of duties and rights from merely being in the domain of 
social contract towards one that is based on what the individual owes to his/her self first. 
Kant uses the heading ‘duties to oneself’ whilst Zayn al-‘Ābidīn talks about the notion 
of rights to the self. It is striking that despite differences in the religious, geographical 
and linguistic backgrounds of Kant and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn both authors have come up with 
a similar concept (though Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s concept is historically much earlier being 
expressed in the 7th century). Moreover, both have cited similar duties to oneself such as 
reducing eating, drinking and lust.  
 
The most important part of Kant’s framework to the self is what he means by ‘duties’ 
and how this relates to his overall understanding of law. Is it even possible to ascribe 
duties to the self and think of them within a practical framework? When Kant uses the 
term ‘oneself’, he is referring to man as the subject and his capacity for reason. 
However, as I have argued, Kant appears to bring out the ‘self’ through the use of moral 
feelings and conscience and so it is possible to talk about some kind of non-rational 
entity or at the least, non-rational dimensions which are connected to the performance of 
duties. Here, Kant argues in his Doctrine of Virtue that when we are talking about duties 
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to oneself, we are talking about internal laws. These internal laws must be cultivated in 
order for an individual to achieve qualitative perfection (as opposed to quantitative 
perfection) which is formal and has degrees. It is formal because it still operates in 
accordance with maxims. However, “maxims are here regarded as subjective principles 
which merely qualify for giving of universal law.”444 This means when we are thinking 
about applying duties to oneself, we are talking about an internal process of: a) natural 
perfection which is the cultivation of any capacity whatever for furthering ends set forth 
by reason. The capacity to set oneself an end, any end whatsoever, is what characterises 
humanity, as opposed to animality: “cultivate your powers of mind and body so that they 
are fit to realise any ends you might encounter.”445 And b.) the cultivation of morality in 
us. This is an incentive, based on the heart; law prescripts on the maxim of the action. 
 
Here, we can ascertain that duties refer to the maxims by which the individual lives and 
perfects himself/herself by. The duties which arise from these maxims, and are naturally 
ethical in nature, fall into casuistry. Casuistry is not how to find something but rather a 
“practice in how to seek truth”446 and developing moral judgement. As one’s moral 
judgement is cultivated, he/she has the strength to perform duties to his/her self. These 
duties allow for a heightened capacity in the individual to eventually and practically 
fulfil “the supreme principle of the doctrine of virtue - act in accordance with a maxim 
of ends that it can be a universal law for everyone to have.”447 As such, Kant’s “duties to 
oneself”, as part of his doctrine of virtue, are synthetic duties in comparison to the duties 
of the Doctrine of Right which are analytic in nature. 
 
By connecting duties to oneself to the eventual performance of a universal law, Kant is 
boldly making a link between ethical development and performance of law. This is 
proven by his lengthy treatment of what constitutes duties to oneself and what it takes to 
be receptive to these duties. Kant constructs this framework by making a division 
between “formal” duties to oneself (i.e negative duties belonging to a human being’s 
moral health) and “material” duties (i.e positive or widening duties related to a human 
being’s moral prosperity). This division is grounded by two principles. With regards to 
formal duties, the “first principle of duty to oneself is: live in conformity with nature” 
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and the second is “make yourself more perfect than mere nature has made you.”448 
Though Kant acknowledges that depending on an individual’s state of animality, 
subjective duties are extracted from this objective division (such as not excessively 
eating), he is still advocating a framework for duties to oneself which is rooted in 
enabling the human being to be an end in himself, rather than a “plaything for his 
vices”.449 This will allow for “man’s duty to himself as a moral being [to] only include 
what is formal in the consistency of the maxims of his will with the dignity of humanity 
in his person.”450 Therefore, Kant’s approach to duties to oneself is based on cultivating 
one’s will to apply maxims that regard human beings as ends in themselves and these 
maxims are derived through reason. Kant’s two principles as above provide a formal 
direction to attain this aim. 
 
2.2 Kant’s Structure of Duties to Oneself 
 
In order for a human being to be an end in himself/herself, Kant initates a further 
division of duties to oneself into duties to oneself as an animal being and duties to 
oneself as a moral being. Both sets of duties focus on the danger of an individual in 
debasing his/her own humanity thereby reducing his/her moral worth. In order to stop 
this, Kant cites three articles to protect the humanity in the individual. Article 1 deals 
with killing oneself. According to Kant, this is a crime, which can also be called 
murdering oneself. It can also be regarded as a violation of one’s duty to other human 
beings and even “as a violation of duty to God, as man is abandoning the post assigned 
to him in the world (without having been called away from it).”451  Again, Kant makes 
implicit reference to the Bible452 to substantiate his point but it is intriguing that killing 
oneself is actually annihilating the existence of morality from the world and debasing 
humanity (which includes the prohibition of maiming oneself or giving away an organ of 
yours to another). Thus, another connection is made between duties to oneself and the 
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preservation and functioning of morality for all human beings. It is significant that Kant 
uses scripture when describing personal ethical development but when it comes to the 
implementation of laws on a universal level, scripture is nowhere to be found. This may 
imply that Kant considers the role of scripture to be related to personal belief and 
spiritual growth only. However, it does seem to drive his so-called ‘pure’ or ‘rational’ 
approach to philosophy in both the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and the 
Metaphysics of Morals because the notion that a human being should value his humanity 
and be a responsible person considering himself and others as ends has great similarity 
with the Biblical (and even Qu’ranic) concept of human beings as stewards or 
vicegerents on earth.453 
 
Article 2 deals with defiling oneself by lust. Kant argues that just as we are to preserve 
life, sexual love is there to preserve species, which is a natural end. Kant admits it is 
difficult to find a strong argument to show you don’t have a right to enjoy your sexual 
organs the way you want to but states that lust means you are governed by your 
animalistic impulses, which is a debasement of humanity. Finally, article 3 deals with 
excessive use of food and drink. Again, the fundamental argument is that vices such as 
drunkenness and gluttony make man lower than an animal and makes him senseless.  
 
The three articles as above provide a structure for the ethical development of the self but 
all are grounded in protecting the rationality of the human being. Kant previously stated 
that the intelligible aspect of the person must rule over his/her senses, primarily through 
reason. If reason is diminished, a person would not be capable of adhering to any sort of 
duty or universal maxim. This is elaborated in his next section which deals with duties to 
oneself as a moral being. These duties involve the preservation and enhancement of 
character, as opposed to biological existence. The first duty is not to lie. Kant argues this 
violates one’s dignity, even though it may have no consequence on others. Again, Kant 
emphasises that the first duties one owes is to oneself. Lying is not seen first and 
                                                          
453
 The Qur’ān has similar notions of stewardship and death. In the Qur’ān, human beings are 
vicegerents on earth in the vein of Adam: “When your Lord said to the angels, ‘Indeed I am going 
to set a viceroy on the earth,’ they said, ‘Will You set in it someone who will cause corruption in it, 
and shed blood, while we celebrate Your praiseand proclaim Your sanctity?’ He said, ‘Indeed I know 
what you do not know’” (2:30) and “Indeed We presented the Trust to the heavens and the earth 
and the mountains, but they refused to bear it, and were apprehensive of it; but man undertook it. 
Indeed he is most unfair and senseless” (33:72). With regards to death, it also has an appointed time 
that is only with God: “Allah takes the souls at the time of their death, and those who have not died in 
their sleep. Then Heretains those for whom He has ordained death and releases the others until 
a specified time. There areindeed signs in that for a people who reflect” (39:42), Qarā’ī: The Qur’ān. 
172 
 
foremost as a deed in relation to other people but to the self. Lying harms one’s own 
dignity as it is not befitting for a human being who is capable of reason and in control of 
his/her passions; lying debases an individual. This is explicitly shown through article 2 
which deals with avarice. Avarice does not merely relate to greed and miserliness but 
“restricting one’s own enjoyment of the means of good living so narrowly as to leave 
one’s own true needs unsatisfied.”454 Here, Kant is referring to avarice as the removal of 
one’s end as a human being and replacing it with those needs that make a human being a 
mere means or tool for whatever he/she covets. The true needs of cultivating dignity and 
heightening understanding of concepts are relegated or ignored thus restricting true 
fulfilment.  
 
Finally, article 3 deals with servility or false humility. This means belittling one’s own 
moral worth merely as a means to acquiring the favour of another such as hypocrisy or 
flattery. This degrades one’s personality and dignity. Humanity in a man is the object of 
respect which can be demanded from every other man but which he must also not 
forfeit. The consciousness and feeling of the insignificance of one’s moral worth in 
comparison with the law is humility. True humility is valuing one’s own dignity not 
forfeiting it for another. Here the self or at least the inner freedom of a person is meant 
to be protected, elevated and treated as an end in itself. 
 
Kant’s concept of duties to oneself attempts to make the bridge between personal ethical 
development and performance of moral duty. He says, “the first command of all duties 
to oneself is know (scrutinize, fathom) yourself, not in terms of your natural perfection 
but in terms of your moral perfection in relation your duty.”455 Whilst the process to do 
this is subjective and there are potentially many maxims one may apply to his self (Kant 
terms the duties contained in the Doctrine of Virtue as imperfect i.e wide-ranging duties, 
not governed by external laws), the idea of duties to oneself is always in relation to 
performance of a duty.  
 
Therefore, Kant’s approach is to give a practical framework to ethical development that 
can fully materialise in the implementation of law (not its incentive, though both can 
coincide in the performance of a duty). He clearly believes moral duties must be given to 
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the self and that these must be viewed practically and functionally with a view to 
contributing to the universal ends of all human beings. 
 
 
2.3 Defining Rights to the Self in Risālat al-Ḥuqūq 
 
Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s approach to duties to oneself has been included by Chittick under the 
heading ‘Rights of God against oneself’ in Risālat al-Ḥuqūq. Zayn al-‘Ābidīn uses 
ḥuqūq and nafs in two ways but it appears he is indicating on one meaning. In the first 
instance, he uses the term ‘li-nafsika’, meaning ‘for yourself’ in the sentence,  
 
“The greatest of God’s rights against you is the right which He has made incumbent 
upon you for Himself and which is the root of all rights, then those which He has made 
incumbent upon you in yourself (li-nafsika), from your crown to your foot, in keeping 
with the diversity of your organs.” 456 
 
Chittick has translated li-nafsika as ‘in yourself’ and so a set of rights are within your 
bodily organs. This appears to be in keeping with the context of the sentence as well as 
what follows which is a delineation of bodily organs from the tongue to the foot which 
all have rights against the self. This is a perfectly acceptable way to look at the phrase li-
nafsika but I would further argue that the Arabic preposition ‘li’, meaning ‘for’ or ‘to’, 
denotes a close relationship between two things indicating on belonging and 
possession.457 It is possible to translate ‘li-nafsika’ as ‘for yourself’, ‘to yourself’ or even 
‘owing to yourself’ because the preposition ‘li’ confers benefit on the word to which it is 
attached or indicates on a thing belonging to another thing. Thus, the rights of the bodily 
organs are for the sake of the self and these belong to the self as well. 
 
The second type of phraseology Zayn al-‘Ābidīn uses is ‘wa amma ḥaqqu nafsika 
‘alayka’, meaning “and as for the right of your self upon you” in the sentence: 
 
“The right of your self against you (wa amma ḥaqqu nafsika ‘alayka) is that you employ 
it in obeying God; then you deliver to your tongue its right, to your hearing its right, to 
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your sight its right, to your hand its right, to your leg its right, to your stomach its right, 
to your private part its right, and you seek help from God in all that.”458 
 
Chittick has translated the phrase as “the right of your self against you” to denote how 
the rights of the bodily organs are there to restrain the self’s desires. This is why in 
Risālat al-Ḥuqūq Zayn al-‘Ābidīn continues to talk about the purpose of the bodily 
organs to stop immoral behaviour such as the obscenity that can arise from the tongue or 
the backbiting that that one can listen to through one’s ears. Therefore, Chittick 
translates ‘alayka’ as ‘against you.’ Again, this is perfectly acceptable within the tone of 
Zayn al-‘Ābidīn however one could translate ‘alayka’ as ‘upon you’ as the preposition 
of ‘ala’ means on, upon, on top of or over something.459 In the context of the phrase wa 
amma ḥaqqu nafsika ‘alayka, it is possible to translate it as, ‘and as for the right of your 
self upon you’ because the rights of your self impose themselves upon the self, as if they 
are over the self, demanding some kind of performance. Here, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn does not 
use the preposition ‘li’ but uses the grammatical device of idhāfah which denotes a 
possessive construction. This construction joins two words together to create a 
possessor-possessed relationship. Thus, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn joins ‘ḥaqq’ and ‘nafsika’ 
together to create the compound phrase ‘ḥaqqu nafsika’, meaning ‘right of your self.’ In 
contrast to ‘li-nafsika’, the possessive construction indicates that the self possesses rights 
rather than rights being for the benefit of the self through some kind of imposition. 
 
The two phrases above that Zayn al-‘Ābidīn uses are in some respects different but 
within the context he is using them, they appear to indicate on one meaning – that there 
are a certain set of rights that impose upon the self through one’s biological organs. This 
kind of imposition attaches rights to the self for its own benefit and creates duties for the 
self to perform in relation to those organs. Thus, regardless of the different phraseology, 
the basic meaning is the same which allows comparison with Kant’s duties to oneself. 
Moreover, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn does not use ‘ḥuqūq’ or ‘nafs’ in a phrase. He has used 
‘ḥaqq’, meaning right (the singular of ḥuqūq, meaning rights) and ‘nafs’ together as 
shown above but there is no phrase like ‘ḥuqūq al-nafs.’ Ḥaq in fact has several 
meanings: truth correctness, rightness, rightful possession, property, one’s due, duty, 
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proper manner, true, authentic, real, right, fair, reasonable, correct, sound and valid.’460 
Considering the emphasis he has placed on rights and the self, it is important to examine 
possible phrases that capture his intentions and enable a clearer comparison with Kant 
who uses the phrase ‘duties to oneself.’ It is intriguing that Chittick also acknowledges 
the need to use appropriate terminology when translating Arabic words in order for 
particular phrases to have relevance in modern discourses such as human rights.461 
 
‘ḥuqūq ila al-nafs’, meaning ‘rights to the self’, could be an appropriate term to 
represent Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s philosophy because it is able to capture the closeness of the 
relationship between rights and the self. Any preposition in Arabic is simply a word 
without meaning until something follows it and therefore when we insert ‘ila’ with 
‘nafsika’ it creates an understanding that rights (ḥuqūq) are owed to the self (indicating 
on the performance of duties towards one’s organs) and that rights are closely attached 
to the self (demonstrating the necessary relationship between rights and the self). All of 
these indications capture the intentions of Zayn al-‘Ābidīn in attaching rights to organs 
for the self, especially because ila indicates a movement towards a definite object and 
signifies the meaning of ‘to, toward and up to.’462 Thus an individual that perform duties 
towards his/her organs is engaging in actions which actively develop his/her self which 
creates a real identity for that person. In fact, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn even begins Risālat al-
Ḥuqūq with the phrase, “God has rights against you and that these encompass (muhīt) 
you in every movement through which you move…”463 The phrase indicates on the 
breadth at which he using the concept of rights – as a notion that encompasses not just 
relationships between people but the very biological organs of the person as well. 
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Other possible phrases such as ḥuqūq al-nafs, meaning ‘rights of the self’ could be used 
but may suffer from greater ambiguity since rights of the self may imply the rights 
which the self is naturally entitled to. This would be the same approach of the Islamic-
Western human rights discourse that looks at rights as natural legal entitlements of 
people. Another phrase could be ‘ḥuqūq li-nafsika’, meaning ‘rights for your self’, 
which directly stems from Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s own usage of ‘li-nafsika.’ Whilst this 
phrase is certainly better than rights of the self because it captures a deeper relationship 
between rights and the self, in English translation it could suffer from some vagueness 
because ‘li’ means for or to, denoting belonging or possession. Thus, rights would 
belong to the self or are for the benefit of the self but this does not capture the 
imposition of rights by biological organs on the self which is the context in which Zayn 
al-‘Ābidīn is operating in and which is the paradigm shift for human rights in this thesis.  
 
Therefore, perhaps ‘ḥuqūq ila al-nafs’, meaning ‘rights to the self’, could be an 
appropriate phrase to describe Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s approach to assigning rights to 
biological organs since it captures the imposition of these rights on the self and the 
continual interaction between one’s organs and self. 
 
2.4 Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s Understanding of ‘Rights to the Self’ 
 
What does Zayn al-‘Ābidīn mean by the notion of ‘rights to the self’ and how does he 
give it an operational framework within his charter? If we take the aforementioned 
definition of ḥaqq as right and as an appropriate course of action, we are dealing with 
how we should be appropriate to ourselves; how we should correctly or even justly act 
towards ourselves. Within the text of Risālat al-Ḥuqūq, this does not have the meaning 
of total personal autonomy i.e ‘I have autonomy over my body’ or ‘I have a right to use 
my body the way I want to.’ The notion of right here is in terms of incumbency and 
duty. Whilst the Kantian notion of duty is rooted in a person’s basic freedom as a 
rational being capable of determining ends, autonomy is still bound by these very ends; 
hence Kant’s crucial statement in the Groundwork: “Now I say that the human being, 
and in general every rational being, exists as end in itself, not merely as means to the 
discretionary use of this or that will…”464 In this respect, there is a similarity in both 
authors in binding personal autonomy within the concept of ends or in the case of Zayn 
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al-‘Ābidīn, teleological incumbency to the self through the specific use of bodily organs 
(this will be explained shortly) and ultimately, God. 
 
With regards to the self, it is interesting that Kant never separates the term ‘self’ from 
‘one’ (in his phrase duties to oneself) and admits that he is not talking about the spiritual 
self or soul. However, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn takes the opposite approach. The term ‘ḥuqūq’ as 
well as the independent use of ‘nafs’ throughout the early part of Risālat al-Ḥuqūq 
immediately indicates Zayn al-‘Ābidīn is talking about an entity that is by itself, in itself 
and for itself. There is an independent worth attached to the self which is capable of 
being talked about in separation to the body. This is substantiated when he talks about 
the rights to the self in relation to specific bodily parts: ‘The right of your self (nafs) 
against you is that you employ it in obeying God; then you deliver to your tongue its 
right, to your hearing its right, to your sight its right, to your hand its right, to your leg its 
right, to your stomach its right, to your private part its right, and you seek help from God 
in all that.’465  
 
Though the concept of owing duties, rights or obligations to one’s self is the same in 
both authors’ works, there is a marked difference in approach. By giving the self an 
ontological value, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn gives it independence. This has huge implications, 
which I will explore in the next chapter in terms of my own understanding of rights to 
the self but suffice to say that within the confines of Risālat al-Ḥuqūq, the self is an 
independent object capable of functioning in relation to God, organs, actions and people. 
The thought of owing rights to organs and even actions (like praying and fasting) is 
unique in that it appears the self that injects a kind of life into them. This also reflects the 
Shī‘ī tradition’s emphasis on evaluating one’s biological organs in everyday actions.466 
As an example of Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s approach, he says  
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“the right of fasting is that you know it is a veil which God has set up over your tongue, 
your hearing, your sight, your stomach, and your private part to protect you from the 
Fire. If you abandon the fast, you will have torn God's protective covering away from 
yourself.”467  
 
There is clearly a relationship between what the actions do to the self and what the 
action is capable of doing or its basic telos. This paves the way for the concept of the 
self to be relevant in the Islamic-Western human rights discourse because it is the self 
that guides all rights claims and defines a moral or immoral purpose for these claims. 
 
Zayn al-‘Ābidīn begins his concept of rights to the self by making a connection between 
God and self. God is the “root of all rights”468 and after this root, there are: 
 
“those which He has made incumbent upon you in yourself, from your crown to your 
foot, in keeping with the diversity of your organs. He has given your tongue a right 
against you, your hearing a right against you, your sight a right against you, your hand a 
right against you, your leg a right against you, your stomach a right against you, and 
your private part a right against you. These are the seven organs through which acts 
(af'al) take place.”469  
 
The above paragraph encapsulates the notion of having rights within and to ourselves (as 
opposed to outside of ourselves) – ‘upon you in yourself.’ This follows the same 
approach of Kant. However, whereas Kant dealt with duties to oneself in relation to 
existence (e.g not to kill oneself, not to eat excessively), Zayn al-‘Ābidīn connects the 
self to one’s bodily organs (a notion that Kant did not accept470), which is demonstrated 
by the specific mention of each organ such as the tongue, stomach and private part. This 
is a more elaborate notion of rights to the self as Zayn al-‘Ābidīn is creating an intricate 
system of rights between the self and one’s organs. 
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2.5     Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s Structure of Rights to the Self 
 
Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s structure of rights to the self is substantiated by his clear delineation 
and explanation of what kind of rights the self should owe to its organs. He states: 
 
 - “the right of the tongue is that you consider it too noble for obscenity, accustom it to 
good, refrain from any meddling in which there is nothing to be gained, express 
kindness to the people, and speak well concerning them. 
- the right of hearing is to keep it pure from listening to backbiting (ghiba) and listening 
to that to which it is unlawful to listen. 
- the right of sight is that you lower it before everything which is unlawful to you and 
that you take heed whenever you look at anything. 
- the right of your hand is that you stretch it not toward that which is unlawful to you.  
- the right of your two legs is that you walk not with them toward that which is unlawful 
to you. You have no escape from standing upon the narrow bridge (al-sirat [over hell]), 
so you should see to it that your legs do not slip and cause you to fall into the Fire.  
- the right of your stomach is that you make it not into a container for that which is 
unlawful to you and you eat no more than your fill (shib').  
- the right of your private part (farj) is that you protect it from fornication and guard it 
against being looked upon.”471 
 
According to Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, the tongue has a purpose – that it should not be used 
obscenely; the hand has a purpose – not to take that which is unlawful for it; the private 
part has a purpose – to protect it from fornication. More than that, it is not merely up to 
us to fulfil these purposes but that the tongue or stomach has a right over the self and so 
demands that purpose from us. The tongue becomes an imposer of rights, as opposed to 
a passive acceptor of what we determine of the tongue. Although Kant has an article on 
lying and implies the ignoble use of the tongue, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn is specific in 
mentioning the bodily organ of the tongue. What is also different is that for Kant, it is 
the intelligible being within ourselves that exercises reason to control our inner freedoms 
and desires, which includes actions like lying and avarice. Therefore, we set the limits 
on our animalistic actions.  
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However, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn argues it is the bodily devices that set limits for us. This is 
explicitly illustrated by the right of the stomach as being a container that should not be 
overfilled. Kant devotes a section to excessive eating and drinking and argues this makes 
a person senseless (thus reducing his capacity to reason) and lower than an animal (thus 
debasing his own humanity). The same could be implied from Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s 
treatment of the right of the stomach; however, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn focuses more on the 
appropriate treatment of that organ without a detailed exposition on how we should treat 
our stomachs; perhaps we may not be able to know when we are debasing ourselves or 
not if we do not learn the purpose of our stomachs first. The same could be said of lust. 
Kant argues that a person would be governed by his animalistic impulses if he were to 
be lustful (thus stopping reason from dominating his passions). Zayn al-‘Ābidīn 
deliberates on how to treat that very organ, before we become lustful. This locates an 
understanding of reason that is situated within our sense-based or animalistic being. It is 
presumed that each organ has a function but that this function is set by the organ itself.  
 
Furthermore, it implies that physically practicing and learning how to use one’s organs 
is significant in moral development. However, it could be argued that Kant and Zayn al-
‘Ābidīn coincide here in that the idea of practice is essentially casuistry for Kant and he 
devotes a section on this under each of his articles in the doctrine of virtue. At the end of 
the Metaphysics of Morals, he also comments on ethical ascetics,  
 
“the rules for practicing virtue (exercitiorum virtutis) aim at a frame of mind that is both 
valiant and cheerful in fulfilling its duties (animus strenuus et hilaris). For virtue not 
only has to muster all its forces to overcome the obstacles it must contend with; it also 
involves sacrificing many of the joys of life, the loss of which can sometimes make 
one’s mind gloomy and sullen.”472  
 
This appears to indicate a spiritual dimension in Kant’s work in order to develop virtue 
in one’s self. But again this is framed within the performance of duties to oneself which 
can only materialise when an individual’s state of mind is focused on curbing his/her 
animalistic desires. 
 
Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s perspective of organs as having an autonomous legal or moral 
function can be criticised on the grounds that it is really the self or ‘I’ that gives life or 
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purpose to anything. It is the ‘I’ that relates the world to our senses; we perceive the 
relationship between our selves and anything else, be that an organ, person or society.473 
However, I would argue that this is missing the point of Risālat al-Ḥuqūq. What is 
important here is precisely the perception that we have of our self in relation to other 
things. One may call Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s approach metaphorical, mystical, spiritual, 
teleological or biological but as per my central questions in the thesis, how do we view 
our selves? How can we give it a practical framework that enables greater virtue within 
us and enable a deeper understanding of human rights? I would posit that Zayn al-
‘Ābidīn’s approach is to make the self accessible in order to respect the rights of other 
human beings.  That is why Kant considers his duties to oneself as constituting the 
crucial preparation for the performance of a duty. And, this is also why Zayn al-‘Ābidīn 
situates the rights to the self prior to all other rights as it appears that without coming to 
some kind of acute perception of ourselves, any system of rights will fail. 
 
Therefore, what we find in Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s framework of rights to the self is the idea 
that our internal and external devices ranging from our tongues to our hands have rights 
over us. Our human devices can be independent tools with the ability to cause benefit or 
harm to ourselves and others. The idea that such obvious biological tools have a kind of 
existence, effect and even control over us is interesting. It means we are immediately 
directed to think of our ‘being’ as an intricate system of existence.  
 
3 The Operation of the Framework of Duties and Rights to the Self 
 
3.1 Kant’s View of Being Receptive to Duties 
 
Having introduced both the foundations and concept of duties to oneself and rights to the 
self from both authors’ works, how do their frameworks of the self work practically? In 
what way can the self be receptive or recognise the duties or rights which both authors 
talk of? And, how do the duties to the self branch out to other categories of rights, thus 
allowing me to make the connection between duties to oneself and human rights? These 
questions are crucial as they act as a bridge to the human rights discourse discussed in 
chapter one and the need to carve out a role for the self in that discourse. 
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Kant argues that any duty, whether to oneself or others, cannot be fulfilled if, 
 
“there are certain moral endowments which if anyone lacks them they could have no 
duty to acquire them. They are moral feeling, conscience, love of one’s neighbour and 
respect for oneself (self-esteem). There is no obligation to have these because they lie at 
the basis of morality as subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty, not 
as objective conditions of morality. All of them are natural predispositions of the mind 
for being affected by concepts of duty.”474  
 
As I have argued, Kant is making an admission of innate moral attributes that are 
predisposed in a human being. From an overall reading of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Kant implies basic attributes like moral feeling and conscience come from God. Even in 
the Groundwork, Kant admits at the end that philosophy cannot answer why we feel the 
inclination to be moral or why we would want to be free.475 What is crucial about these 
moral endowments on a practical level is that no duty can be understood or be fulfilled if 
a person is not subjectively receptive to it. This receptiveness can only occur when an 
individual knows himself and understands and nurtures these attributes. 
 
Here, Kant describes moral feeling as “the susceptibility to feel pleasure or displeasure 
merely from being aware that our actions are consistent with or contrary to the law of 
duty.”476 This moral feeling, which is a natural pleasure or displeasure a person feels 
towards a particular action, is naturally innate in us. Kant uses the same argument of 
innateness when explaining conscience as an “internal judge”, love as “a matter of 
feeling, not willing” and respect as a “feeling of special kind.”477 This shows that the 
system of duties and ends can be constructed but who will respect any of these notions if 
he/she is not receptive to them in the first place? Kant brings in a distinct element of 
subjectivity here or at the least, a personal response to duty that primarily operates 
through non-rational means; conscience, love and feeling are closer towards intuition 
and innate emotions rather than a rigid system of logic cut off from human nature. 
 
In order to remain consistent, Kant argues,  
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“to have these predispositions can’t be considered a duty, rather every man has them and 
it is by virtue of them that he can be put under obligation. Consciousness of them is not 
of empirical origin; it can instead only from consciousness of a moral law, as the effect 
this has on one’s mind.”478  
 
He separates duties from natural predispositions which, according to him, can’t really be 
investigated by philosophy (or perhaps pure philosophy should not be concerned about 
them; that is the task of anthropology479). Most importantly, though, Kant categorises 
these moral endowments within the framework of obligation and as resulting from 
consciousness of a moral law – as the effect this has on one’s mind. Here, Kant 
translates our subjective feelings into the categorical imperative by making universal 
maxims out of them. For example, in talking about duties of virtue to others, Kant 
highlights benevolence (as part of love) as a key duty. He says:  
 
“…the maxim of benevolence (practical love of man) is a duty of all men toward one 
another, whether or not one finds them worthy of love. For every morally practical 
relation to men is a relation among them represented by pure reason, that is, a relation of 
free actions in accordance with maxims that qualify for a giving of universal law and so 
cannot be selfish.”480 
 
Kant also attempts to bridge duties to oneself to duties of virtue to others, specifically 
the duty to love other men. Here, the subjectivity of the moral endowments is translated 
on a social level extending to the duties owed to other human and even non-human 
beings. For example, Kant’s duties of love, “beneficence’, gratitude and sympathy” and 
correspondingly, the vices of hatred of men, “envy, gratitude and malice”481 show how 
the virtues cultivated in the self must eventually help others. These duties are external in 
nature and this is where Kant creates his system of universal duties by branching out the 
duties to oneself to other human beings. This is similar to Zayn al-‘Ābidīn who begins 
with the rights to the self as the foundation of Risālat al-Ḥuqūq before tackling the rights 
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owed to others. This similarity brings both authors’ approach closer with regards to how 
the individual must channel his own conscience and love, first to himself and then 
others. Most importantly, it highlights duties to oneself as the foundation of all social 
actions which shows that if human rights are to be successful, whether from a Western 
or Islamic worldview, then the way in which a human being understands the duties to 
his/her self becomes crucial. 
 
However, the reduction of these endowments (as significant as they are) towards 
obligation or duty and being more of an effect of moral law does not accord them their 
true value. Practically, a human being responds or interprets his own end and any 
universal duty in accordance with his/her level of love or conscience. The question still 
remains as to how to overcome this subjective feeling which can result in duties towards 
ourselves and others being performed or understood at a very personal level with the 
potential to discard the reasoned endeavour of universalising maxims - the foundation of 
Kant’s framework. This is where I feel the subjective element in relation to performance 
of duty needs to be given an enduring framework – an issue tackled to a degree in Zayn 
al-‘Ābidīn’s notion of fulfilling rights towards the ‘self’, a very personal entity.  
 
Regardless, what should be noted is that Kant’s framework of duties to oneself rests on 
people’s understanding of their own conscience and love, which in practical terms offers 
a huge potential in establishing a workable system of human rights that begins with 
oneself. 
 
3.2 Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s Approach to being Receptive to Rights to the Self 
 
Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s framework of the self appears to openly admit the subjective elements 
of being receptive to rights without immediately translating them into universal maxims. 
When he talks about the self’s relationship with its bodily organs, these rights relate to 
the person’s own perception of his/her hand, stomach or private part. It is a subjective 
endeavour on the part of the person to try and see what his/her own imperfections and 
perfections are with how he/she is using his/her bodily organ. This is in light of the 
teleological ends specified by Zayn al-‘Ābidīn for each organ. This approach is similar 
to Kant in that a person must focus on rooting out his/her vices. However, whereas Kant 
translates the moral feeling into universal maxims, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn keeps these rights 
within a non-rational dimension that are fundamentally related to a person’s self. The 
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primary task of an individual is to enhance a greater awareness of his/her self. This 
stems from understanding the teleological ends appropriate for each organ, which is not 
the domain of universal maxims but rather personal maxims. So, the tongue should not 
be obscene or the private part should not be used for fornication. These ends do 
eventually relate to people, which I will explain in the next section but at the outset Zayn 
al-‘Ābidīn places greater emphasis on a person’s understanding of his/her own organs. 
 
Here, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn also provides accessibility to self-development by constructing a 
framework which individuals can use. For example, by listing the bodily organs, their 
rights, their ends and their relationship to the self, he has offered a way in which ethical 
growth can occur through identifying parts of the body and their moral implications. 
Indeed, what can lack in any duty or rights-based system is how to nurture ethical 
perfection in an individual. Towards the end of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant 
increasingly talks about casuistry but also includes a rather surprising but unique section 
on a dialogue between a teacher and student. The dialogue which shows the teacher 
questioning the student on what his desire in life is, how he can make others happy, the 
concept of duty and more implies that Kant was trying to show how his moral 
framework could be digested by the average individual. I think this is extremely far-
sighted from Kant as he clearly understands that not everyone can digest “hair-
splitting”482 words. However, this dialogue still needs to be taught and broken down 
which again calls for a simpler explanation of some sort. Zayn al-‘Ābidīn is using the 
concept of a charter and moreover, his list of rights to the self are quite straightforward, 
identifiable by the common man and talks about basic morals (such as not eating too 
much), whereas Kant goes into a great depth about numerous virtues and vices.  
Therefore, I would argue an individual can benefit from Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s framework of 
the self in a more pragmatic fashion than Kant’s owing to the simplicity of his approach. 
It also seems to leave a lot of responsibility to the individual rather than specifying a list 
of virtues and vices which in some respects, can be effective if we argue that once the 
self has mastered the use of an organ, it will naturally behave in an appropriate way to 
others. 
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3.3 Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s Expansion of Rights to the Self to Rights to Others 
 
In the latter part of Risālat al-Ḥuqūq, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn expands the rights to the self to 
others. There are too many categories to state here but few examples will suffice. For 
example, he mentions the rights of leaders, subjects, womb relatives and then a 
miscellaneous category of others which includes the rights of neighbours, companions, 
business partners, debtors, adversaries, advisors, counsellors, elders and youngsters.483 
With regards to how to treat a person who has done a kind act towards you, he says:  
 
“the right of him who does a kindly act (dhu l-ma'ruf) toward you is that you thank him 
and mention his kindness; you reward him with beautiful words and you supplicate for 
him sincerely in that which is between you and God. If you do that, you have thanked 
him secretly and openly. Then, if you are able to repay him one day, you repay him.”484  
 
Naturally, a person that is able to control and direct his tongue can act in a way that 
honours the one who has done a kind act towards him. It is striking that expressing 
beautiful words and supplicating sincerely for the person are crucial in thanking a person 
because these actions stem from the proper use of the tongue. Thus, if one reflects on the 
purpose of one’s biological organs, he/she can use them to do good acts for someone 
else.  
 
Another example is in the realm of leadership. In talking about how a leader should treat 
his subjects Zayn al-‘Ābidīn states,  
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“the right of your subjects through authority is that you should know that they have been 
made subjects through their weakness and your strength. Hence it is incumbent upon 
you to act with justice toward them and to be like a compassionate father toward them. 
You should forgive them their ignorance and not hurry them to punishment and you 
should thank God for the power over them which He has given to you.”485  
 
Here, it is intriguing that in the performance of the right, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn fuses law, 
ethics, spirituality and theology together. A person must reflect on his/her position (a 
spiritual exercise), he must act like a “compassionate father” towards his subjects (an 
ethical concern), he is a leader by virtue of his subjects’ weakness and it is incumbent to 
act with justice toward them (his legal status and duty) and finally, the leader should 
thank God for the power given to him (a theological understanding of a Higher being). 
This deepens the performance of rights which cannot remain purely rational; it also must 
be non-rational and intuitive. The very moral endowments which Kant speaks of are 
connected not merely as predispositions in the performance of law but necessary 
external conditions. According to Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, sincerity, love and compassion are 
the incentives and aspects of rights which an individual must use. 
 
Another difference in the way the framework given to the self operates is a new category 
included by Zayn al-‘Ābidīn called ‘rights of acts.’ Perhaps similar to his approach to 
bodily organs, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn gives a right to actions to which the self is the subject. 
For example, he says,  
 
“the right of your ritual prayer (salāt) is that you know that it is an arrival before God 
and that through it you are standing before Him. When you know that, then you will 
stand in the station of him who is lowly, vile, beseeching, trembling, hopeful, fearful, 
and abased, and you will magnify Him who is before you through stillness and dignity. 
You will approach the prayer with your heart and you will perform it according to its 
bounds and its rights.”486  
 
Giving rights to actions again can be regarded as metaphorical but there appears to be a 
logic in connecting God to the self, then the self with bodily organs and then what the 
bodily organs should relate to – actions. After this comes the category of people or 
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specifically, rights to others. Therefore, there is a purposeful direction in Risālat al-
Ḥuqūq in trying to approach the concept of rights in a structured way that the common 
man can understand. The example of the ritual prayer (as well as charity, fasting, hajj 
and offering) is based on the idea of what the action should be doing to the self.487 The 
ritual prayer intends to make the self humble and abased thereby reducing ego but 
ultimately, acknowledge the glory of God. The ritual prayer clearly lies within the furū 
al-dīn (branches of religion)488 of Islām which specifies the external acts which range 
from the ritual, social, spiritual and physical in order to get closer to God.  
 
Therefore, whilst Kant has not included specific actions which may help to nurture 
virtue, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn includes actions like prayer and charity in order to give a 
practical outlet to performing virtue. 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
My concluding remarks are based on two themes: the similarities and differences in 
approach between the two authors in giving a framework to the self and how their 
concepts can aid me in my own framework for the self in chapter four. 
 
The fundamental similarity between Kant and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn is the acknowledgement 
that duties are owed to a person’s self, not just other people. This goes beyond private 
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and public duties (which Kant deals with in the Doctrine of Right) and makes space for 
an inner dimension to law that can have a practical position within the performance of 
duties and rights. The key difference is that whereas Kant chooses to reserve God 
outside of the domain of philosophy, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn includes Him as the root of all 
rights. According to Kant, the incentive for these duties is always within the scope of 
performing duty and acknowledging the universal ends of human beings, valuing their 
humanity and dignity. Moral feeling, conscience, love of human beings and respect 
appear to have more of a place in the Metaphysics of Morals in the preparation of 
performing one’s duty. For Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, however, these non-rational incentives are 
actually primary in the performance of rights thus putting a human being’s perceptions 
and subjective feelings as the driver of law (not merely supplementary); but these are 
always directed by teleological ends as exemplified by his unique categories of rights of 
bodily organs and actions. 
 
The key points of development for me from both authors are the importance of 
examining how rights or duties to the self can operate in practice. I would like to take 
these duties out of a non-rational dimension, as Kant has done and include them in a 
rights discourse, in the vein of Zayn al-‘Ābidīn. Moreover, I want to explore how 
ontological norms can be discovered from the internal relationship of the self and its 
bodily organs. This is an aspect hinted by Zayn al-‘Ābidīn but I want to take it further by 
looking at how human rights can be better understood and implemented by this internal 
relationship. By developing my own a framework which not only positions the self as 
the central feature of human rights but emphasies the way in which it should be accessed 
and nurtured through one’s biological organs, I can proceed to carve out a role for the 
self in the Islamic-Western human rights discourse. 
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Chapter 4 
 
My Framework for the Self: the ‘Internal Human Contract’ 
 
Having analysed the self in accordance with Kierkegaard, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, Kant and 
Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, I can now extract the main facets of how they understand the self and 
construct my own framework of how to access the self. The goal of this chapter is to 
explain the nature of this framework and secondly, to appropriately position it within the 
Islamic-Western human rights discourse as a means by which the concept of rights can 
be broadened. At the end of chapter one, I outlined where the notion of the self could 
contribute which is in addressing the issues of curbing human desires, addressing 
psychological insecurities, nurturing empowerment and constructing identity. In my 
view, these are the problems which the current paradigm of human rights does not 
tackle. The Internal Human Contract could offer a way to address these problems.  
 
Whereas the analysis of chapters two and three were faithful to the authors’ texts, this 
chapter will use the authors’ main ideas independently in order to help create my 
framework and demonstrate the specific methodological influences of the authors. What 
I have found (especially in relation to my aim of narrowing the gap between Islamic and 
Western scholarship) is that each author can be used to contribute to a more accessible 
and universal framework for the self. For example, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s theological and 
metaphysical conception of God does not necessarily contradict Kierkegaard’s 
conception of the self as an entity engaging in a subjective and personal journey. 
Perhaps the self can start on this journey and arrive at a firmer ontological conclusion 
about reality. Again, Kant’s separation of religion and philosophy does not necessarily 
mean that Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s rights to the self (which are rooted in God) have no 
practical relevance to non-religious people. I will attempt to combine these views to 
form a rounded framework for the self. 
 
The approach of combining specific elements together from various facets of Muslim 
scholarship in order to analyse human rights has been attempted by Abdullahi An-
Na‘īm. He argues,  
 
“many elements of what I am proposing have been presented by other Muslim scholars, 
which I ﬁnd to be encouraging, because it indicates that my proposal can draw on that 
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accumulation of insights and arguments... what I hope to contribute is to bring various 
elements together, particularly the dimensions of constitutionalism, human rights, and 
citizenship, in ways that facilitate the practical implementation of the proposed 
framework for mediating the relationship of Islām, the state, and society.”489  
 
An-Na‘īm’s methodology is refreshing as it cuts through the oppositional and exclusivist 
discourse between Islām and the West – a discourse which Arkoun argues as suffering 
from “intellectual arrogance”, which is why he defends, “a pluralistic, open 
epistemology that goes beyond the contradictory debates on the one-sided truth, or the 
right of each individual to hold on to his ‘difference’, without caring about the 
ideological dimensions implicit in each ‘difference’, or ‘identity’ currently based on 
emotional ties.”490 In the same vein, I do not wish to be constrained by the ideological 
dimensions present in both the Shī‘ī and Western philosophical tradition but rather use 
an “open epistemology” that draws on the philosophical ideas in both traditions. 
 
As outlined in chapter one, an-Na‘īm’s use of constitutionalism, human rights and 
citizenship demonstrates an interdisciplinary, pluralistic and practical approach to 
human rights which I strongly advocate.491 Where my approach differs is the breadth of 
scholarship that I am tapping into in order to come up with a practical framework. I am 
tapping into both Islamic and Western scholarship, specifically Shī‘ī-Islām and Western 
philosophical sources and amalgamating ideas from the four figures to shift the 
discourse on human rights from constitutionalism and citizenship towards self-
awareness and identity. An-Na‘īm’s discourse, whilst interdisciplinary, is within the 
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confines of jurisprudence and law whereas mine attempts to combine law with 
meptahysics and philosophy. 
 
Furthermore, my approach is very much a quest for meaning for the individual, in the 
vein of Charles Taylor’s methodology in his seminal work Sources of the Self. His 
thesis, arguments and structure are rooted in finding out why human beings have certain 
deep-rooted instincts or “gut feelings”492, what gives them meaning and dignity in their 
lives and specifically, how frameworks that foster meaning are extremely important. Yet 
he acknowledges his essay is one of “retrieval”493 and that others may regard 
“ontological claims”, “meanings and frameworks” as “very suspicious.”494 It is easier, as 
others say, to regard this kind of framework as a “pseudo-question” and go for a 
“stripped down ontology” to keep with a “more scientific outlook.”495 My framework 
attempts to give an entry point for the self in order for human rights to be cultivated and 
implemented in society. This moves discussions from only problematising the self to 
offering a practical way in which personhood can be developed.  
 
The approach of combining elements in the vein of an-Na‘īm and giving importance to 
the notion of self akin to Taylor are useful intellectual strategies in order to give weight 
to the task of constructing the Internal Human Contract. Moreover, they potentially 
represent aspects of current Islamic and Western intellectual thought respectively but not 
in an oppositional discourse; rather in a discourse of finding meaning for human beings 
and constructing a pragmatic structure, not just a philosophical analysis.496 I will begin 
by briefly summarising the authors’ main views and then elaborate on my own 
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framework for the self, drawing upon the views of all the authors at each stage of my 
framework. This chapter is not prescriptive but instead, lays the seeds of a workable 
framework for the self which can be sieved in the Islamic-Western human rights 
discourse. My conclusion will give some brief hints as to how the Internal Human 
Contract discourse can be developed in a more practical capacity in the future. 
 
1. Summary of the Ideas of the Four Authors 
 
Kierkegaard’s approach to the self in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses is within the 
Christian tradition and he terms the self as the soul. However, rather than just 
deliberating on rituals and theological doctrines as a way to nurture the soul, he focuses 
more on ‘upbuilding’ i.e on self-reflection, ethical improvement, attainment of morals 
and true inner growth to enhance one’s knowledge of one’s self. It is precisely gaining 
self-awareness that is the task of Kierkegaard in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses and it 
appears he places the self in a broader scope. Though his epistemological foundation is 
clearly based on scripture, he wants to allow fellow Christians to think about the 
substance of their religion, which is personal ethics. This should be done by thinking 
about one’s self pragmatically in terms of one’s goals, desires, happiness and 
contentment in life.  
 
‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib takes a similar approach to Kierkegaard in Nahj al-Balāgha in viewing 
the self as the soul. Whilst Kierkegaard is instigating the reader to think about what the 
self is, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib relays what he feels to be objectified aspects about the soul to 
his audience. According to him, the soul does have ontological attributes which are 
relayed in revelation and aḥadīth and these should be acknowledged by religious 
believers, specifically Muslims. His approach, however, in developing the self is similar 
to Kierkegaard because he informs his audience, through his sermons, how to develop 
piety, reduce worldly desires and cultivate a relationship with God; the themes are 
virtually identical to Kierkegaard. In sum, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib uses a more ontological 
approach in describing the self whilst Kierkegaard takes a more subjective approach, 
leaving it to the reader to figure out what the self actually is. Both authors, however, use 
ethical development and self-knowledge as the ways to do this. 
 
Whereas Kierkegaard and ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib have viewed the self as a moral, spiritual and 
metaphysical entity that begins to occupy a place in practical ethical development, Kant 
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and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn have used the self in a much wider framework. For them, the self is 
capable of possessing rights and/or duties. These rights are actually internal rights which 
a human being owes to his/her self and which form the foundation for external rights 
between human beings. Hence, the self does not remain within ethical development but 
rather has a role to play in bringing about self-awareness for the performance of duties 
and legal obligations to one’s self as well as to others. In the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Kant is emphatic in separating religion and philosophy arguing that the self should not 
be considered as a soul - it is not the task of philosophy to engage in this line of enquiry 
(though as I have argued he acknowledges the existence of the soul and God outside the 
domain of philosophy). His approach posits the self as an inner freedom that requires 
guidance and regulation. Moreover, he does not believe that bodily organs can possess 
any kind of rights; rather, duties are associated with curbing animalistic desires related 
to the body such as lustfulness and avarice. This is where Zayn al-‘Ābidīn differs as he 
does believe the self is the soul stemming from God and bodily organs such as the hand 
or legs have rights against the self. Where the two authors meet is the idea that the self 
has relevance in preparing the individual for the performance of enforceable rights. 
Here, the self helps the individual to fulfil maxims but requires casuistry and structure 
and a list of duties to follow. This of course is different from Kierkegaard and ‘Alī b. 
Abī Ṭālib who emphasise development of the self through a broad cultivation of the 
notion of piety. 
 
In light of the authors’ views, my approach is to view the self in a pragmatic capacity 
that is rooted in moral development but is capable of being realised in legal and social 
machinery. Moreover, I argue that it is capable of discovering ontological norms and an 
ontological reality through the idea of recognising its own duties. This is perhaps a 
median position between the four authors as I am not starting from a purely scriptural 
position that acknowledges the self within a religious framework; nor am I fully 
advocating a position that leaves the self disconnected to theology and morality. I also 
believe that Kierkegaard’s subjective approach has a great deal of value in giving space 
to all human beings to develop knowledge of their selves, regardless of religious, social 
and ethnic background. ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s inner recognition of a reality beyond our own 
perception as outlined in sermon 1 of Nahj al-Balāgha also has value as I argue self-
knowledge is not merely a moral quest or a quest to discover one’s self or personality. It 
can also be a quest to discover inner realties that are not only common to human beings 
but which may indicate on the origins of human beings; through recognising the self we 
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may tap into a collective knowledge of where we are from, who we are and where we 
are going.  
 
Here, Kant’s emphasis on the role of the self in helping an individual perform duties and 
obligations to him/her self as well as others is crucial in giving a structure to this self-
discovery. Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s ‘rights to the self’ through bodily organs and actions gives 
a specific structure here, arguably more practical than Kant’s casuistical approach as it 
allows an individual to practically reflect on the kind of duties he/she owes to his/her 
organs on a daily basis. Indeed, these very organs such as the tongue or hand are the 
cause of happiness or destruction for a human being. For my own deliberations, I believe 
that there needs to be casuistry but not in the philosophical form of Kant. I think that 
Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s charter provides an appropriate form to initiate the beginnings of a 
structure for the self and include it in the Islamic-Western human rights discourse. 
 
From the texts of the above authors, one can argue the self is an identifiable entity by 
every human being, whatever his/her mental capacity. There is, I believe, recognition by 
a human being that he/she possesses a personality, an ‘I’, which defines him/her on a 
long-term or short-term basis. When a person says ‘golf makes me happy’ or ‘loneliness 
makes me sad’, he/she is relating his/her happiness to something. Even if a person does 
not identify this as his/her self, it is still something which he is relating to beyond his/her 
physical senses. The commonness and simplicity by which we identify our selves is 
significant; it gives me an entry point in giving a framework to the self and make it 
relevant within the Islamic-Western human rights discourse. It appears the relationship 
between a human being’s every day activities and his/her self is present but may not 
always be acknowledged, depending on how self-aware that individual is – a point 
repeatedly emphasised by ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib in Nahj al-Balāgha as well in other 
narrations.497 I believe this is the crucial starting point in order to establish the self as an 
accessible entity for every human being, whether religious or non-religious. If the self is 
an entity which we refer to constantly, whether knowingly or unknowingly, it clearly has 
a foundational and dynamic place in our lives. It is the initiator, repository, reference 
point and guide of our actions. It seeks to inform us of our desires and goals whilst at the 
same time storing information of our experiences and memories. These very experiences 
guide us but continue to change, thus changing the nature of who we are. It appears the 
self is both a static and constant entity (in the vein of Kierkegaard) that defines our 
                                                          
497
 See chapter three of this thesis for ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib’s emphasis on knowing the self. 
196 
 
private and public conduct. It also contains many facets and functions ranging from our 
instincts and desires to memories and visions. However we want to describe this entity, 
it seems we must admit that it is the only reference point we have in our lives of defining 
who we are and our perceptions of the world. 
 
If the self holds such a central place in our lives, it is important to consider how we can 
better understand it. Is it possible for every human being to do this? Is this only the task 
of the believer, spiritualist and scholar? How can every human being, young or old, 
understand his entity which is the constant reference point in their lives? This has been 
my central concern in my thesis because in my view, the self is the pre-cursor to all 
actions and rights – a point that Kant and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn have expressed in their texts. 
The problems I identified in chapter one involved human rights failing to addresses 
concerns of whether rights could be grounded in anything deeper than dignity, whether 
an over-arching vision of rights could be provided through the self and finally, how the 
desires and claims for rights could be evaluated and nurtured. Black letter law may 
regulate society through legislation but it is always an individual’s nature and behaviour 
which causes society to prosper or disintegrate – hence the significance of these 
aforementioned problems. To better understand the self, I argue an accessible and 
recognisable framework is needed. I will now define this framework by first outlining 
six attributes that have been derived from the texts of the authors which act as the 
philosophical foundations for the Internal Human Contract.  
 
2. My Framework for the Self: the Internal Human Contract and the Six 
Attributes that Characterise it 
 
Starting from a combined position incorporating the views of all four authors that the 
self must be concerned with morality and personal development as well as the need to 
posit a structure for this, the overall ethos of the Internal Human Contract is to achieve 
inner moral growth for the performance of human rights. This inner moral growth is 
achieved through the primary goal of my framework which is for an individual to 
recognise his/her self. By accessing the self, a person is free to engage in self-knowledge 
and fulfil a set of rights towards himself/herself. In order to facilitate this access, the 
Internal Human Contract must have the following features.  
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Accessibility: The Internal Human Contract must fundamentally be accessible to the 
layman in order to provide an entry point to the self that is instantly recognisable. It 
cannot be incomprehensible or difficult to understand nor should it be exclusive for the 
scholar or educated person. Accordingly, in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant states,  
 
“the wise man rightly requires that every philosophic teaching be capable of being made 
popular (that is, of being made sufficiently clear to the senses to be communicated to 
everyone) if the teacher is not to be suspected of being muddled in his own 
concepts…”498  
 
Hence for me, accessibility means universality and offering an entry point to the self that 
can be identified by every individual, young or old, lower or upper class, whatever their 
religious and ethnic background. Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s Risālat al-Ḥuqūq gives me a form by 
which these entry points can be accessed. His simple language, division of rights and 
phrases appeals to the layman. His natural structural progression in tackling God, then 
the self, bodily devices, actions, leaders, the family unit and then other relations is both 
logical and comprehensible. Moreover, his explanation of these various rights is concise 
and does not suffer from technical legal language. For example, Zayn al-‘Ābidīn states, 
“the right of hearing is to keep it pure from listening to backbiting” or the “right of your 
neighbour is that you guard him when he is absent”499 which are both easy to understand 
and apply. I want to use this same approach in making my framework accessible within 
the Islamic-Western human rights discourse. 
 
Choice: Secondly, the Internal Human Contract must offer an individual the freedom to 
access his/her self in a manner that allows choice, personal analysis, control and the 
formulation of his/her own identity. It cannot force an individual to behave in a 
particular way or believe in a set of norms. An individual must arrive at a particular 
position of understanding his/her self with his/her own autonomy. This is very much a 
Socratic approach, inspired by Kierkegaard’s Eighteen Upbuilding Discourse that allows 
a person to be his/her own teacher. Even in his other works, Kierkegaard states, “from 
the very beginning, I have stressed and repeated unchanged that I was ‘without 
authority.’ I regard myself rather as a reader of the books, not as the author.”500 I would 
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take the same approach here in that I do not consider myself as an authority; I have more 
to learn from the very process of the framework itself. Although Kierkegaard situates his 
writings from a Christian background, he explicitly says that, 
 
“the category for his undertaking is: to make persons aware of the essentially Christian 
but this accounts for the repeated statement: I am not that, for otherwise there is a 
confusion…I say: the whole undertaking is for my own discipline and education.”501  
 
It is precisely raising a person’s awareness of the self and doing so from the perspective 
of an initiator and learner that I am coming from. I think Kierkegaard’s approach is 
invaluable as it removes bias, self interest and arrogance from the Internal Human 
Contract.502 
 
Structure: Thirdly, the Internal Human Contract must offer a system of co-ordinates 
that guide this very accessibility. There must be a map, a clear direction which offers a 
structure to every individual to access his/her self and understand the way in which they 
implement human rights. As I will show, I have identified our biological devices as 
these coordinates. The task of this structure is to enable the individual to navigate 
himself/herself after the entry point to the self has been identified. Once an individual 
chooses to become more aware of his/her self, these co-ordinates are at his/her disposal 
to constantly facilitate this access. ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib has inspired this approach because 
in contrast to Kierkegaard who advocates upbuilding and a freer journey to discover 
one’s self, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib continually emphasises the Qur’ān and Sunnah as the 
cornerstones of Godly guidance. The Qur’ān and Sunnah are of course the key sources 
in uṣūl al-fiqh (the principles of jurisprudence) to derive a law and in the Shī‘a tradition, 
sunnah is specifically defined as the actions, sayings and tacit approval of Prophet 
Muḥammad and his progeny, which he left behind for the Muslim community to seek 
guidance from.503 Here, the Qur’ān and Sunnah can be regarded as the coordinates for 
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every Muslim to turn to when they want to seek moral, spiritual, legal and theological 
guidance.  
 
In Nahj al-Balāgha, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib devotes several sermons to the kind of guidance 
both these tools can provide. For example, in sermon 110, he states:  
 
“Learn the Qur’ān because it is the best narration. Understand it because it is a spring for 
the hearts. Seek cure with its light because it is a cure for the chests. Beautify its 
recitation because it has the most beneficial stories.504 
 
Here, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib emphasises how the Qur’ān is the key source of guidance for 
Muslims and its potential spiritual impact as a “spring for the hearts” and “cure”, which 
is for “disbelief, hypocrisy, revolt and misguidance.”505 I believe this is a beneficial 
approach as instead of leaving the task of self-reflection to an individual, which can be 
an arduous one especially if a person is not used to contemplation, it is useful to provide 
some kind of foundation or structure to access the self.506 
 
Practicality: Fourth, these co-ordinates and my framework overall must be practical; 
they must relate to our everyday actions as human beings. An overly theoretical 
framework that has little connection with our day to day activities, social lives, rights, 
relationships, personal desires and communities in which we live would have little 
benefit to an individual. How could that individual develop an awareness of his/her self 
and the implementation of rights that are connected to the reality in which he/she lives 
in? Practicality is a central characteristic precisely because it offers a tangible 
connection with an individual’s life. It is significant that Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s Risālat al-
Ḥuqūq strikes deep at the heart of one who reads it because it talks about rights and 
                                                          
504
 Ar-Razi: Nahj al-Balāgha, volume 1, sermon 110, p. 422. I have modified the translation 
somewhat from the text by replacing “fairest of discourses” with “best narration”, “blossoming” with 
“spring”, “hearts” with “chests” and “beautiful narration” with “beneficial stories.” Sermon 176 and 
158 further expound the concept of the Qur’ān as being the foundational source of guidance for a 
human being. 
505
 Disbelief, hypocrisy, revolt and misguidance are the key illnesses which the Qur’ān is able to cure 
according to ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib in sermon 176. Ar-Razi: Nahj al-Balāgha, volume 1, sermon 176, p. 
657. 
506
 Taylor argues that before the modern age, questioning this foundation (be it religious or moral) 
would have made no sense to people like Luther, “this term [crisis of meaning] would have made no 
sense to Luther in its modern use …the meaning of life was all to unquestionable for this Augustinian 
monk, as it was for his whole age’ That is why I am arguing for foundations in my framework simply 
because ‘a framework is that in virtue of which we make sense of our lives spiritually. Not to have a 
framework is to fall into a life which is spiritually senseless.” Taylor: Sources of the Self, p. 18. 
200 
 
duties that every human being engages in, expects and perceives. The leader as a 
“compassionate father”, mother as someone who remained “thirsty as long as we drank” 
and the stomach as a “container” that should not be “overfilled” are pertinent examples 
of this approach.507 Kant tackles the same subject-matter in the Metaphysics of Morals 
when he discusses how a human being should not overeat or be led by base desires.508 
Therefore, the emphasis on relating the self to everyday problems and concerns is 
crucial for the Internal Human Contract to be sieved in the Islamic-Western human 
rights discourse. 
 
Ethical Reflection: Fifth, the Internal Human Contract must focus on inner awareness 
and ethical development to guide an individual’s actions and the implementation of 
human rights. The source of our human rights is our motivations, intentions and desires 
as human beings. My framework must be able to tap into these very powerful forces and 
enable us to become more cognisant of what drives our everyday actions. If we can 
access them, then we have the ability to examine and mould them thereby giving us 
greater control of our own development and identity. The constant direction must always 
be inwards to accomplish awareness of one’s self. This has been inspired by the writings 
of both Kierkegaard and ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib. For example, Kierkegaard deals with themes 
ranging from ‘strengthening the inner being’, ‘preserving one’s soul in patience’ and 
‘against cowardliness.’509 Equally, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib talks about ‘backbiting and 
speaking ill of others’510, ‘the transience of this world’511 and ‘death and taking lessons 
from it.’512 These themes almost compel one to reflect on one’s existence and the 
Internal Human Contract must be able to do the same.  
 
Internal Dialogue: Lastly, the Internal Human Contract must be able to create an 
internal dialogue, a constant verbal and non-verbal exchange with one’s self. There 
should be a universal method in which one’s inner awareness can be translated into 
some form of communication or terminology by which one can measure one’s self. Even 
if the labels by which we identify our awareness are only initial and temporal, they 
provide the beginnings of a language that enable all individuals to contextualise and 
define their inner awareness. They may decide to develop or invent new modes of 
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communication but a broad, universal form of communication is necessary to not only 
maximise accessibility to my framework but make it tangible to the individual. Indeed, 
in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, Kierkegaard stated that “this little book…is called 
‘discourses’, not sermons, because its author does not have authority to preach, 
‘upbuilding discourses’, not discourses for upbuilding, because the speaker by no means 
claims to be a teacher.”513 He clearly intended the reader to take charge and create a 
meaningful discourse with God rather than being told exactly how to manage this 
conversation. In some respects, I agree with this attitude because it allows the reader 
personal freedom to engage in self-awareness. This precisely accomplishes my aim of 
generating internal dialogue with one’s self. Upbuilding cannot just occur to those that 
are unable to grapple with key moral concepts pertaining to the self. Therefore, I have 
identified our biological organs as identifiable symbols in order for this journey of 
personal reflection to begin for the realisation of human rights. These six attributes form 
the Internal Human Contract’s salient characteristics. I will now define and explain what 
this framework is, how these attributes manifest themselves within the framework and 
how it specifically relates to the implementation of human rights. 
 
2.1  The Primary Aim of the Internal Human Contract: Biological Tools as 
Instruments of Identity 
 
In light of the aforementioned six characteristics (accessibility, choice, structure, 
practicality, ethical reflection and internal dialogue), I argue that an effective framework 
by which we can better understand our selves begins from the manner in which we 
perceive our biological tools. By biological tools, I mean our natural bodily organs 
ranging from our eyes and ears to our hands and legs, a point inspired by Zayn al-
‘Ābidīn and Kant. Why should our biological tools represent an effective entry point to 
ourselves? These tools are a natural part of us; they are our real physiological devices 
interconnected with each other and are under our power. They represent a reality for us 
insofar as they contribute to our physical make-up, our perception of ourselves and in 
relation to others; they are directly connected to the performance of our actions and 
others identify us through them. Thus, despite the fact that they are biological, they 
remain a fundamental part of our everyday existence.514 
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Moreover, we can identify our biological tools such as our hands or eyes easily and 
instantly. They require no mediator, except our own recognition. We therefore can be 
epistemologically certain not only of their existence but of the way in which they 
function. This instant connection may make us feel lost without them and it is for this 
reason that our biological tools cannot be denied or ignored.515 This helps satisfy point 
one of the six aforementioned attributes that my framework must be accessible to the 
layman and I would argue that our biological devices are a starting point to foster this 
accessibility. If we accept this presumption, we still must perceive our biological tools in 
a manner that allows them to connect to the self. This requires giving them an existence 
that is not purely biological but capable of being perceived in a non-rational manner. Is 
this feasible given that accessibility and practicality are key features of my framework? 
 
I argue that it is possible because our instantaneous recognition of our biological tools 
enables us to think of them as an innate part of our existence. They are already playing a 
role in the performance of our actions, whether talking or moving, seeing or hearing. 
This means attaching a qualitative value to our biological tools to the extent that they 
posses a worth themselves. This worth gives authority to a particular tool which we 
must, at the least, consider in our day to day actions. This authority may not initially be 
rooted in any moral dignity but begins with a minimum relational existence with the self 
whereby the individual understands that his/her biological devices are an integral part in 
the performance of his/her actions.516 
 
The relationship between our body and our consciousness is not new; it has been 
explored before but not from the specific perspective of our biological tools. Lisa 
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Blackman has surveyed classical and current approaches to body studies but there is no 
mention of how specific biological devices contribute to the cultivation, formation and 
creation of rights.517 Here, one finds that the traditional mind-body problem in 
philosophy (both Western and Islamic) dealt with either the dualism of the mind and 
body, interactionist dualism which posited a relationship between the two and monism, 
the view that either the mind or body constituted one single existence.518 This is in 
addition to the religious and philosophical doctrines of the soul being the main subject of 
human existence and transcending the body to reach God.519 These early debates 
developed into specific branches which dealt with reductionist theories pertaining to 
physicalism, the view that our consciousness was rooted solely in our physical make-up 
and various manifestations of this such as behaviourism and functionalism.520 On this 
side, the body became the sole subject and our mind, self or consciousness became 
minimised. At the other end of the spectrum, the phenomenological tradition developed, 
which emphasised our consciousness as a fundamental part of our existence and as the 
most significant way in which we can access God, the Spirit, the Other and/or Being.521  
 
The mind-body relationship developed specifically into body studies which Blackman 
argues, “the field of body studies has proliferated since the 1980s and 1990s, now 
existing as a transdisciplinary locus of enquiry.”522 This transdisciplinary focus involved 
looking at the “human self [that] was not self-contained, indvidiualised, clearly bounded 
and separate from others, but rather the borders and boundaries between self and other 
were considered porous and permeable.”523 This positioned the self as an entitly capable 
of relating to the body, other people’s bodies and affecting the identity of other human 
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beings.524 Others such as Ernest Becker have argued that the self actually is actually 
motivated by the fear of mortality. The frailness of our body leads to create beliefs, 
cultures and symbols in order to ignore or avoid the inevitability of death, known as 
“terror management theory.”525 Greenberg and Solomon have developed this and argued 
that, 
 
“the body is a problem because it makes evident our similarity to other animals…”526 
and so “in our mad frenzy to deny all that is animal, we may be robbing ourselves of half 
of our identity. The neurotic denies him-self or herself the most because he or she lacks 
the secure cultural anxiety buffer that we must wear to approach and embrace our 
animalistic tendencies”527…”by embracing the multitude of cultural meanings given to 
our body, we may be missing out on much of the pleasure that our physical bodies can 
provide us.”528  
 
This view argues that the body is actually motivated by death (not life) and should, at the 
least, embrace that which is physically pleasurable. I am arguing for the opposite and 
something more specific in this thesis; the relationship between bodily organs and the 
self merits examination and moreover, we can view our organs as a force for positive 
meaning and moral development not mortality and death.529 I believe Zayn al-‘Ābidīn 
has provided a template for this relational existence in Risālat al-Ḥuqūq, which can be 
developed further to enable an individual to understand the link between his/her 
biological tools and his/her self. Zayn al-‘Ābidīn stated that the tongue, ears, eyes, 
hands, legs, stomach and private part had rights against the self. He further specified the 
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teleological functions of these devices expressing that there was a moral function to 
them which should be fulfilled (or an immoral function which should be avoided).  
 
What I am advocating is a stage before devices possess rights and teleology. This stage 
is a mere relational stage that acknowledges the physical function of our biological tools. 
I will show that attaching moral values and a dignity to these devices can be 
accomplished but there must be a stage before this. A potential statement which can give 
effect to this is as follows: ‘my biological tools are instruments for my actions.’ This 
statement is purposefully simplistic to accomplish the primary goal of making the 
transition from our tools as mere biological parts to instruments of activity, which also 
satisfies point one and four of my six attributes in nurturing accessibility and practicality 
respectively. Thus, although research so far has dealt with the relational aspect between 
the mind and body (the initial part of my framework), it has not dealt with specific 
biological tools as forming intricate relationships with the self and has not deliberated on 
a practical entry point for the layman in order to nurture these very tools to enhance 
his/her consciousness and implement rights in wider society.  
 
2.2      The Secondary Aim of the Internal Human Contract: Biological 
Tools as Instruments of Reflection 
 
If we establish that our biological tools are instruments of activity, not just static parts, 
then we are acknowledging that they play a vital role in all our private and public 
actions. Whether we use our tongue to talk to people or use our hand to write, they are 
the link between what we intend them to do and the intended outcomes. The secondary 
aim of looking at this relationship is a subjective exercise in questioning our tools’ 
functions. We may intend for our tongue to talk but should that be its function? If we 
choose to use it in this way, which words should come out of our mouths? This is a 
reflection and examination exercise initiated by the individual himself/herself. It is 
purely personal because the individual is questioning the role his/her instruments play in 
his/her life. This stage is not necessarily meant to yield any moral outcome (and as such 
is amoral) but only a better understanding of how the individual uses his/her biological 
tools. It has been particularly inspired by the concept of tafakkur (reflection) which has 
been abundantly emphasised by ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib as well as the approach of Kierkegaard 
in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses in order to make the reader reflect on his/her 
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actions.530 This has some similarities with the tradition of phenomenology531 that 
emphasises systematic reflection to determine the essential properties and structures of 
consciousness and experience, specifically “lived experience”532.  
 
Often such techniques are only associated with spiritual masters533; however I would 
argue it is a practical technique which we employ everyday but to varying degrees. It 
could be from simply reflecting on what type of food we want to eat, how we wish to go 
about our day or examining our moral decisions. Whatever the mode of reflection, I am 
advocating that it should be a key tool to develop inner moral awareness. The technique 
of reflection can satisfy point four of my six attributes which emphasises the need for 
practicality and being able relate to our everyday experiences, whether these occur in 
times of happiness or distress. 
 
During this process, a person becomes a traveller that encounters his/her own self, which 
is an enemy because it contains carnal desires that dissuade him/her from cultivating a 
meaningful moral identity. As Allāmah Tabatabāī, the Shī‘ī philosopher and jurist, 
states,  
 
“it should be made clear that at this juncture and as a result of what the traveller 
witnesses in his soul, he may be taken over by pride and I-ness (ananiyah). He may 
encounter his biggest and staunchest enemy, which is nothing but his own carnal soul 
(nafs), as it has been pointed out in this tradition: “Your most ardent enemy is your 
carnal soul, which dwells between your two sides.”’534  
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It is precisely the act of becoming a traveller, finding out one’s habits and desires, that 
should result from this stage. Hence, in comparison to embracing the “carnal soul”, as 
advocated by Greenberg, Goldenberg, Solomon and Pyszczynski, one may decide to 
combat it and regard it as an “enemy” to the self. This satisfies point two and five of the 
attributes of the Internal Human Contract, choice and ethical reflection, because a person 
is free to reflect on his/her existence independent of theological doctrines and begins to 
initiate a process of ethical reflection which improves his/her actions as both an 
individual and member of society.535  
 
2.3 The Third Aim of the Internal Human Contract: Discovering Moral Norms 
through Experience 
 
Considering that our biological tools are involved in physical activity and thus 
contribute to our lived experiences as human beings, an individual that engages in the 
aforementioned process of reflection is reflecting on an all-inclusive experience. This 
means he/she will look at his/her physical conduct, desires, motivations and reasons 
which encompass his/her fullest cognitive and non-cognitive faculties as a human being. 
For example, by reflecting on how he/she used his/her tongue on a particular day, he/she 
would have to reflect on how much he/she talked (a physical activity), what he/she 
spoke (his/her intelligible language) and why he/she used particular language 
(motivations). All of these internal and external faculties actually cover several rational 
and non-rational tools of a human being from intellect and intuition to emotions, 
passions and physical activity. What can happen during this process of reflection is an 
experiential discovery of norms i.e through an individual’s all-inclusive experience 
using his/her biological devices, he/she obtains an understanding of the moral norms, 
which time and time again, drive his/her conduct. I would like to illustrate this by way of 
an example. 
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Take John who defends his family with a knife from a thief – he is experiencing an all-
inclusive human experience of reasoned choice, aggression, love and his own dignity. 
The first aspect here is that he is discovering his human dignity, his own worth, the 
honour of defending his family and the need to exact justice not merely through the 
mind but through his heart, feeling, intuition and love. All of these processes are 
dialectically and collectively informing his decisions. He realises that he has used his 
hand in a manner intended to defend himself and his family, though one of the possible 
outcomes may be the death of the thief or even himself and his family members. Though 
he is presented with little choice, his hand becomes the key instrument in his activity to 
defend his house and by using it in a particular way, he can become conscious of how he 
has used it, what the instrument is capable of and his motivations behind picking up the 
knife.  
 
Through this inclusive human experience with the entry point as the hand, John is able 
to discover what dignity and life mean to him, the moral difference between himself and 
the thief and arguably the most moral way to defend his family. Here, John is able to use 
his experience to discover moral norms that are so fundamental to his humanity. Not 
only does it take into account both rational and non-rational modes of behaviour, which 
can be a contentious issue for philosophers in defining human dignity and what is 
‘good’536 but such an experience can occur on a day to day basis in ordinary situations. 
Whether one is walking to the supermarket, conversing with a friend or having an 
argument with someone, his/her biological tools are in motion and at every instance, 
there is a collective interplay between his/her biological tools and his/her feelings which 
allow that person to discover his/her own worth in that situation and the type of morals 
he/she has used. What is important here specifically with regards to my framework is 
that the entry points of one’s biological devices as tools for ontological discovery should 
be made known to a person. This fosters the process of reflection expressed in stage two 
of the Internal Human Contract and also shows that our biological devices can be these 
very entry points for discovering moral norms. This satisfies point six of my six 
foundational attributes of my framework, internal dialogue, which emphasises that there 
should be a set of coordinates which precipitate this mode of self-discovery. 
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Therefore, the discovery of moral norms and moral worth are significant at this stage 
because an individual has made a transition from mere acknowledgement of his/her 
biological tools as instruments of activity to reflecting upon their functions and now, the 
discovery of moral norms in relation to these very tools. Here, teleology can be 
attributed to one’s biological devices precisely because the appropriate manner or goal 
in which to use these devices has arisen from the person himself/herself. One may attach 
an immoral or moral usage to his/her devices based on his/her experience and this is a 
decision that the individual must make. It is entirely possible that a person may be 
satisfied in destroying things with his/her hands, rather than creating things with them 
but what has significantly happened up until this decision-making point is the process of 
acknowledgement, reflection and discovery through his/her biological tools. At the least, 
this process has initiated greater self-awareness in an individual than before and it would 
be reasonable to argue that minimally, an individual would think carefully what his/her 
tools are capable of, as instruments of activity. This would result in a personal, inner 
growth within the individual as to who he/she is and what kind of norms he/she is 
subscribing to in life.537  
 
This minimal relationship has increasingly been argued in recent years as an instinctual 
pull to morality, a point though clearly made by Kant, previously in the Groundwork.538 
For example, Besser-Jones argues our basic relationship to that which is moral is a 
“sense of duty”, as if to be “pulled by morality: to feel we should do the right thing.”539 
In fact, what is interesting is not that “we should do the right thing” but rather to seek 
out a justification for moral requirements. She states, “if there is a justification for moral 
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requirements (that is, a solid explanation of why they hold an overriding normative 
status), then we should not deny them this status. Thus the first step in resolving this 
practical problem of alienation and motivation is to seek out a justification of moral 
requirements.”540 She argues this is significant because understanding our moral 
obligations results in psychological well-being:  
 
“Consider, for a moment, some of the most uncontroversial moral requirements: do not 
harm innocent people; do not lie, cheat or steal; do not break promises absent good 
reason; help others when you can. These are the rules that, when followed, generate the 
speciﬁc sort of positive social interaction that has been proven to be essential to 
psychological well-being. They will enable people to develop trusting bonds, to be 
respected and to respect others. They will generate stable patterns of expectations and 
interactions. They will provide the foundations for deeper relationships to develop and 
ﬂourish. These are the characteristics of positive social interaction, and we have every 
reason to think that interactions between those that are committed to these sorts of 
guidelines will be of this nature. Of course, this requires a genuine commitment to 
morality by all parties; without such a commitment interactions would lack the mutuality 
and reciprocity proven to be critical to them.’541 
 
This paragraph is crucial in not only giving weight to my original argument in this 
chapter that fostering a genuine commitment to morality (through a particular 
framework) can support the idea of well-being, meaningful identity and positive growth 
in both an individual and society. This goes back to Charles Taylor’s key point about 
how much contemporary philosophy has ignored our fundamental moral intuitions, 
 
“…much of contemporary philosophy has ignored this dimension of our moral 
consciousness and beliefs altogether and has even seemed to dismiss it as confused and 
irrelevant...we are dealing here with moral intuitions which are uncommonly deep, 
powerful and universal. They are so deep that we are tempted to think of them as rooted 
in instinct, in contrast to other moral reactions which seem very much the consequence 
of upbringing and education. There seems to be a natural, inborn compunction to inflict 
death or injury on another, an inclination to come to the help of the injured and 
endangered. Culture and upbringing may help to define the boundaries of the relevant 
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'others' but they don't seem to create the basic reaction itself. That is why eighteenth-
century thinkers, notably Rousseau, could believe in a natural susceptibility to feel 
sympathy for others.”542 
 
Here, I am arguing for a more positive relationship between the use of our biological 
instruments and our perception of morality. It is precisely through the usage of our 
biological devices that we can encounter this minimal relationship to our “moral 
consciousness” but more than that, we can discover the meaning behind the norms we 
encounter so as to produce “stable patterns of expectations and interactions.” The 
continual problem of how to discover such norms or how to tackle the issue of a lack in 
motivation or ‘genuine commitment’543 to understand them can potentially be resolved 
by developing the link between our natural bodily devices and our experiences. This 
accomplishes point three of the Internal Human Contract which is to offer a structure or 
method by which a human being can develop moral norms; I have argued that our 
natural bodily devices offer us this structure. 
 
2.4 The Fourth Aim of the Internal Human Contract: The Construction of Internal 
Duties 
 
During the process of discovery as above, an individual can grasp the reasons and 
motivations which drive his/her behaviour on a day to day level. There may be a 
realisation that these norms repeat themselves and help create the teleological functions 
for one’s biological organs. It as at this point that a person may create duties and 
responsibilities which he/she performs daily in order to accomplish the goals he/she sets 
for himself/herself. These duties are necessary to give effect to the norms that the person 
discovers. What I am advocating is a very specific type of internal regulation which 
creates duties in relation to his/her biological devices. Creating duties in one’s life, such 
as towards one’s family, work or friends, is arguably instinctual and frequent but as per 
my framework, I believe there is a stage before this which can nurture duties to the self. 
 
I am arguing for the idea that if an individual sets himself/herself duties then these duties 
should first and foremost be formed in relation to his/her biological tools; there would 
have been a basic acknowledgement of the worth of his/her biological devices as 
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instruments of activity and that these play a vital role in giving rise to his/her actions. 
His/her actions may be moral or immoral, progressive or destructive but if the reflection 
yields greater moral worth in himself/herself (which I argue would be a natural step), 
then that individual can formulate duties to his/her biological instruments and attach a 
specific teleological direction for them which would internally regulate his/her 
motivations and usage of his/her instruments.  
 
I believe Zayn al-‘Ābidīn’s deliberation on the rights bodily organs have over the self 
and Kant’s duties to oneself offer a foundational starting point to formulate these 
internal duties. However, they can be varied to suit the individual. So, a person can say 
‘I owe a duty to my hand in that it should create things, not destroy things’ or that ‘I owe 
a duty to my ears to hear that which is pleasing, not displeasing.’ Here I am providing a 
universal framework in order to access the self via a person’s biological tool’s in order 
to create a reflective and interactive relationship between a person’s tools and his/her 
self. The formulation of these rights or duties towards one’s biological organs is 
subjective insofar as duties and the moral content of these duties may be ascribed very 
personally, varying in detail, type, language, time period in which the duty is performed, 
motivation and intended outcome. Millikan has extensively deliberated on how human 
beings construct language, particularly in relation to the body which is known as 
biosemantics.544 She has also discussed the teleological nature of he body, not in terms 
of claiming or understaning rights but rather in questioning what the proper function of 
the body is in relation to our emotions and desires. Millikan argues that the “capacity to 
develop and to act on desires would seem to have been selected for only because desires 
are sometimes fulﬁlled and, of course, sometimes do represent means to fulfilment of 
our biological interests.”545 Moreover, she states that,  
 
“body organs and instinctive behaviours also ‘have functions.’ As is the case with both 
tools and language devices, not every token of such a device succeeds in servings its 
‘own’ or ‘proper’ function. And we can imagine a person intentionally using such a 
natural device, say one of his own organs or refleces, to serve a purpose that does not 
accord with its proper function…and as is the case with language devices but not with 
tools, these natural devices have not literally been ‘designed’ by someone to serve their 
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functions.  The ‘functions’ of these natural devices are, roughly, the functions upon 
which the continued reproduction or survial has depended.”546 
 
Millikan’s exploration of how we assign functions to our bodily organs gives weight to 
my arguments in this chapter that the Internal Human Contract can offer a way in which 
we can assign duties to organs within the context of human rights. Millikan does not 
believe that the teleological functions of these organs has been designed (and have 
actually evolved within the context of natural selection) and this is where a key 
difference emerges with the Internal Human Contract and the worldview of Kant and 
Zayn al-‘Ābidīn. Kant believed curbing our immoral desires had a function of increasing 
the moral worth of the individual whilst Zayn al-‘Ābidīn argued our specific bodily 
organs had a designed purpose which was eventually meant to instil taqwā (God-
consciousness) in an individual. Thus, I advocate the individual finding a greater 
teleological purpose in their bodily organs which contrasts with Millikan’s somewhat 
reductionist approach and accomplishes points five and six of the Internal Human 
Contract which are positive ethical reflection and internal dialogue that may help the self 
to construct a vision of transcendence. 
 
2.5 The Final Aim of the Internal Human Contract: Liberation 
 
When a person has reached the stage of cultivating his/her identity by constant self-
awareness of his/her biological tools and the duties owed to them, that person may have 
the ability to tap into his/her common human identity. This represents the final aim of 
my framework which I have called ‘liberation.’ This stage builds from the previous 
stage where one has formed duties to one’s biological devices. The rights our bodily 
organs impose on us offer us a way in which we can reflect on the norms we hold dear in 
our lives and how we wish to live our life. By reaching this point, we may be able to tap 
into the common norms and values all human beings possess i.e we may begin to 
understand the concept of humanity itself, where it comes from and how it should 
function. It is arguably the ontological root of all human beings, their source of origin 
and the most appropriate moral attributes for them.547 Within the paradigm of human 
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 Millikan, Ruth G., Language, Thought, and other Biological Categories (MIT Press, 2001), pp. 2-
3. 
547
 Taylor’s ‘web of interlocutors’ is a similar concept; the idea that our morals come from a deeper 
and shared space of upbringing and our environment which results in common notions of ‘good’ – see 
Taylor: Sources of the Self, chapter 2. However, I am further arguing for a liberation of that very 
environment which leads to the ontological and/or transcendental source of this “web.” 
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rights, moral agents can be more acquainted with the source of human rights and the 
specific manner of their implementation. 
 
What I am advocating here is a transition from reflecting on the purpose of our 
biological organs to formulating concrete values about one’s existence and the way one 
should live. The transition enables an individual to form a set of beliefs about humanity 
itself, which becomes the code of his/her existence. They may only result from a 
particular level of epistemological certainty but they offer a deeper, intrinsic 
understanding about human beings and perhaps existence itself. Such a transition may 
occur through thinking about the common traits, values and duties which all human 
beings possess through the performance of their biological devices or it may occur 
through a process of intersubjectivity i.e of rationally weighing evidences and opinions 
amongst a group of people. There may be other non-rational means such as a heightened 
level of intuition but I think this becomes a personal endeavour on the part of each 
person. Arguably it may involve a more supra-rational understanding of our origins 
which is metaphysical but at the least, the Internal Human Contract gives an opportunity 
to any individual to compare his/her values to others, to see the commonness of others’ 
duties to his/her own and how this commonness may point to something deeper about 
humanity itself. It is this basic mode of enquiry which can be initiated upon the choice of 
every individual through the Internal Human Contract framework. I have called this step 
‘liberation’ because a human being becomes liberated from the constraints of his/her self 
and biological tools to a deeper level of awareness that projects his/her self in front of 
the ‘Other.’  
 
Kierkegaard, ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, Kant and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn considered the ‘Other’ to be 
God though in different ways. For Kierkegaard, God was the Being who guided us and 
welcomed us back through our period of difficulty in the world: “…just as it is the same 
God who, after having led us by his hand through the world, draws back his hand and 
opens his arms to receive in them the yearning soul. Amen!”548; for ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, 
God was the highest truth to be known, “the inner knowledge of Allah, Glory be to Him, 
is the highest of knowable truths”549; for Kant, God did not have a place in philosophy 
but appeared to occupy a core part of one’s personal life:  
                                                          
548
 Kierkegaard: Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, p. 29. 
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 Rayshahri: The Scale of Wisdom, no. 4072, p. 707. ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib further elaborates on the 
conception of God in Nahj al-Balagha as Being that has no like: “Praise is due to Allah whose worth 
cannot be described by speakers, whose bounties cannot be counted by calculators… the foremost in 
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“The idea of God ought to fill people with reverence every time they hear His name 
spoken. And it should be pronounced but seldom and never lightly. The child must learn 
to feel reverence towards God, as the Lord of life and of the whole world; further, as one 
who cares for men, and lastly as their Judge.”550 
 
For Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, God is the one who indicates to us and we should know him: “I 
have attained knowledge of You through You, and You are the One Who indicated to 
me to Yourself and called me to Yourself, and were it not for you, I would not know 
who You are.”551 
 
Whilst the above conceptions of God may differ slightly amongst the four authors, God 
was the central Being in their lives and through Him they became liberated and found 
true solace. The four texts of this thesis, therefore, clearly indicate on finding happiness 
in God. What I am advocating in the Internal Human Contract is the free choice that any 
human being has to traverse a path of reflecting on the purpose of his/her biological 
devices, his/her moral worth and how this may lead to a greater understanding of his/her 
existence and the implementation of human rights in society. Such a person may arrive 
at the notion of God, a different conception of reality or no conception of reality. 
However, if the Internal Human Contract has propelled an individual to think deeply 
about the origin of his/her norms and the nature of his/her existence, then my framework 
has accomplished points two and six i.e choice and internal dialogue. This is because the 
Internal Human Contract has fostered a freer type of ethical reflection through one’s 
biological devices initiated by personal choice and given the opportunity for an 
individual to formulate his/her own internal dialogue with whatever conception of 
transcendence he/she arrives at. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
religion is the acknowledgement of Him, the perfection of acknowledging Him is to testify Him, the 
perfection of testifying Him is to believe in His Oneness, the perfection of believing in His Oneness is 
to regard Him Pure, and the perfection of His purity is to deny Him attributes…” (Nahj al-Balāgha, 
sermon 1, pp. 21 - 23). 
550
 Kant, Immanuel., Kant on Education (Ueber Paedagogik), trans. Annette Churton, introduction by 
C.A. Foley Rhys Davids (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1900), p 107. Kant elsewhere explicitly says 
that the idea of God’s love is attainable through reason alone, see: Kant, Immanuel., Religion within 
the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. with an Introduction and  Notes  by  Theodore  M.  Greene  and  
Hoyt  H.  Hudson,  Harper  Torchbooks/The Cloister Library (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 
110. 
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Therefore, the stage of liberation involves moving from I-ness to Otherness which 
results in a kind of confidence and happiness about the norms a person has discovered 
and the very source of these norms. At this point, a more objectived perception of 
existence may take place which inspires a sense of commitment to the very source of 
transcendence a person discovers. In theological terms, this may be translated as 
‘believing’, ‘testifying’ or ‘taking an oath’ in something which you believe to be real, 
certain and central to your existence. Whilst a person is free to do this, the Internal 
Human Contract allows a person to decide on how he wishes to describe and testify to 
his/her liberated experience. As such, there is no theological expectation at this stage.552 
What is significant is that by reflecting on the use of our bodily organs, we may develop 
the ability recognise the source of rights, the kind society we wish to live in and how this 
should be directed by a greater conception of existence.  
 
It is precisely the self’s longing for an attribute, instinct, notion or Being that is beyond 
itself and which liberates it that forms this last part of my framework. Arguably, this last 
part of my framework reflects a more mystical approach – certainly a process advocated 
by Ali b. Abi Taib, Kierkegaard and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn and perhaps to a lesser degree, 
Kant.553 This kind of approach which thrusts the self as the central entity in one’s life, 
capable of being accessed through one’s biological organs offers a possible framework 
to understand our existence. Taylor has in fact argued that such frameworks are 
important as they “attempt to define our ontological reality’554 and give us a bearing and 
direction for our spiritual experiences. It is up to the individual to decide how often 
he/she wishes to reflect on the use of his/her biological devices and what this means to 
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 In the Islamic tradition, taking the shahādah (witnessing) is the foundation of becoming a Muslim, 
i.e one who submits to God with certainity and knowledge. The shahādah is: “There is no God but 
Allah, and I witness that Muḥammad is the messenger of Allah” (for the Shī‘a, an additional 
statement is said which is, ‘I bear witness that Ali is the successor of Muḥammad’). For information 
on the shahadah, see: Gimaret, D., “Shahadah”, The Encyclopedia of Islām, 2nd Edition, vol. 9, 
(Leiden: Brill, 1997), p. 201. In the Christian tradition, the acceptance that one is a sinner, that God 
loves His creation and that he/she needs to be saved by Jesus Christ are crucial to becoming a 
Christian and form the core parts of the baptism ceremony. See: Marty, Martin E., Baptism: A User’s 
Guide (Minneapolis: Augsburg Books, 2008). 
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human being’s ‘supersensible’ moral vocation.” Bielefeldt, Heiner., Symbolic representation in 
Kant’s practical philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 270. 
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him/her. The primary aim of the Internal Human Contract is at the least to foster a 
minimal reflective relationship between one’s organs, the duties he/she owes to them 
and how this helps an individual understand and implement human rights successfully. 
 
2.6 Situating the Internal Human Contract within the Islamic-Western 
Human Rights Discourse 
 
The Internal Human Contract has compromised of five stages – 1) biological tools as 
instruments of activity, 2) biological tools as instruments of reflection, 3) discovering 
moral norms through experience 4) the construction of internal duties and 5) liberation. 
These stages are grounded by six core attributes - accessibility, choice, structure, 
practicality, ethical reflection and internal dialogue. Taken as a whole, the Internal 
Human Contract offers a possible entry point to access the self through one’s bodily 
organs and this allows a human being to reflect on how he/she is using his/her organs, 
their purpose, how their usage informs his/her identity, what kind of duties would be 
appropriate to create to use his/her organs more effectively and how this may lead to a 
discovery of core norms for himself/herself which may give that person a vision of the 
source of these norms. Thus, the Internal Human Contract combines ethics, philosophy, 
law and mysticism which provides an interdisciplinary method by which the self can be 
analysed and practically actualised in society. The various facets of the Internal Human 
Contract have been directly inspired by the four texts analysed in this thesis and 
therefore shows the creative value of comparing and upbuilding specific ideas from 
these texts.  
 
I argue that the Internal Human Contract provides a viable framework for the self to be 
used in the Islamic-Western human rights discourse. As explained in chapter one, the 
discourse did not address the following factors of human behaviour – namely, human 
motivations, desires, empowerment and identity. These are all crucial for the 
implementation of any human right because without a person being able to understand 
why he/she has rights, what to do with them, how to regulate them and apply them 
correctly, any legal regime, Western or Islamic, which attempts to enforce these rights 
may fail. This is because the source of human rights, which I have argued to be the self, 
is the crucial starting point to understand the nature of these rights. If the self is not 
factored into this discourse in a meaningful way, then human rights become artificial 
legal constructs which are not concerned with human motivations. Therefore, the 
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Internal Human Contract offers a way in which these very motivations can be 
understood and harnessed by reflecting on the use of one’s biological organs. This shifts 
the paradigm of human rights from a social contract worldview to an internal or personal 
contract worldview which looks at human rights as stemming from the interaction 
between rights and the self rather than rights between human beings. As such, the 
Internal Human Contract can be placed within the discourse in the following ways. 
 
Firstly, it is able to tackle the human desires and motivations which can be an obstacle 
for implementing human rights in the world. As I have outlined in chapter one, the root 
of violence and conflict stems from a lack of control of one’s temperament. If human 
beings are constantly empowered to act and claim their rights in our period of 
postmodernity, then there has to be a counterbalance which allows the human being to 
reflect on what he/she is claiming for. Thus, the Internal Human Contract is able to 
address this overlooked area of the discourse by advocating a relationship between rights 
and one’s organs. 
 
Secondly, the Internal Human Contract can add a new set of rights called ‘rights to the 
self’ within existing human rights legislation. Even if this is a kind of soft law, it shows 
that there are a set of rights which human beings can learn in order to nurture the way in 
which they use and create rights. It gives confidence to human beings to develop rights 
to their organs which can enhance their personal and public lives. This also 
accomplishes the task of human rights education which the majority of scholars in 
chapter one advocated. 
 
Thirdly, the Internal Human Contract encourages understanding one’s identity and their 
place in society by reflecting on the purpose of their organs. It can nurture a deeper 
enquiry into one’s existence and this make a human being more than a collector of 
rights. Rather, he/she becomes a reflective person, constantly engaged with his/her self 
and how he/she could be a contributing member of society.  
 
Fourth, the Internal Human Contract can be a uniting framework for Islām and the West 
in harmonising the conflicts explained in chapter one. This is in itself would be a 
significant contribution to the discourse which is rooted in conflict and misconception. 
The self and its relationship to one’s biological tools could offer a way in which both 
worldviews can agree on an entity which is universal, crucial to the implenetation of 
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rights, not bound by theological doctrines and can be applied by any human being, 
regardless of his/her religion, race or gender.  
 
Fifth, the Internal Human Contract can be codified in a simple form in order to help 
human beings reflect on the nature of human rights. The purpose of this thesis is not to 
codify the Internal Human Contract but further research in this area is briefly hinted at in 
the conclusion. Nonetheless, if the Internal Human Contract can be put in a form and 
language that is accessible to any human being than it can become a useful tool to 
prevent conflict in society and enhance our understanding of how to implement human 
rights. In this way, the Internal Human Contract could shift the paradigm of human 
rights from a social contract system to one that is orientated towards the self.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has attempted to lay the foundations for the Internal Human 
Contract and specifically the appropriate entry point to the self. By entry point, I mean a 
way in which one can understand and be aware of the self. I have identified our 
biological devices as the entry point precisely because these devices are natural in 
human beings, can be easily identified and have a crucial link between our thoughts and 
the performance of our actions. The identification of biological tools as an entry point to 
the self has so far not been considered in the Islamic-Western human rights discourse. 
As such, our biological tools can be a new way of giving us access to the self in order to 
create and discover rights through ethical reflection. 
 
We discover norms everyday but arguably, the problem is we may not know how to 
formulate duties we understand to these norms. This is where formulating rights to one’s 
biological organs become crucial in order to nurture greater moral awareness in an 
individual. The formation of the duties, very much inspired by Zayn al-‘Ābidīn and 
Kant, has the ability to create a set of coordinates for a person to assess their actions in 
relation to their biological devices such as the hand, tongue, leg or stomach. This is 
important in creating an internal self-regulation which an individual initiates and 
nurtures.  The final stage of my framework is liberation, the notion that the constant 
repetition and understanding of one’s duties to one’s self through one’s biological tools 
may lead to a process of understanding the very root of these duties and norms. It is up 
220 
 
to the individual to discover what this root or source is which may give him/her a vision 
of transcendence. 
 
Together these stages constitute the Internal Human Contract so that the layman can 
access his/her self in a free, clear and accessible manner through his/her biological tools 
and tackle the problem areas which the Islamic-Western human rights discourse does not 
address - namely desire, empowerment and personhood. Echoing my point in chapter 
one, my contention has been that the current human rights culture has actually fostered a 
more autonomy based understanding of what the self is thereby creating an outward 
notion of the self that demands or expects rights. The notion of biological tools as the 
entry point to the self is intended to create an inward notion of the self that creates 
responsibilities to one’s natural devices. This hopefully would create a climate of inner 
responsibility thus carving out a role for the self in the Islamic-Western human rights 
discourse. 
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Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this thesis has sought to explore the role of the self in Islamic-Western 
human rights discourse through a comparative and creative analysis of four texts, 
Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, Nahj al-Balāgha, The Metaphysics of Morals and 
Risālat al-Ḥuqūq. My main argument has been that the Islamic-Western human rights 
discourse needs to be significantly broadened to look at rights from the lens of the self. 
This lens enables a deeper analysis of human desires which are explicitly linked to 
claiming and implementing rights. Without considering the intimate relationship 
between rights and the self, we would arguably be ignoring the root of the human rights 
discourse.  
 
As such, the four texts have provided me with a way in which the self can be defined, 
positioned as an observable entity within ethical dilemmas and given a practical 
framework through the relationship between one’s biological organs and the duties one 
owes to them. Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses and Nahj al-Balāgha have laid the 
foundational meanings of the self whilst The Metaphysics of Morals and Risālat al-
Ḥuqūq have laid the seeds for a practical framework for the self. These four texts have 
enabled me to construct my own framework entitled the ‘Internal Human Contract’, 
which marks the creative contribution of this thesis. My framework explicitly builds 
from the aforementioned ideas present in the texts in order to develop a notion of rights 
that is related to the self. It is here that I argue a valuable role for the self can be carved 
within the Islamic-Western human rights discourse because the Internal Human Contract 
is a framework that can be applied by any individual and recognised as a kind of 
personal legal system.  
 
The roots of this framework stem from combining philosophy, metaphysics, law and 
theology which represents the interdisciplinary methodology of Kierkegaard, ‘Alī b. Abī 
Ṭālib, Kant and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn in their texts. Thus, both in style and substance I have 
intended to show how these four texts can break the oppositional discourse between 
Islām and the West and offer a way in which philosophical ideas can be amalgamated to 
combat contemporary issues – in this case, human rights. In my view this would be an 
attempt to answer the kind of telos human beings may need today in a deconstructionist 
modern environment that leaves the self without a cohesive view of the cosmos.  
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By attaching rights to the self through one’s biological organs, a human being may be 
able to develop greater self-awareness, improved moral conduct and a vision of 
transcendence, regardless of his/her religious background. The self, therefore, can be a 
unifying and universal entity that brings Islām and the West closer together as well as 
being an accessible entity for all human beings. It is also hoped that my thesis 
contributes further research on Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, Nahj al-Balāgha, The 
Metaphysics of Morals and Risālat al-Ḥuqūq in both Islamic and Western scholarship. I 
have attempted to demonstrate the creative potential of these four texts not just by their 
own merit but in particular, the value in comparing specific ideas together. This would 
help to show how the Shī‘ī-Muslim philosophical tradition can positively impact the 
Western philosophical tradition and vice versa. 
 
There are some final implications for the ideas discussed in this thesis and in particular, 
the application of the Internal Human Contract. These would of course require further 
research but they warrant a brief mention only if to show the continuing potential of the 
Internal Human Contract to be applied in areas beyond those discussed in this thesis. 
 
International Law 
 
Although I discussed the Islamic-Western human rights discourse in chapter two, this 
was to provide a necessary context to the self in for it to be practically applied within the 
scope of rights. I confined my discourse to the root of human rights, the self and did not 
pursue an explicitly legal enquiry where I would show how the Internal Human Contract 
could be applied in the machinery of international law. However, there are avenues by 
which the Internal Human Contract could operate within international legislation as a 
kind of soft law mechanism by which human rights could be reflected upon and 
implemented at a personal level.  
 
The idea of international law wasn’t just conceived as a private legal system that would 
operate through courts and government machinery. Dixon and McCorquodale argue 
international law is a system, “by which legal rules are created in order to structure and 
organise societies and relationships. It acknowledges the influence of political, 
economic, social and cultural processes upon the development of legal rules.”555 These 
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influences make international law multifarious and extend its ability accept sources of 
law that are non-positivistic in nature. This is evident when we examine the sources of 
international law which are outlined in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice 1945: international conventions (also known as treaties), international custom, 
general principles of law recognized by civilised nations and finally, judicial decisions 
and teachings of highly qualified publicists. 
 
What is intriguing about these sources is they reflect more the source of our obligations 
rather than formal, positivistic sources of legal content.556 International custom is a 
source of our obligation because the obligation arises out of our political and social 
attitude. General principles of civilized nations are a source of obligations because they 
reflect good practices of a government and people of a particular society. But if they 
represent the source of our obligations, they reflect something much wider than hard and 
soft law. They reflect our ethics, attitudes and culture. These are variables, always 
changing with human progression or regression. With such flexibility within the sources 
of international law, there is a huge scope for manipulation and lack of enforcement. 
This is where I would argue the Internal Human Contract can become a tool of 
international law because it can ably fit within its ethical language and flexible 
machinery. The Internal Human Contract could help implement or nurture human rights 
around the world since this is one of the prime objectives of international law, an 
argument advanced by Lauterpacht.557 
 
Specifically, the Internal Human Contract could be used to reform criminals and young 
offenders as a technique by which to evaluate the use of their biological organs. By a 
criminal understanding the kinds of duties he/she owes to his/her biological organs, a 
more positive use of these organs may result. This reform would have to be implemented 
as a technique or mode of training as part of the rehabilitation process in prisons and 
communities. This may be of particular value to those that are not attached to a religion 
or particular moral code but still intend to introspect on themselves or be required to do 
so. 
                                                          
556
 See Fitzmaurice, G., ‘Some problems regarding the formal sources of international law’, Symbolae 
Verzijl, (1958), p. 153, reproduced in Koskenniemi, M. (ed), Sources of International Law (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2000) and Weil, P., ‘Towards relative normativity in international law’, American Journal of 
International Law 77, (1983) , pp. 413 – 442. 
557
 See Lauterpacht, H., International Law and Human Rights (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd, 1950), 
pp. 68-72. Dixon and McCorquodale also argue that state universal standards ‘would not be achieved 
if states are left to its own devices’, op. cit. p. 125. 
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Here, the Internal Human Contract could shift the paradigm of human rights from a 
social contract system to one that is orientated towards the self. The golden rule has been 
a key influence for human rights as it has inspired the creation of legal and social 
relationships that consider respecting the rights of other human beings as paramount.558 
This is based on the notion of “do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”559 
This principle has influenced the kind of contracts and relationships we form with each 
other since we are required to consider how we wish to be treated whenever we deal 
with another person.560 The kind of contracts that have developed from the golden rule 
are rooted in moral doctrines, religious and/or theological doctrines, moral theories 
emphasising various forms of rationality and conceptions of the ‘good’ and more 
recently, human rights legislation.561 
 
In the case of moral doctrines, the contract or commitment is to a moral norm applicable 
to all, which can be independent of revelation. It is essentially a contract of genuine 
commitment to the golden rule for one’s personal and public life outside of the domain 
of religion.  In the case of religious and/or theological doctrines, the contract is 
exclusively with a Supreme Being or Deity (which may even take the form of 
transcendental and earthly manifestations). So, in Islām and Christianity, one’s 
submission is to God and particularly in Islamic theology (kalam), this is codified as 
tawḥīd (Oneness of God). Here, a personal contract is made or oath between the believer 
and God. Though the golden rule is equally intertwined with God, who is the Source and 
representation of morality itself562, the commitment is to a ‘Being’ that fosters or 
nurtures the golden rule.  
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In the case of moral theories, the contract is to a moral norm, as in the case of a moral 
doctrine but the differences lies in the objective nature of the norm. In a moral doctrine, 
the moral code has been codified, almost to the level of belief; this code is universal and 
accepted by the majority of society. However, in the case of moral theories, the types of 
contracts that result from the golden rule can be wholly personal, subjective, without any 
ontological source, changing and contextual. So, one could subscribe to utilitarianism, 
deontological ethics and virtue ethics or a combination of all of them which would 
manifest the golden rule for a particular situation or outcome. Here, contracts are 
effectively personal views of the kinds of duties human beings owe to themselves and 
society. Finally, in the Islamic-Western human rights discourse, contracts arise 
exclusively based on notions of human worth and natural entitlement and are geared 
towards respecting the rights of other human beings.  
 
The Internal Human Contract, however, does not strictly fit into the aforementioned 
categories because it relates not only to the self but how the self operates in relation to 
biological tools. The golden rule related to how one should act, not what one should act 
with or what drives one’s actions. The Internal Human Contract is specific to one’s self 
or identity and its relation to his/her biological instruments. I would argue it would be 
difficult to follow any sort of golden rule, moral doctrine, moral theory or conception of 
dignity if there is no cultivated self and no understanding or respect for one’s own 
biological devices. Moreover, it also encompasses the aforementioned categories as the 
Internal Human Contract presumes a code which that person considers objectified 
(perhaps similar to the notion of the moral doctrine), a personal oath to that very contract 
(in some respects similar to the oath made to a theological or religious doctrine), a 
theory as to why he/she has subscribed to (the idea that biological tools carry 
significance in moral-decision making) and finally, that this contract contributes to 
his/her dignity as a person (relating to the modern notion of human dignity).  Perhaps 
this could change the way we conceive of international law considering that it is not just 
states that shape international legal and political process but individual actors as well. A 
similar reasoning could be applied to ‘ilm al-fiqh (the science of jurisprudence) which 
due to globalisation has become a kind of Muslim international law with global 
mukallafīn (legally accountable people). Thus there needs to be a system for individuals 
to deeply understand the contracts they form with other people. 
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Bioethics 
 
In the realm of bioethics, the Internal Human Contract could be of particular use in 
discussions on human dignity, particularly when bioethicists remain somewhat hostile to 
contributions stemming from religious texts, arguing that “religious voices no longer 
carry much weight” in deliberations on human dignity.563 Human dignity is often viewed 
as autonomy or constraint, essentially categorising the concept as either a way in which 
human beings should be rightfully empowered (though their own creative, intellectual 
and moral capacities) or conversely, should be restrained (either by their own rational 
agency, social contracts or standards set by the state).564 Some have argued human 
dignity is simply indefinable and others have viewed it in terms of social rank.565 
However, few have explored frameworks which help an individual cultivate his/her 
dignity and in particular, give importance to building a relationship with the self. Here, 
the issue is not necessarily what human dignity is but how to access this so-called 
‘indefinable worth’ which seems to give a unique status to human beings.  
 
As has often been the case in recent years, some such as Macklin have deemed it to be a 
“useless concept”566 and this is especially the case when the concept of the self is 
brought into the discussion. This is because the self is considered to be a non-rational 
entity and therefore is not something tangible or identifiable. Of course, this depends on 
one’s notion of the intellect and where one obtains this ‘worth’ from. This is more 
problematic when one talks of the soul in relation to human dignity because as Kraynak 
has argued, “scientific materialism denies the soul and thereby undermines human 
dignity, but most materialists find they cannot do without the soul and restore it by 
various strategies.”567 My concern is whatever intellectual strategy you employ to restore 
the source of dignity or whichever label you use to categorise it, we still need to ‘access’ 
that very dignity. This is not necessarily a religious issue but a practical one; what is the 
best kind of framework a human being can use to nurture his/her own worth? 
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Here, the Internal Human Contract could be used to shift the discourse on human dignity 
to the notion of ‘rights to the self.’ Perhaps this concept could inform discussions on 
human dignity (whether from the Western or Muslim worldview) by creating a 
framework for the self in which there is an entry point through one’s biological devices, 
which can lead to a greater understanding of personhood and innate worth. 
 
Education 
 
In the realm of education, secular education is being reinvestigated in order to see 
whether the detachment from God, religion and spirituality is an effective manner by 
which to teach students. The empirical approach of secular education which negates 
intuitive and ‘supra-rational’ sources of knowledge also diminishes the creative 
characteristics of students and halts personal moral reflection.568 This is also in light of 
the growing concern of youth misbehaviour and crime committed in the United 
Kingdom showing that the classroom is disconnected to a young person’s social and 
moral environment.569 As a result, there is now discussion using a hybrid ‘secular-
spiritual’ approach to education which does not derive from religious sources but rather 
a humanist epistemology. In describing this approach, Bigger argues:  
 
 “We  need  to  regard  spirituality  inclusively  as  a  quest  for  personal  meaning  at  
the highest level, which includes intellectual, ethical, social, political, aesthetic and other 
such dimensions. It marks a quality of reflection which is holistic in scope, transcends 
material  needs  and  ambitions,  and  transforms  the  personality  in  positive  ways.”570  
 
He further comments,  
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“Spiritual development is a secular, holistic, deep rooted yet dynamic form of 
consciousness, deep personal growth integrating our understanding.  Spiritual education 
is in a real sense education done properly, embracing the whole being of the learner. 
Religion can be a helpful staging  post  but  also  can  become  a  prison  which  by  
dogmatism  inhibits  personal  growth. Today we need deep and dynamic integrative 
thinking as food for new growth and renewal. Global as well as personal well-being 
depends upon it.”571 
 
Such methods are valuable in promoting a broader concept of education yet they are also 
paradoxical because they aim to include consciousness and personal growth without 
acknowledging the ontological sources of these feelings or the knowledge they produce. 
Religious believers would call this Divine inspiration and/or revelation yet these terms 
may be regarded as threatening to secularists. Again, there needs to be an honest 
exchange of what educators want from education and how they wish to nurture students. 
In my view, the Internal Human Contract could provide a viable framework for both 
religious believers and secularists within the fold of education to help nurture greater 
moral awareness and spiritual creativity in students. As I have argued in chapter four, 
the Internal Human Contract does not require religious belief at the outset (though it 
could develop later on) but rather encourages awareness of how to use one’s biological 
organs. This mechanism may help students from all religious and cultural backgrounds 
to carve out a deeper purpose to their lives rooted in a vision of morality and 
transcendence. 
 
Overall, the three sections above give further direction to the research of this thesis and 
hopefully show the creative value in comparing the four texts of Kierkegaard, ‘Alī b. 
Abī Ṭālib, Kant and Zayn al-‘Ābidīn. 
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